Selevan v. New York Thruway Authority

• Decision Date: 15 October 2009
• Docket Number: Docket No. 07-0037-cv.
• Citation: 584 F.3d 82
• Parties: Robert SELEVAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, and Anne Rubin, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. NEW YORK THRUWAY AUTHORITY, and John L. Buono, individually and as Chief Executive and Chairman of the New York Thruway Authority, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

584 F.3d 82

Robert SELEVAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, and Anne Rubin, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. NEW YORK THRUWAY AUTHORITY, and John L. Buono, individually and as Chief Executive and Chairman of the New York Thruway Authority, Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 07-0037-cv.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued: September 8, 2008.

Decided: October 15, 2009.

Seth R. Lesser (Andrew P. Bell, on the brief), Locks Law Firm PLLC, New York, NY, for Robert Selevan and Anne Rubin.

Benjamin Gutman (Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General of the State of New York, Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Peter H. Schiff, Senior Counsel, Robert M. Goldfarb, Assistant Solicitor General, on the brief), Office of the Attorney General of the State of New York, Albany, NY, for New York Thruway Authority and John L. Buono.

Before CABRANES, POOLER, and KATZMANN, Circuit Judges.

JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal we consider whether plaintiffs, who challenge an interstate highway toll policy that affords a discount to residents of a particular New York municipality, have stated claims under several provisions of the United States Constitution.

Plaintiffs-appellants Robert Selevan and Anne Rubin (collectively, "plaintiffs"), who are citizens of the United States residing in Nassau County, New York, and Ontario, Canada, respectively, challenge a January 18, 2007 order of the District Court dismissing their suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for lack of standing and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), (6). Plaintiffs' putative class action alleged that an interstate highway toll policy of defendants-appellees New York Thruway Authority and John Buono, Chief Executive and Chairman of the New York Thruway Authority (jointly, "NYTA"), that affords a discount to residents of a particular city violated the dormant Commerce Clause in addition to plaintiffs' rights under the Equal Protection Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the U.S. Constitution. In this appeal we consider whether (1) plaintiffs have Article III standing to challenge NYTA's toll policy; (2) plaintiffs are proper parties to bring suit under the Supreme Court's "prudential standing" doctrine; (3) NYTA has established that it acted as a "market participant," and not as a governmental entity regulating interstate commerce; (4) plaintiffs have stated a claim under the dormant Commerce Clause; (5) plaintiffs have alleged an infringement of their right to travel in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (6) Rubin, a U.S. citizen residing in Canada, stated a claim under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the U.S. Constitution.

BACKGROUND

The Grand Island Bridges (jointly, "Grand Island Bridge" or "the Bridge"), maintained and operated by NYTA, comprise a portion of Interstate-190 that spans Grand Island, New York, a municipality situated in the Niagara River approximately halfway between Niagara Falls, New York and Buffalo, New York. Plaintiffs' amended complaint alleges that, pursuant to NYTA policy, each vehicle crossing the Bridge—except those driven by residents of Grand Island—must pay a toll of 75 cents. Residents of Grand Island, who may establish their status with, among other things, vehicle registration documents, are entitled to pay as little as 9 cents per trip—that is, 66 cents less per trip than non-residents of Grand Island. Prior to initiating this litigation, each plaintiff paid the non-resident toll during trips through New York to New Jersey for shopping, tourism, and other activities.

In March 2006, plaintiffs filed this putative class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Gary L. Sharpe, Judge). In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that NYTA's toll scheme violated several provisions of the United States Constitution: the Commerce Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clauses of Article IV and of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause. Additionally, plaintiffs alleged that NYTA's toll policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the New York Constitution.¹ NYTA moved to dismiss plaintiffs' claims, arguing that plaintiffs lacked standing and that, in any event, plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), (6). The District Court permitted plaintiffs to file an amended complaint prior to taking the motion under consideration.

In a January 18, 2007 memorandum-decision and order, the District Court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice. See Selevan v. N.Y. Thruway Auth., 470 F.Supp.2d 158, 178 (N.D.N.Y.2007). In a thoughtful and careful opinion, the District Court held that plaintiffs lacked standing under the Supreme Court's "prudential standing" doctrine because their claims did not fall within the "zone of interests" protected by (1) the Commerce Clause, see id. at 172, (2) the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see id. at 176, or (3) the Privilege and Immunities Clause of Article IV, see id. at 173-74. The District Court did not consider whether plaintiffs had stated a claim under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the basis that plaintiffs' complaint had done nothing more than recite that provision. See id. at 172 n. 10. The District Court also held that even if plaintiffs had standing to bring their equal protection claim, dismissal was appropriate because they had failed to state a claim. Id. at 176-77. Inasmuch as the Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. Constitution and the New York Constitution are co-extensive, the District Court's equal protection analysis also resulted in the dismissal of plaintiffs' state law claim. See Town of Southold v. Town of E. Hampton, 477 F.3d 38, 52 n. 3 (2d Cir. 2007) ("Because the Equal Protection Clauses of the federal and New York Constitutions are coextensive, our analysis responds to [plaintiff's] claims under each of these provisions." (citation omitted)). Because it dismissed plaintiffs' action in its entirety, the District Court did not consider whether class certification was appropriate.

Selevan and Rubin filed this timely appeal.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the District Court erred in dismissing their action. They argue that they had standing to sue and that they had indeed stated claims under the Commerce Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Only Rubin has appealed the District Court's holding with respect to the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. NYTA contends that we should affirm the District Court's dismissal because plaintiffs lacked Article III standing inasmuch as they did not establish that they had suffered injury-in-fact. Further, NYTA argues that plaintiffs failed to state a claim under any of the constitutional provisions cited in their amended complaint.

We review de novo a district court's dismissal of a complaint for lack of standing, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), and for failure to state a claim, see Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Klein & Co. Futures, Inc. v. Bd. of Trade, 464 F.3d 255, 259 (2d Cir.2006); Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir.2002). In conducting this review, we assume all "well-pleaded factual allegations" to be true, and "determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). "We construe plaintiffs' complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs' favor." Holmes v. Grubman, 568 F.3d 329, 335 (2d Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We first consider whether plaintiffs have established Article III standing. Second, we turn to plaintiffs' claim under the Commerce Clause. In discussing this claim, we address the District Court's holding that plaintiffs' claim should be dismissed under the Supreme Court's "prudential standing" doctrine, and we consider NYTA's argument that plaintiffs' claim was properly dismissed because, under the "market participant" doctrine in the Supreme Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, NYTA was not in fact regulating interstate commerce in charging tolls on the Grand Island Bridge. We then consider whether plaintiffs have stated a claim under the dormant Commerce Clause. Third, we address plaintiffs' contention that they have stated claims under the Equal Protection Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for a violation of their right to travel. Finally, we consider Rubin's contention that she has stated a claim under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.

I. Article III Standing

Under Article III of the Constitution, the jurisdiction of federal courts is limited to the resolution of "cases" and "controversies." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. "In order to ensure that this `bedrock' case-or-controversy requirement is met, courts require that plaintiffs establish their `standing' as `the proper part[ies] to bring' suit." W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co. v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 549 F.3d 100, 106 (2d Cir.2008) (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997)). Specifically, plaintiffs must demonstrate "(1) injury-in-fact, which is a `concrete and particularized' harm to a `legally protected interest'; (2) causation in the form of a `fairly traceable' connection between the asserted injury-in-fact and the alleged actions of the defendant; and (3) redressability, or a non-speculative...