Kephart v. Institute of Gas Technology
Decision Date | 24 August 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 77-2055,77-2055 |
Citation | 581 F.2d 1287 |
Parties | 17 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1461, 17 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8573 Wilbur L. KEPHART, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INSTITUTE OF GAS TECHNOLOGY, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Arthur W. Friedman, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellant.
James W. Gladden, Jr., Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellee.
Before FAIRCHILD, Chief Circuit Judge, CUMMINGS and BAUER, Circuit Judges.
The central issue presented in this appeal is whether the 180-day notice requirement of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act may be tolled on equitable grounds. We hold that it may.
On July 15, 1976, Wilbur Kephart commenced an action against the Institute of Gas Technology, alleging that he had been discharged by IGT in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. The district court found, however, that Kephart had failed to comply with the Act's requirement that notice of intent to sue be filed within 180 days of the " alleged unlawful practice," 1 and, on this ground, entered summary judgment for the defendant.
At the heart of the trial court's ruling was its conclusion that the 180 day notice requirement of § 626(d) is a jurisdictional prerequisite that is not subject to equitable tolling. In recent years, however, courts of appeal have generally taken the opposite view, holding § 626(d) to be more in the nature of a statute of limitation and therefore subject to equitable modification. See, e. g., Bonham v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 569 F.2d 187 (3rd Cir. 1978); Gabriele v. Chrysler Corporation, 573 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1978); Dartt v. Shell Oil Company, 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976), Aff'd by an equally divided court, 434 U.S. 99, 98 S.Ct. 600, 54 L.Ed.2d 270 (1977).
569 F.2d at 193 (citations omitted). See also Dartt, supra at 1260.
We find this view persuasive, particularly in light of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978 (Public Law 95-256, enacted April 6, 1978). Significantly, the amended version of the Act retains the 180 day filing requirement, 2 but the "Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference" clarifies the requirement as follows:
Conf. Re. H.R.Rep. No. 95-950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 12 (1978), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, p. ----. At the very least, this explanation reflects a Congressional understanding that a construction of § 626(d) which permits equitable tolling is consistent with the larger design and purposes of the Act. We conclude, therefore, that the 180 day notice requirement of the ADEA is not a strict jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court and that it is thus subject to equitable modification when necessary to effect the remedial purposes of the statute.
The question thus becomes whether the plaintiff has alleged facts which, if accepted as true, are sufficient to establish an equitable basis for tolling the time limitations of § 626(d). In particular, we must decide whether Kephart's claim that IGT failed to post any notice which advised employees of the existence of the Act would, if proven at trial, provide sufficient equitable grounds for tolling the 180 day requirement. We hold that it would.
Section 627 of the Act provides:
"Every employer . . . shall post and keep posted . . . upon its premises a notice to be prepared or approved by the Secretary setting forth information as the Secretary deems appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this chapter."
Such notice, moreover, must be posted in a prominent place on the employer's premises. 29 C.F.R. § 850.10 (1976). It is quite apparent that Congress imposed this requirement on employers to insure that protected employees would be fully informed of their rights under the ADEA. And it is equally apparent that this end would not be realized if employers were free to breach the posting requirement without penalty. It is our conclusion, therefore, that the 180 day notice limitation of § 626(d) is tolled by the employer's failure to post...
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