Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 4602

Decision Date22 June 1978
Docket NumberNo. 4602,4602
Citation580 P.2d 1123
PartiesCHRYSLER CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, Appellant (Defendant below), Floyd A. Rummell, III (Defendant below), v. Eddie TODOROVICH, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
CourtWyoming Supreme Court

Michael J. Sullivan, of Brown, Drew, Apostolos, Barton & Massey, Casper, Glenn Parker, of Hirst & Applegate, Cheyenne, for appellant.

G. L. Spence, of Spence & Moriarity, Casper, for appellee.

Before GUTHRIE, C. J., and McCLINTOCK, RAPER, THOMAS and CALLAHAN, D. J. *

THOMAS, Justice.

This appeal presents troublesome questions involving the duty of a manufacturer to anticipate collisions when designing and constructing automobiles, and the apportionment of damages and the application of the contribution statutes between an automobile manufacturer and the driver of a following automobile when an automobile seat breaks from the force of a rear end collision, causing an indivisible injury. These questions are unique in Wyoming, and the combination of the latter two apparently is rare in other jurisdictions. Other issues relating to the loss of elective office as a basis for establishing damages for personal injury; the denial of cross-examination of an expert witness by reference to federal standards for automobile seats; the contributory negligence of the driver who was hit from behind; the question of whether the trial court permitted trial in an atmosphere of passion and prejudice; and the proper preservation of instructional error also must receive attention in the course of this opinion.

Chrysler Corporation seeks reversal of a judgment in the amount of $400,000 which was entered in favor of Eddie Todorovich. The judgment was premised on the verdict of the jury which found Chrysler liable for personal injuries sustained by Todorovich, and assessed the amount required to compensate him for his injuries at $450,000. Those injuries were sustained when the vehicle driven by Todorovich was struck from the rear by one driven by Floyd A. Rummell, III. The trial court reduced the judgment to $400,000 because Rummell had paid $50,000 to Todorovich in settlement of Todorovich's claim against him. We conclude that prejudicial error occurred at the trial with respect to the cross-examination of the plaintiff's expert witness and testimony ascribing the loss of an elective office to the injuries sustained by Todorovich. We will reverse and remand for a new trial in accordance with this opinion.

The facts surrounding the collision and the injuries sustained by Todorovich are not complicated. On June 12, 1973, Todorovich, who then was the Sheriff of Hot Springs County, Wyoming, was driving his 1969 Chrysler four-door automobile in a southerly direction on State Highway 130. He was accompanied by Gerald A. Stack, County Attorney for Hot Springs County, Wyoming, who occupied the right front seat. They had been traveling at speeds between 55 and 60 m. p. h., and for a number of miles had been followed by Rummell, who was driving a 1973 GMC Suburban. The distances between these two vehicles varied from 100 yards to as much as a quarter of a mile.

At a point approximately eleven miles north of Saratoga, Wyoming, Todorovich recognized a funeral procession approaching him from the south. He then was on the crest of a rise in the terrain over which the highway was built, and he slowed his vehicle, not by applying the brakes, but by permitting it to decelerate. At that time he dropped out of Rummell's sight. Rummell then was observing the funeral procession, and he did not slacken his speed. When he next observed the Todorovich vehicle it was immediately in front of him, and he struck it from the rear causing extensive damage to the vehicle and injuries to Todorovich.

The expert witness who testified about the accident for Todorovich assumed a speed differential of 20 m. p. h. between the two vehicles when the collision occurred. It was discovered that a seat bracket on the left front seat had broken, and that, because of the broken bracket the seat, in such a collision, would rotate and tilt into positions different from its normal position. The injuries sustained by Todorovich consisted essentially of a herniated disc caused by what the medical expert described as hyperextension of the lumbar spine, and in the process permanent damage resulted to nerve fibers in his spine. The experts opined that the hyperextension of the lumbar spine was more pronounced than and different from that which would have occurred had the seat bracket not failed. Stack was not injured, and in the presentation of his case Todorovich attached significance to the fact that a similar seat bracket on the seat occupied by Stack did not fail in the accident.

Todorovich's action originally was filed against Rummell. Later Chrysler Corporation was joined as a defendant. The week preceding the date set for the trial a settlement was made between Rummell and Todorovich pursuant to which Rummell agreed to pay Todorovich $50,000. The details of the settlement arrangement, beyond the amount paid and the dismissal of the Todorovich action against Rummell, are not known to us. When Chrysler learned of the settlement it proceeded to serve and file a cross-claim against Rummell. It was served by mail the Friday before the Monday on which the case was set for trial. The cross-claim actually was filed with the court on the morning the trial was scheduled to begin. The cross-claim was premised upon a claimed right by Chrysler to be indemnified, although it apparently would encompass a claimed right to contribution, in the event that Chrysler were found liable to Todorovich. Todorovich moved for dismissal of the cross-claim, and that relief was granted by the trial court. The dismissal of the cross-claim was premised upon an apparent understanding among the court and counsel for Todorovich and Chrysler that the issue of relative fault between Rummell and Chrysler would be submitted to the jury in any event.

The case then proceeded to trial with only Todorovich and Chrysler as parties. The evidence, very generally, involved the presentation of the facts surrounding the collision between Rummell and Todorovich; the manner of design and construction of the automobile seat by Chrysler; expert testimony describing an alternative and safer design and construction; and expert testimony relating to the injuries and resulting damages of Todorovich. During the cross-examination of the expert witness who testified on behalf of Todorovich with respect to the failure of the automobile seat and the alternative safer design and method of construction counsel for Chrysler attempted to inquire of the expert about Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 207 (concerning seat design standards) which was promulgated by the Highway Traffic Safety Administration under the authority of the National Traffic Safety Administration under the authority of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 718, 15 U.S.C., § 1381, et seq. The utilization of the federal standard for purposes of cross-examination was not permitted by the trial court. Furthermore, the court ruled that the standard could not be admitted as part of Chrysler's case in chief.

When Gerald A. Stack testified about the accident, he also was qualified, over the objection of Chrysler, as an expert with respect to politics in Hot Springs County, Wyoming. As an expert, he was permitted to give his opinion that Todorovich was not reelected as sheriff in Hot Springs County in the general election of 1974 because of the injuries he received in this accident. The record does not disclose proof of the salary of the sheriff of Hot Springs County.

After the evidence was closed the district judge ruled, as a matter of law, that Todorovich was not negligent in the operation of his vehicle at the time of this collision. He therefore refused to submit the issue of Todorovich's negligence to the jury under the Wyoming comparative negligence statute. 1 Among the instructions which were given to the jury were the following:

"Instruction No. 9

"This is a case which involves a theory known in the law as the 'Second Accident' concept. In a 'Second Accident' case, a manufacturer is charged with designing and manufacturing a vehicle which will not aggrevate (sic) or enhance the occupant's injuries after an intervening impact.

"Instruction No. 10

"In ascertaining the 'purpose for which it was manufactured' or the 'intended use,' you are instructed that when a manufacturer makes automobiles for sale to the public, the law charges him, Chrysler, in this case, with knowing and foreseeing that some of these automobiles may be involved in collisions, and the manufacturer must use reasonable care in design of an automobile with such knowledge."

"Instruction No. 18

"You are instructed that the defendant, Chrysler, is liable if you find that the alleged manufacturer defect was one of the causes of the injury to the plaintiff, even though you also believe that the negligence of Mr. Rummell was a contributing factor in causing the accident.

"Instruction No. 19

"Any design defect not causing the accident would not subject the Defendant Chrysler to liability for the entire damage, but the manufacturer would be liable only for that portion of the damage or injury caused by the defective design over and above the damage or injury that probably would have occurred as a result of the impact or collision absent the defective design.

"Instruction No. 20

"THE COURT INSTRUCTS THE JURY that, in the jury's deliberations, the jury shall make the following determinations: What percentage of the plaintiff's injury is attributable to the negligence of Chrysler, if any, and what percentage of plaintiff's injury is attributable to the negligence of Rummel, (sic) if any.

"The jury is further instructed to fill in the following blanks opposite the names of Chrysler and Rummel (sic) to correspond to the jury's findings...

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