Dickerson v. U.S. Steel Corp.
| Citation | 582 F.2d 827 |
| Decision Date | 01 September 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 77-2419,Nos. 77-2419,AFL-CIO,77-2420,No. 77-2420,77-2419,s. 77-2419 |
| Parties | 17 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1589, 17 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8597 Moses DICKERSON, Millard Starling, and Eddie Williams, on their own behalf and on behalf of others similarly situated v. UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, Appellant in, and International, United Steelworkers of America (), and Local 4889, UnitedSteelworkers of America (), and Local 5092, United Steelworkers ofAmerica (), and Local 5030, United Steelworkers of America (), and Local 5116,United Steelworkers of America (), and Local 7246, United Steelworkersof America (). Appeal of UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA et al., in |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit) |
Henry T. Reath, Carl N. Martin, II, Thomas P. Preston, Duane, Morris & Heckscher, Philadelphia, Pa., S. G. Clark, Jr., Gen. Atty. Labor, U. S. Steel Corp., Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellant, U. S. Steel Corp.
Robert M. Weinberg, Michael H. Gottesman, Julia Penny Clark, David M. Silberman, Bredhoff, Gottesman, Cohen & Weinberg, Washington, D. C., Bernard Kleiman, Chicago, Ill., Carl B. Frankel, Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellants, United Steelworkers of America (AFL-CIO).
Harriet N. Katz, Michael Churchill, Prather G. Randle, Alice W. Ballard, Samuel, Ballard & Hyman, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellees.
Before ROSENN and HUNTER, Circuit Judges, and KUNZIG, Court of Claims Judge. *
This is an interlocutory appeal which presents us with the novel question of whether a class action provides an appropriate forum for adjudicating the individual claims of class members who are not named plaintiffs but who testified in support of a class claim held to be without merit. The genesis of this appeal lies in a broad-based class action race discrimination suit brought by two former employees of United States Steel Corporation ("the Company") at its Fairless Works in Bucks County, Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs, Moses Dickerson and Eddie Williams, filed this action in June 1973 on behalf of themselves and all other black employees and black applicants for employment at the Fairless Works. The complaint alleged racial discrimination in the Company's employment practices and in the practices of the representative union, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, and five of its local unions (collectively "the Union") in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e Et seq. and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. In addition, the plaintiffs asserted individual claims and sought injunctive and back pay relief.
The district court certified the broad class in September 1974, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2). The certified class consisted of: a. all blacks now employed or who might be employed in the future by the Company at its Fairless Works plant; all blacks who were employed by the company from July 2, 1965, to the present date, but who are no longer employed there; and all blacks who unsuccessfully sought employment at the Fairless Works plant at any time between July 2, 1965, and the present date; b. all blacks who are represented, or who might be represented in the future by defendant union at the Fairless Works plant; and all blacks who were represented by defendant union at the Fairless Works plant from July 2, 1965, to the present date.
In April 1976 the defendants moved to decertify the class. The district court denied the motion, but expressly reserved the right to reexamine the class prior to trial to safeguard manageability. In August 1976, as part of its final pretrial orders, the district court granted in part U. S. Steel's motion to decertify by reconstituting the class, narrowing it to the following: a. All blacks now employed or who might be employed in the future as hourly production and maintenance employees by the Company at its Fairless Works plant; and all blacks who were employed as hourly production and maintenance employees by the Company from July 2, 1965, to the present date, but who are no longer employed there; b. All blacks within the class identified in sub-paragraph (a) who are represented, or who might be represented in the future by the Union at the Fairless Works plant; and all blacks within the class identified in sub-paragraph (a) who were represented by the Union at the Fairless Works plant from July 2, 1965, to the present date.
During this pretrial period, plaintiffs conducted extensive discovery relating to class-wide claims of discrimination in the Fairless Works, gathering both statistical information to be used by plaintiffs' experts and individual case studies of differing treatment. Defendants conducted similar statistical studies, deposed plaintiffs' experts, and deposed many members of the plaintiff class who had been identified by plaintiffs in either interrogatories or pretrial statements as suffering from discrimination.
Pursuant to the court's pretrial orders, the plaintiffs filed a pretrial statement summarizing the subject of the testimony to be adduced. Each witness was limited at trial to testimony of what had appeared in the summary.
The plaintiffs stated that they would prove class-wide discrimination of the following types:
(1) initial assignment of blacks to undesirable jobs;
(2) exclusion from crafts by discriminatory tests;
(3) exclusion from first crews and newly opened facilities;
(4) exclusion from promotions;
(5) restrictive transfer opportunities;
(6) excessive discipline;
(7) failure by the union to process grievances;
(8) maintenance of a hostile atmosphere to blacks; and
(9) violation of the steel industry consent decree.
The case proceeded to trial November 29, 1976, plaintiffs presenting the principal class-wide claims by means of expert testimony based on plant historical and statistical information. In addition, the live testimony of thirty class members and the deposition testimony of thirty-two others provided evidence in support of alleged specific instances of discrimination, which ostensibly was offered to buttress the class-wide claims. After fifty-eight trial days over a period of seven months, the plaintiffs finally rested their case.
Upon the close of plaintiffs' case, the Company and the Union separately moved for involuntary dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). In response the district court issued an order and opinion on July 25, 1977, Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 439 F.Supp. 55 (E.D.Pa.1977), in which the court held, Inter alia :
1. Plaintiffs established a prima facie case of racial discrimination as to the following class-wide claims: 1
a) initial assignments;
b) access to craft jobs;
c) promotion to management jobs; and
d) transfers to new facilities.
2. Plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination for their other claims. 439 F.Supp. at 71-75.
3. The named plaintiffs established a prima facie case of racial discrimination in various forms. 439 F.Supp. at 90-93. In addition, the district court Sua sponte reviewed the testimony of the class members who had testified, and determined that a number of these witnesses, about fifty in number, had established Prima facie Individual claims of racial discrimination, even though the applicable class-wide claims of racial discrimination were dismissed. It is this part of the opinion and order retaining individual claims of class-member witnesses other than named plaintiffs, which is the basis of this interlocutory appeal.
Upon defendant's motion, and without objection by plaintiffs, the district court issue a memorandum and order August 18, 1977, clarifying its earlier opinion and agreeing to certify for appeal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), the propriety of adjudicating in this action the individual claims of the class-member witnesses. The certified question reads:
May an individual class member, who has not presented any evidence of having satisfied the jurisdictional prerequisites in his own name and who is not a named plaintiff in the class action, be entitled to relief for an individual claim of discrimination, if the class-wide claim encompassing his individual claim on that issue is dismissed?
We answer the question in the negative.
The district court's determination to permit adjudication of the individual claim of class-member witnesses in this suit appears to be predicated on grounds of fairness and judicial economy. The court concluded that the testimony of class-member witnesses offered to support the class-wide claims or the individual claims of the named plaintiffs established Prima facie cases of discrimination for many of those witnesses. The court reasoned that it would be a needless formality and a waste of judicial resources to require these witnesses to commence their own lawsuit:
Once the evidence is before the Court, with jurisdiction established by the class representatives, it would be manifestly unjust to ignore clear instances of proven discrimination. To do so would be to overlook an employer's infrequent discrimination, by throwing out claims presented to the Court because they do not together constitute a class-wide case. . . . The Court believes that such a procedure as this is mandated by the remedial nature of Title VII.
The defendants present two main arguments against permitting this suit to continue treating the witnesses as parties. First, the Company argues that the individual claims are barred by Res judicata. Second, both defendants contend that the district court had no inherent power to Sua sponte create individual causes of action for nonparties to this class action. 2
The Company contends that, as a threshold matter, the district court's dismissal of a class-wide claim bars individual lawsuits under that claim by class-member witnesses. The Company reasons that just as a class member can step into the shoes of a class representative who is...
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