Yoshioka v. Superior Court

• Citation: 58 Cal.App.4th 972,68 Cal.Rptr.2d 553
• Decision Date: 27 October 1997
• Docket Number: No. B110759,B110759
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8267, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13,331 David YOSHIOKA, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles, Respondent. Glenn Alan TODD et al., Real Parties in Interest.

Page 553

68 Cal.Rptr.2d 553

58 Cal.App.4th 972, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8267,

97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13,331

David YOSHIOKA, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles, Respondent.

Glenn Alan TODD et al., Real Parties in Interest.

No. B110759.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 7, California.

Oct. 27, 1997.

As Modified Nov. 18, 1997.

Holstein, Taylor & Unitt and Brian C. Unitt, Davis, for Petitioner.

Remcho, Johansen & Purcell, Robin B. Johansen, Joseph Remcho, Kathleen J. Purcell, Sacramento, and Gina M. Calabrese, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Ford, Walker, Haggerty & Behar, Maxine J. Lebowitz, Long Beach, Murchison & Cumming and Richard D. Newman, Santa Ana, for Real Parties in Interest.

Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, Linda A. Cabatic, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Leslie R. Lopez, Shelleyanne W. L. Chang, Deputy Attorneys General, Horvitz & Levy, Christina J. Imre and Jon B. Eisenberg, Encino, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Parties in Interest.

WOODS, Associate Justice.

Petitioner David Yoshioka wishes to collect non-economic damages from Real Parties in Interest Glenn Alan Todd and Judith Todd. He challenges Proposition 213 (passed by voters last November and which prohibits uninsured drivers from collecting such damages) as unconstitutional on due process and equal protection grounds. Amici in support of petitioner further challenge under California's single subject rule. We find that the initiative withstands constitutional muster on all three grounds and therefore must deny his petition for a writ of mandate.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SYNOPSIS

On July 26, 1994, Petitioner David Yoshioka and Real Parties in Interest Glen Alan and Judith Todd were involved in an automobile accident. Petitioner had no auto insurance at the time of the accident. Petitioner filed his complaint in the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles on June, 14, 1995, alleging that he was rear-ended by real parties and subsequently sustained serious injuries.

On November 5, 1996, Proposition 213 was passed by 76.83 percent of the voters of the State of California, creating California Civil Code section 3333.4. This initiative prohibits uninsured motorists and drunk drivers from collecting non-economic damages in any action arising out of the operation or use of a motor vehicle. Further, it prohibits recovery of any damages by felons for injuries caused in the commission of or flight from a felony. (Civ.Code, § 3333.3.) The voter's pamphlet reveals numerous interests the electorate considered in enacting this initiative. Essentially such interests can be narrowed down to two broad concerns the voters took into account: (1) the interest in restoring balance to our justice system and (2) the interest in reducing costs of mandatory automobile insurance.

On November 8, 1996, the subject litigation proceeded to arbitration where an award was made. Both parties filed a request for trial de novo. The matter was set for trial on March 17, 1997. Based on Proposition 213, real party brought a motion in limine to exclude all evidence of general damages and bar all jury instructions on that issue. Judge Piatt granted the motion in limine because he refused to rule that Proposition 213 was unconstitutional in its retroactive application and looked for appellate review on that issue. Further, he granted the real parties' request to amend their answer to add Proposition 213 as an affirmative defense. The trial was continued until May 27, 1997, to afford petitioner the opportunity to file his writ petition.

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandate on April 2, 1997. Subsequently, on May 5, 1997, real parties filed an opposition to the writ. Petitioner replied on May 16, 1997. Amici curiae in support of the petitioner filed a brief on May 14, 1997. Real parties answered on May 27, 1997. Amici in support of real parties (the Attorney General and the Association of California Insurance Companies) filed briefs on June 12, 1997. The constitutionality of this initiative is now before this court for review.

DISCUSSION

Petitioner contends that both the retroactive and prospective applications of Proposition 213 are unconstitutional because the initiative violates his rights of (1) due process and (2) equal protection under the federal and state Constitutions. Further, amici in support of petitioner contend this initiative is invalid because it violates California's Single Subject Rule. Accordingly, petitioner wishes to collect both economic and non-economic damages for injuries suffered from real parties in interest. We disagree with petitioner's contentions that this state initiative is unconstitutional in either its retroactive or prospective form and application.

I. RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF PROPOSITION 213

Courts addressing retroactive application of initiatives generally follow a two step analysis. (Gutierrez v. De Lara (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1575, 1578, 234 Cal.Rptr. 158.) First, the court must determine whether the initiative has been retroactively applied. If so, the court must then decide if the people intended that the statute be so applied. Upon a finding of intent, the initiative may be enacted unless it is prohibited by state or federal constitutional provisions. (Ibid.) Therefore, we first look at the retroactive application itself and then determine if its application is constitutional.

Proposition 213 provides: "This act shall be effective immediately upon its adoption by the voters. Its provisions shall apply to all actions in which the initial trial has not commenced prior to January 1, 1997." (Italics added.)

This initiative was applied to petitioner by the concept of secondary retroactivity. Secondary retroactivity is best defined by our Supreme Court as "retroactivity which affects the future legal consequences of past transactions." (20th Century Ins. Co. v. Garamendi (1994) 8 Cal.4th 216, 281, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 807, 878 P.2d 566.) The court noted that this type of retroactivity "does not offend any laws, including the United States and California Constitutions." ¹ (Id. at p. 282, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 807, 878 P.2d 566.) Petitioner's case involves an accident occurring prior to Proposition 213's passage, yet encompasses a trial set following its effective date. He filed a complaint with the court against real parties for an accident which occurred on July 26, 1994. Proposition 213, passed in November of 1996, has prevented him from seeking non-economic relief because this matter was set for trial on March 17, 1997. It is clear that the initiative applies to petitioner in a retroactive manner.

Since the initiative does not expressly state that it will apply retroactively, we must Generally, "[t]he presumption is very strong that a statute was not meant to act retrospectively, [wherein] [i]t ought not receive such a construction unless the words used are so clear, strong and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied." (U.S. Fidelity Co. v. Struthers Wells Co. (1908) 209 U.S. 306, 314, 28 S.Ct. 537, 539, 52 L.Ed. 804.)

                determine the electorate's intent.  (Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1212, 246 Cal.Rptr. 629, 753 P.2d 585;  Russell v. Superior Court (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 810, 814, 230 Cal.Rptr. 102.)   In order to determine such intent it is best to look at the language of the initiative itself.  (See Feckenscher v. Gamble (1938) 12 Cal.2d 482, 500, 85 P.2d 885;  where our Supreme Court held that the measure of damages which applied at the time of the accrual of the cause of action was inapplicable due to the legislative amendment of Civil Code section governing that measure of damages.)
                

Petitioner argues that the words, "provisions shall apply to all actions in which the initial trial has not commenced prior to January 1, 1997 " are susceptible to an alternate interpretation that the voters wanted to give uninsured motorists sufficient time to bring their case to trial if the case was already pending. Therefore, the electorate did not express a clear intent to apply the statute retroactively. He contends that the informed voters who understand the court system is incredibly backed up, would not adopt an exception to the retroactive application for only those cases which, out of mere luck or coincidence, happen to already have a trial date before January 1, 1997. Therefore, it would be illogical to conclude that such voters intended to apply the statute retroactively. Further, the uninformed voters, who are unaware of the civil litigation process, may have thought those pending cases could all be set for trial within two months time.

However, assuming such an alternative interpretation is possible upon examination of this particular phrase, petitioner fails to consider other sections of the initiative that support a clear finding of retroactive intent. Real parties point out that the initiative specifically states,

"A YES vote on this measure means: Uninsured drivers or drivers convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of an accident could no longer sue someone who was at fault for the accident for non-economic losses (such as pain and suffering)."

On its face, the words " no longer" in this context can only be interpreted as the initiative no longer allowing the uninsured to sue for non-economic losses. As real parties contend, "no longer sue" does not logically suggest that one and a half or two years from now, when all cases filed before the initiative are finally resolved, uninsured drivers could no longer sue for such relief. Nor does it imply that this initiative should only apply to accidents that occur post the effective date are finally resolved. It merely states that uninsured motorists can no longer sue following the effective January 1, 1997, date....