Mikula v. Allegheny County of Pa.
Decision Date | 10 September 2009 |
Docket Number | No. 07-4023.,07-4023. |
Citation | 583 F.3d 181 |
Parties | Mary Lou MIKULA, Appellant v. ALLEGHENY COUNTY OF PENNSYLVANIA. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
v.
ALLEGHENY COUNTY OF PENNSYLVANIA.
[583 F.3d 182]
Dina R. Lassow, Esq., National Women's Law Center, Washington, D.C., for Appellant.
Caroline P. Liebenguth, Esq., Office of Allegheny County Law Department, Pittsburgh, PA, for Appellee.
Mary Catherine Roper, Esq., American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, for Amici-Appellants American Civil Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania, National Partnership for Women & Families, and Women's Law Project.
Witold J. Walczak, Esq., American Civil Liberties Union, Pittsburgh, PA, for Amici-Appellants American Civil Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania, National Partnership for Women & Families, and Women's Law Project.
Katherine Y. Cheung, Esq., Norris, Tysse, Lampley & Lakis, Washington, D.C., for Amici-Appellees Equal Employment Advisory Counsel and Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America.
Before: BARRY, SMITH and GARTH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
We granted rehearing in this case to determine the effect of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 on the timeliness of appellant Mary Lou Mikula's Title VII compensation claim. For the following reasons, we will reverse the District Court's decision that the claim is untimely as to the paychecks that Mikula received after June 20, 2006, and remand the matter for further proceedings. In addition, we will reinstate our March 24, 2009 decision as to Mikula's Equal Pay Act claim.
Mikula brought this lawsuit against her employer, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania ("the County"), alleging that it discriminated against her on the basis of gender by failing to give her a pay raise in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) ("Title VII"), and by paying her less than a male employee who performed substantially equal work in violation of the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) ("EPA").1
Mikula was hired as the grants coordinator for the Allegheny County Police Department on March 19, 2001. On September 10, 2004, Mikula drafted a memorandum to Police Superintendent Charles Moffatt, requesting that her job title be changed to "Grants and Project Manager" and that her salary be increased "to be equal or greater than [] Fiscal Manager [Ed Przbyla]." At that time, Przbyla's salary was approximately $7,000 per year higher than was Mikula's. Although Moffatt forwarded the request to the Human Resources department, Mikula never received a response.
Mikula again lobbied for a salary increase and a change in job title in October 2005, and soon thereafter told a Human Resources staff member that "she was not paid enough for what she did." Then, in
March 2006, she filed a complaint with the County's Human Resources department complaining of gender and age discrimination. The complaint asserted, among other things, that a comparative male employee was paid $7,000 more than she was paid and that the discrimination started at the time she was hired. In March 2006, Mikula also filed the current cause of action, which, at that time, included only an EPA claim.
On August 23, 2006, Mikula received a letter from the County's Human Resources department informing her that it had concluded that her allegations of discrimination were unfounded and that her "current title and rate of pay are fair when compared with similar jobs." Thereafter, on April 17, 2007, Mikula filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") claiming that the County violated Title VII by paying her less than a male in her position would receive. After she received a right-to-sue letter, Mikula amended her District Court complaint to include a Title VII claim. The amended complaint alleged that since being hired in 2001, she was "paid substantially less compensation for equal work" performed by similarly situated male employees.
Title VII requires a claimant in Pennsylvania to file a charge with the EEOC within 300 days of an unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Watson v. Eastman Kodak Co., 235 F.3d 851, 854-55 (3d Cir.2000). Accordingly, because Mikula filed her EEOC charge on April 17, 2007, any claims based on challenged acts that occurred before June 20, 2006 are time-barred. Before the parties filed their summary judgment briefs, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618, 127 S.Ct. 2162, 167 L.Ed.2d 982 (2007). In Ledbetter, the Court held that a claimant alleging discrimination based on a pay-setting decision must file a charge with the EEOC within 300 days after the discriminatory decision was made, and, in a shift from prior decisions, determined that the continuing effects of past employment decisions adopted with discriminatory intent do not transform a subsequent neutral employment act (such as a paycheck) into a present violation. Id. at 628-30, 127 S.Ct. 2162.
In its summary judgment brief, the County therefore argued that Mikula's Title VII pay disparity claim was untimely under Ledbetter because the allegedly discriminatory pay decision was made in 2001—when Mikula was hired at lower salary than that of Przbyla. Moreover, although Mikula discovered the pay disparity in 2004 at the latest, she did not file her EEOC charge until 2007—long after the 300-day charging period had expired. Mikula responded by distinguishing her case from Ledbetter, stating that "unlike Ms. Ledbetter," she alleged that the County's August 2006 investigation report was a discrete discriminatory pay decision made within the 300-day charging period.
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the County. It held that under the discovery rule, Mikula's Title VII claim accrued in September 2004 when she discovered the allegedly discriminatory pay discrepancy between herself and Przbyla. Because she did not file her EEOC charge until 2007, the claim was untimely, and to find that the statute of limitation was tolled each time she sought a pay raise would run counter to the Ledbetter decision. The District Court also found that the August 2006 investigation report did not constitute a pay decision.
Mikula appealed pro se from the District Court's order. She argued that the District Court erred in determining that the
August 2006 investigation report was not a discriminatory pay decision, stating that it was the first time that the County had addressed...
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