Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.
Decision Date | 13 February 1984 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 73-1328. |
Citation | 580 F. Supp. 1114 |
Parties | Charles GOODMAN, et al. v. LUKENS STEEL COMPANY, et al. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
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William Ewing, Arnold Borish, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiffs.
Robert M. Landis, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendants.
David Silberman, Philadelphia, Pa., for Union.
Plaintiffs in this class action alleging racial discrimination in employment seek equitable and monetary relief against both the defendant employer, Lukens Steel Company, and the defendant labor unions, the International and two local unions of the United Steelworkers of America. This Opinion addresses liability issues.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., is "a broad remedial measure, designed `to assure equality of employment opportunities.'" Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 1783-84, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1823, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)). The Act bars not only overt employment discrimination— discrimination by disparate treatment —but also policies that are superficially neutral but discriminatory in operation— discrimination by disparate impact. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 853, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). Both types of discrimination are here alleged both by the individual plaintiffs and by the plaintiff class.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1854 n. 15, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). The plaintiffs must show "not only `the existence of disparate treatment but also that such treatment was caused by purposeful or intentional discrimination.'" Smithers v. Baular, 629 F.2d 892, 895 (3d Cir.1980) (citations omitted).
The standard method of proving disparate treatment entails three steps. First, plaintiffs must establish a prima facie case. Next, the employer must articulate a legitimate business justification for its actions. If the employer does so, plaintiffs must then demonstrate that the proffered justification is merely a pretext for intentional discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804, 93 S.Ct. at 1825. Although the burden of production thus shifts from the plaintiff to the defendant and back again, the burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiffs throughout. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). In the Title VII context, the term "prima facie case" refers to the "establishment of a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" rather than the presentation of "enough evidence to permit the trier of fact to infer the fact at issue." Id. at 254 n. 7, 101 S.Ct. at 1094 n. 7 (1981).
The McDonnell Douglas plaintiffs alleged only discrimination in hiring; the particular elements of the prima facie case there identified have been modified to cover discrimination in other contexts. See B. Schleir & P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law (2d ed. 1983) 1318-1321 nn. 82-90 (collecting and discussing cases on discharge, discipline, promotion, transfer, layoff, training, and job assignment).
Although an individual alleging disparate treatment is free to introduce direct evidence of a discriminatory intent, as a practical matter plaintiffs typically must rely on indirect evidence from which an inference of such intent can be drawn. Frequently, plaintiffs argue that the employer applied various policies differently to black and white employees; in response, the employer attempts to show that those comparisons are faulty because of factual dissimilarities. As trier of fact, the trial court must resolve these competing claims. See, e.g., Worthy v. U.S. Steel Corp., 616 F.2d 698, 702-03 (3d Cir.1980).
At least in theory, the McDonnell Douglas analysis is also applicable to class actions alleging a "pattern or practice" of classwide disparate treatment. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 355, 97 S.Ct. at 1854. The class plaintiffs must initially demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a pattern of disparate treatment exists and is the defendant's regular and standard operating procedure. Id. Such evidence frequently takes the form of statistical data. See Hazelwood School District v. U.S., 433 U.S. 299, 307-08, 97 S.Ct. 2736, 2741, 53 L.Ed.2d 768 (1977); Wilmore v. City of Wilmington, 699 F.2d 667 (3d Cir.1983). Once plaintiffs have produced such data, the defendant may rebut by showing flaws in the data or the statistical analysis. Absent a persuasive rebuttal, the court will infer that all class members were discriminated against in the fashion alleged.
The second, and more prevalent, theory of liability under Title VII allows plaintiffs to challenge employment policies which, though neutral on their face, are discriminatory in operation. These "disparate impact" cases do not require proof of discriminatory motive. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432, 91 S.Ct. at 854. In Griggs and its progeny, especially Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975), the Supreme Court has articulated the procedure for proving such claims. The plaintiffs must first establish a prima facie case that the challenged procedure does in fact have a substantial adverse impact. Plaintiffs must also demonstrate "a causal connection between the challenged policy or regulation and a racially unequal result." EEOC v. Greyhound, 635 F.2d 188, 193 (3d Cir.1980). The defendants can then attempt to demonstrate that those statistics are deficient and thus insufficient to make out a prima facie case. Dothord v. Tawlindson, 433 U.S. 321, 331, 97 S.Ct. 2720, 2727, 53 L.Ed.2d 786 (1977).
If plaintiffs succeed in establishing a prima facie case, defendant must justify the challenged policy as job-related or otherwise a business necessity. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425, 95 S.Ct. at 2375. The burden of persuasion, however, remains with the plaintiffs; defendant's rebuttal burden is simply to "come forward with evidence to meet the inference of discrimination raised by the prima facie case." Croker v. Boeing Co., 662 F.2d 975, 991 (3d Cir.1981 (en banc)). If the defendant does so, plaintiffs must then show that "a feasible yet less onerous alternative exists." Id. (citations omitted). It has long been established that properly validated job-related tests are permissible even if they have a disparate impact. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433-36, 91 S.Ct. at 854-856. Similarly, a bona fide seniority system—one which was not adopted with intent to discriminate—does not violate Title VII even though it has a discriminatory effect. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 348-55, 97 S.Ct. at 1861-1864.
Section 1981 prohibits intentional racial discrimination in making and enforcing contracts and in securing "equal benefit of all laws and proceedings." 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Proof of discriminatory intent is crucial; the provision "does not extend to facially neutral conduct having the consequences of burdening one race more than the other." Croker, 662 F.2d at 989. Although disparate impact thus is not itself actionable under § 1981, evidence of such impact "may be an important factor in proving racially discriminatory intent." Id.
Variations on the McDonnell Douglas formula for making out a prima facie case have also been applied in § 1981 cases. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Birmingham Board of Education, 648 F.2d 950, 955 (5th Cir.1981); Tagupa v. Board of Directors, 633 F.2d 1309, 1312 (9th Cir.1980). As under Title VII, once the plaintiffs have made a prima facie case, defendant must show a legitimate reason for its actions; thereafter, pla...
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