Fiske v. People ex rel. Raymond
| Decision Date | 20 December 1900 |
| Citation | 188 Ill. 206,58 N.E. 985 |
| Parties | FISKE v. PEOPLE ex rel. RAYMOND. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Cook county court; O.N. Carter, Judge.
Application by the people, on the relation of S.B. Raymond, against David E. Fiske, for a judgment of sale for a special assessment for a street improvement. From a judgment for relator, defendant appeals. Affirmed.
1. An ordinance requiring that a bidder for work on a public improvement shall agree to hire only members of labor unions in the performance thereof, and that, in all contracts executed by the commissioner of public works on behalf of the city, the contractor shall agree to hire only members of labor unions, is unconstitutional and void, as discriminating between different classes of citizens, and as restricting competition and increasing the cost of work.
2. Where work in making a street improvement was done under a valid contract and ordinance, the invalidity of another ordinance or agreement restricting the hiring of labor to members of labor unions could not be urged against a judgment of sale for a special assessment therefor.
3. A provision in the specifications to a contract for work on a street improvement prescribing the length of time which shall constitute a day's work, and making the contractor liable to forfeit the contract if laborers were compelled or allowed to work more than such time in one day, is void and unconstitutional, as infringing on the freedom of contract.
4. Objections to a contract for a street improvement cannot be urged for the first time on appeal from a judgment of sale for a special assessment.
5. A variance between the description of a street improvement in the estimate of the cost, and the description of the improvement in the ordinance therefor, is a part of the proceedings anterior to the judgment of confirmation of an assessment, which, under the statute, if not complained of in the proceeding for confirmation, cannot be set up on the application for judgment of sale.
This is an appeal from a judgment of sale of certain lots located in Cook county, for the nonpayment of a special assessment levied by the city of Chicago for curbing, grading, and paving South Ashland avenue from the street-railway right of way on West Twelfth street to the street-railway right of way on Twenty-Second street. The appellant filed objections to the entry of judgment and order of sale against his property, which objections were all overruled. Judgment was entered as prayed for in the application of the county collector. This appeal is prosecuted from said judgment.George W. Wilbur, for appellant. Charles M. Walker, Corp. Counsel, and Denis E. Sullivan, Asst. Corp. Counsel, for appellee.
1. The first objection urged by the appellant is that a certain ordinance passed by the city of Chicago on October 17, 1898, is unconstitutional and void. Among the objections to the entry of judgment and order of sale was objection No. 12, which is as follows:
“The county court has no jurisdiction herein, because the original assessment proceedings, which are the basis of the application herein, are contrary to the constitution of the state of Illinois, and are therefore void, for the reason that on, to wit, the 17th day of October, 1898, the city council of the city of Chicago, in said county and state, passed a certain ordinance, as follows:
“ ‘An ordinance to provide for the hiring of union labor in public works.
“ ‘Be it ordained by the city council of the city of Chicago:
“ ‘Section 1. That the bids or proposals for doing any public work or making any public improvement shall contain a clause whereby the bidder shall agree to hire only such persons in the performance of such work as are members of labor unions, if there are labor unions in the city of Chicago comprising sufficient persons of the class necessary for the performance of such work; and, in all contracts executed by said commissioner of public works on behalf of the city, the contractor shall agree to hire only such persons in the performance of said work as are members of labor unions, if there are labor unions in the city of Chicago comprising sufficient persons of the class of labor necessary for the performance of such work; and, in all such contracts, the right shall also be reserved to the commissioner of public works, in addition to those already prescribed, to rescind such contracts for non-compliance with the provisions herein named, and to declare such contract forfeited.
“
-Which said ordinance is in full force and effect. That by virtue of said ordinance open competition was restricted, and the cost of said improvement greatly enhanced, to the prejudice of this objector.”
Undoubtedly the ordinance of October 17, 1898, is unconstitutional and void. The requirement that the bidder for doing the work on a public improvement shall agree to hire only members of labor unions in the performance of such work, and that, in all contracts executed by the commissioner of public works on behalf of the city, the contractor shall agree to hire only members of labor unions, amounts to a discrimination between different classes of citizens, and lays down a rule which restricts competition and increases the cost of work. Under our constitution and laws, any man has a right to employ a workman to perform labor for him, whether such workman belongs to a labor union or not; and any workman has a right to contract for the performance of labor, irrespective of the question whether he belongs to a labor union or not. Such ordinances and contracts as the ordinance of October 17, 1898, have been recently held to be unconstitutional and void, in the cases of Adams v. Brenan, 177 Ill. 194, 52 N.E. 314, and Holden v. City of Alton, 179 Ill. 318, 53 N.E. 556. These cases are conclusive as to the invalidity of this ordinance. But the objection here made was properly overruled by the court below, because there is nothing in this record to show that anything was done under the ordinance in question, either to the injury of the appellant, or otherwise. The ordinance of October 17, 1898, is not shown to have been approved by the mayor, or to have been in force when this objection was made. But, whether it...
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