Thelander v. Superior Court of Placer County

• Citation: 376 P.2d 571,26 Cal.Rptr. 643,58 Cal.2d 811
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Decision Date: 04 December 1962
• Parties: , 376 P.2d 571 Relph THELANDER et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF PLACER COUNTY, Respondent; The STATE of California, Real Party in Interest. Sac. 7420.

Page 643

26 Cal.Rptr. 643

58 Cal.2d 811, 376 P.2d 571

Relph THELANDER et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF PLACER COUNTY, Respondent;

The STATE of California, Real Party in Interest.

Sac. 7420.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Dec. 4, 1962.

P. M. Barceloux, Burton J. Goldstein, Goldstein, Barceloux & Goldstein and Reginald M. Watt, Chico, for petitioners.

No appearance for respondent.

Robert E. Reed, Robert F. Carlson and Kenneth G. Nellis, Sacramento, for real party in interest.

GIBSON, Chief Justice

Petitioners filed a negligence action in the Superior Court of Placer County against the State of California. ¹ Over objection by petitioners the state's time to plead to the complaint was extended until 30 days after the 91st day after the final adjournment of the 1963 Regular Session of the Legislature. ² Petitioners then brought this proceeding, asking that a writ of certiorari issue and that the order extending time to plead be annulled.

The principal question is whether the order was contrary to section 1054 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which states in part: 'When an act to be done, as provided in this code, relates to the pleadings in the action, * * * the time allowed therefor, unless otherwise expressly provided, may be extended, upon good cause shown, by the judge of the court in which the action is pending, * * * but such extension so allowed shall not exceed thirty (30) days, without the consent of the adverse party.' (Italics added.) ³

The order was directly contrary to the language of section 1054, inasmuch as it extended the time for a period of more than 30 days without the consent of the adverse parties.

The state asserts, however, that the order was sought pursuant to the 1961 legislation relating to governmental immunity (Stats. 1961, ch. 1404, p. 3209) as interpreted in Corning Hospital Dist. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal.2d 488, 20 Cal.Rptr. 621, 370 P.2d 325. We there held that the legislation suspended the right to maintain certain actions against governmental bodies (57 Cal.2d at pp. 492-495, 20 CalRptr. at p. 623, 370 P.2d at p. 327), and under this legislation petitioners' action cannot be brought to trial prior to the specified date in 1963. The state does not refer to any particular provisions of the 1961 statute but relies on language in Corning at pages 496-497 of 57 Cal.2d, 20 Cal.Rptr. at page 626, 370 P.2d a page 330, which reads: 'The procedure by which the temporary suspension of causes of action is to be accomplished must, of course, give full effect to the legislative intent without impairing the orderly administration of justice. Absent further legislation, cases coming within the statute should be continued and not brought to trial until after the specified date in 1963. In the interim the parties may file pleadings if they so desire and may resort to proceedings for the discovery and perpetuation of evidence in accordance with the sections of the Code of Civil Procedure (§ 2016 et seq.) relating to that subject.' (Italics added.)

The language in Corning cannot properly be interpreted to change the ordinary rules of procedure governing the filing of responsive pleadings. We were there concerned primarily as to whether plaintiffs could file their complaints immediately or must wait until expiration of the suspension period in 1963, and we determined that they could have a choice. We did not declare that when a complaint is filed the adverse party may delay filing a responsive pleading beyond the time permitted by statute. Section 1054 of the Code of Civil Procedure is therefore controlling in the present case.

This conclusion will facilitate discovery proceedings. The failure to file a responsive pleading, of course, will not completely prevent a plaintiff from resorting to such proceedings. For example, depositions may be taken (Code Civ.Proc., § 2016) and interrogatories may be served upon an adverse party (Code Civ.Proc., § 2030). However, until a responsive pleading is filed, the issues to be litigated obviously cannot be ascertained.

Until such time as the Legislature acts to change the substantive law relating to governmental immunity, the decision of this court in Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., 55 Cal.2d 211, 11 Cal.Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457, is the law; its effect was merely suspended by the 1961 legislation (Corning Hosp. Dist. v. Superior Court, supra, 57 Cal.2d at pp. 493-495, 20 Cal.Rptr. at p. 624, 370 P.2d at p. 328). The state, therefore, may properly plead upon the basis of the existing...