Jones v. Byrnes

• Citation: 585 F.3d 971
• Decision Date: 09 November 2009
• Docket Number: No. 08-1889.,08-1889.
• Parties: Genora JONES, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Clayton Jones, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Scott BYRNES, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)

585 F.3d 971

Genora JONES, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Clayton Jones, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Scott BYRNES, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 08-1889.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: October 9, 2009.

Decided and Filed: November 9, 2009.

ARGUED: Joel B. Sklar, Law Office, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant. Joseph Nimako, Cummings, McClorey, Davis & Acho, P.L.C., Livonia, Michigan, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Joel B. Sklar, Law Office, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant. Joseph Nimako, Cummings, McClorey,

Davis & Acho, P.L.C., Livonia, Michigan, for Appellees.

Before MARTIN, GUY, and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges.

The court delivered a PER CURIAM opinion. MARTIN, J. (pp. 978-80), delivered a separate opinion concurring in the disposition of this case.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Genora Jones brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against two police officers of the Redford Township, Michigan police department¹ on behalf of the estate of her husband, Clayton Jones. The officers were engaged in a high-speed car chase of two men suspected of armed robbery on January 23, 2006 around 5:00 a.m. The suspects extinguished their car's headlights approximately four miles into the chase, presumably to make it more difficult for the police to see their car. The effect was also to make their car difficult for oncoming traffic to see in pre-dawn light. The chase proceeded for approximately two more miles until the fleeing suspects collided with Jones as he turned into a gas station on his way to work. Jones died as a result of the collision.

His estate sued the officers, alleging that they deprived Jones of his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights when the officers failed to suspend the chase after the suspects extinguished the car's headlights. The officers asserted qualified immunity. The district court entered summary judgment for the officers, finding that the officers' actions did not "shock the conscience" as required by County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998). The court further found that, even if the officers' conduct did "shock the conscience" for purposes of a violation of Jones's substantive due process rights, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established at the time of the incident that the officers' conduct violated those rights. The estate appeals, and we AFFIRM.

I.

In the early morning of January 23, 2006, Officers Byrnes and Lentine of the Redford Township police force were in their patrol car. Officer Lentine was the driver. At approximately 5:00 a.m., the officers received a call from dispatch reporting an armed robbery at a 7-11 convenience store and that two black male suspects were fleeing on foot. The officers drove towards the store.

As they approached the 7-11, the officers saw a Ford Taurus traveling at a high speed for that area, between fifty-five and sixty miles per hour. The officers claim that the route the Taurus was driving is a well-known escape route used in previous crimes in that area. Given the proximity to the 7-11, the high speed, and the supposedly well-known escape route, the officers suspected that the Taurus was a getaway car for the robbers.

Officer Lentine turned on the cruiser's overhead lights and fell in behind the Taurus to attempt to pull it over. Instead of pulling over, the Taurus sped up. Officer Lentine turned on the cruiser's siren and advised police dispatch that the suspects were attempting to flee. A video of the chase taken by the police cruiser's on-board camera shows that it was still dark outside at the time. However, there was some ambient light from street lamps and businesses. Traffic was relatively light but the roads were by no means deserted. Pedestrian traffic appears to have been very light.

The chase proceeded with speeds reaching sixty to seventy miles per hour. The Taurus ran several red lights and stop signs, and the officers followed suit. The officers witnessed the driver and passenger of the Taurus throwing objects out of the windows at various points during the chase.² Approximately four miles into the chase, the driver of the Taurus extinguished its headlights and continued to flee.

Although later acknowledging that the driver's decision to turn off the headlights escalated the risk to others, the officers continued the chase. The chase proceeded approximately two miles further. The Taurus approached a red light at the intersection of 9 Mile Road and Lahser in Southfield, Michigan. At that time, Jones was driving in the opposite direction on his way to work. As Jones turned left at the stoplight into a gas station, the Taurus ran the red light and collided with Jones's car. Tragically, Jones died from the collision.

As relevant to this appeal, Jones's estate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the officers' conduct—namely, their decision to continue the high-speed chase after the suspects had turned off the headlights of the Taurus—violated Jones's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to be free from arbitrary deprivation of life and liberty at the hands of state actors. The estate contends that the officers' actions violated various local traffic ordinances as well as numerous departmental policies concerning pursuit. The officers dispute this assertion, and there has been no finding that the officers violated any law or policy.

The officers raised the defense of qualified immunity and, after some discovery, the district court entered summary judgment for the officers. The court found no constitutional violation and, in the alternative, that even if there was a violation the right was not clearly established. Jones v. Lentine, No. 07-12756, 2008 WL 2610245, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50502 (E.D.Mich. June 30, 2008). Jones timely appealed.

II.

This appeal arises from the district court's order granting summary judgment for defendants. We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Blair v. Henry Filters, Inc., 505 F.3d 517, 523 (6th Cir.2007). Summary judgment should be granted only when "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). When we review a motion for summary judgment, we must view all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

III.

Government officials, including police officers, are immune from civil liability unless, in the course of performing their discretionary functions, they violate the plaintiff's clearly established constitutional rights. Hills v. Kentucky, 457 F.3d 583, 587 (6th Cir.2006). Until recently, the analytical sequence in addressing an assertion of the qualified immunity defense was the two-step sequential inquiry set forth in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). Under Katz, a court first had to ask whether, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the facts show that the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right. 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. If the answer to this first question was "no," the analysis proceeded no further because the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of violation of a constitutional right; thus the officer need not even seek the protection of qualified immunity. Id.; Parsons v. City of Pontiac, 533 F.3d 492, 500 (6th Cir.2008); Turner v. Scott, 119 F.3d 425, 429 (6th Cir.1997).

If, however, the facts established a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights, Katz mandated that the next step was to determine whether the constitutional right was "clearly established" at the time of the violation. If not, the officer would be entitled to qualified immunity. Katz, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. Under the "clearly established" inquiry, the question is whether the right was "so `clearly established' that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Parsons, 533 F.3d at 500 (quoting Charvat v. E. Ohio Reg'l Wastewater Auth., 246 F.3d 607, 616 (6th Cir. 2001)). "This inquiry ... must be undertaken in consideration of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition...." Katz, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. Previously, this Court has included a third inquiry to "increase the clarity" of the Katz analysis: "whether the plaintiff offered sufficient evidence to indicate that what the official allegedly did was objectively unreasonable in light of the clearly established constitutional rights." Floyd v. City of Detroit, 518 F.3d 398, 405 (6th Cir.2008) (quoting Estate of Carter v. City of Detroit, 408 F.3d 305, 311 n. 2 (6th Cir.2005)).

However, in Pearson v. Callahan, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009), the Supreme Court recently abandoned Katz's requirement that courts address all qualified immunity inquiries sequentially. Id. at 813. The Court recognized that the lower courts had complained that the sequential mandate was cumbersome and often forced courts to decide constitutional questions unnecessarily, and also recognized that the sequential mandate was impossible to force on any given judge's thought process. On the other hand, the Court found that the Katz inquiry was still appropriate and a correct statement of the test for qualified immunity. Thus, the Court held that "while the sequence set forth [in Katz] is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory. The judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand." I...