People v. Crane

Citation585 N.E.2d 99,145 Ill.2d 520,165 Ill.Dec. 703
Decision Date27 November 1991
Docket NumberNo. 70371,70371
Parties, 165 Ill.Dec. 703 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. David CRANE, Appellee.
CourtSupreme Court of Illinois

Roland W. Burris and Neil F. Hartigan, Attys. Gen., Springfield, and Paul A. Logli, State's Atty., Rockford (Robert J. Ruiz and Rosalyn B. Kaplan, Sols. Gen., and Terence M. Madsen, Jack Donatelli and Steven J. Zick, Asst. Attys. Gen., of Chicago, and Kenneth R. Boyle, William L. Browers and Lawrence M. Bauer, Office of the State's Attys. Appellate Prosecutor, Elgin, of counsel), for the People.

Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, and Gloria A. Morris, Asst. Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Springfield, for appellee.

David Crane, Joliet, pro se.

Justice HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Winnebago County, defendant, David Crane, was found guilty of the beating and burning murder of Robert Gahan, and sentenced to a 40-year term of imprisonment. Defendant appealed to the appellate court, which reversed and remanded defendant's conviction. 196 Ill.App.3d 264, 144 Ill.Dec. 78, 554 N.E.2d 1117. We affirm the appellate court.

FACTS

On April 21, 1986, Robert Gahan was killed by being beaten and burned. As a result of a police investigation, defendant was determined to be the prime suspect. Defendant was arrested by New Mexico police on December 23, 1986, on misdemeanor traffic charges, and, due to an Illinois parole violation and an outstanding warrant, he was held as a fugitive from justice. While being held in Las Cruces, New Mexico, defendant, on January 7, 1987, was interviewed by Illinois Detectives Roger Costello and Larry Schultz.

Defendant told the Illinois detectives that Gahan gave him a ride while he was hitchhiking. Gahan asked defendant if he wanted to smoke marijuana, and defendant responded that he did. Defendant directed Gahan to a secluded area, and while they Differing accounts were given by the detectives and defendant of the events which transpired during the interview which led up to defendant's statement. The detectives testified that they began interviewing defendant at approximately 8:30 a.m. Detective Costello read defendant his Miranda rights from a waiver card, and after being read each individual warning, defendant was asked if he understood it. Defendant did not respond to any of the warnings. After being read all of the warnings, defendant was asked if he understood each of them. Defendant responded by nodding his head in the affirmative. Defendant was then asked if he wished to talk to the detectives, and again defendant nodded in the affirmative. Defendant was informed that the detectives were there to obtain his version of the circumstances surrounding Gahan's death. Defendant did not respond in any way to the detective's request. Detective Schultz then showed a photograph of Gahan's body to defendant. Defendant pushed the picture aside and said, "I have not murdered anyone." Detective Schultz then told defendant what they had been told regarding defendant's involvement in Gahan's death. Defendant asked to read the written statements the detectives had, but was not allowed to read them because the detectives did not want the statements to influence anything defendant might want to say. After the detectives told defendant the events as they believed them to be, defendant sat silently for several minutes. Detective Costello told defendant to tell them if he did not want to talk in order to save everyone time. Defendant bowed his head and after about 30 seconds began to give a statement as to what happened the night of April 21, 1986.

[165 Ill.Dec. 705] were smoking the marijuana, Gahan grabbed defendant by the neck and began to choke him. Defendant responded by repeatedly striking Gahan with numchucks (martial arts weapons) until he fell to the ground. Defendant, thinking that Gahan was dead, took Gahan's car to a friend's house, Brian Carlson, and related what had just occurred. At Carlson's suggestion, defendant decided to destroy the evidence by burning Gahan's body. Defendant poured gasoline over Gahan and lit him on fire. Defendant also stated that a few days later he heard that Gahan was alive at the time of the burning, and that upon hearing this news he started to cry. After giving his statement, defendant was asked to put it in writing. At this point defendant requested an attorney, and all questioning stopped.

Defendant's version of the events leading up to his statement are as follows. While Detective Costello was reading defendant his rights, Detective Schultz showed defendant a photograph of Gahan's body saying, "You burned him alive, you murdered him." Defendant responded that he did not murder anyone and that he wanted a lawyer. Detective Schultz then produced written statements and told defendant that they were made by people who implicated defendant in Gahan's murder. Defendant refused to talk to the detectives for approximately half an hour, during which time the detectives conveyed to defendant what they had determined as a result of their investigation. According to defendant, about an hour after the detectives began interviewing him, he began to shake, and due to intimidating words used by Detective Schultz, defendant began to tell the detectives about Gahan's death. Defendant, however, was unable to remember what Detective Schultz said which was intimidating.

MISTAKE OF FACT JURY INSTRUCTION

Defendant was charged with two counts of murder. Both charges stated that he beat and burned and thereby caused the death of Gahan. Count I charged that defendant acted "with intent to kill or do great bodily harm," and count II charged defendant acted "knowing such acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, pars. 9-1(a)(1), (a)(2).) Defendant argues that in regard to the beating, the action taken by him, in repeatedly striking Gahan with numchucks, was in self-defense. In regard to the burning, defendant argues that he is not guilty of murder because at Defendant argues that the appellate court, relying on People v. Ellison (1984), 126 Ill.App.3d 985, 81 Ill.Dec. 222, 466 N.E.2d 1024, correctly determined that he was denied a fair trial by the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on mistake of fact. We agree. A defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case if there is some foundation for the instruction in the evidence (People v. Unger (1977), 66 Ill.2d 333, 338, 5 Ill.Dec. 848, 362 N.E.2d 319), and if there is such evidence, it is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to so instruct the jury (People v. Papas (1942), 381 Ill. 90, 95, 44 N.E.2d 896). Defendant's mistake of fact defense was supported by the evidence. Detectives Costello and Schultz both testified that while defendant was giving his statement, he said that he believed Gahan was dead prior to the burning. The State's experts who testified on Gahan's cause of death were unable to conclusively determine that Gahan was alive at the time of burning. While Doctor Powers testified that Gahan was probably alive at the time of the burning, he acknowledged that it was possible that he was already dead. Doctor Blum testified that a lay person seeing an unconscious body with injuries like Gahan's might reasonably conclude that the person was dead. This evidence satisfies the requirement of some foundation to entitle defendant to an instruction on mistake of fact.

[165 Ill.Dec. 706] the time of the burning, he believed that Gahan was already dead. The trial court instructed the jury on self-defense, but refused to give defendant's mistake of fact instruction.

Mistake of fact is a valid defense if the mistake negates "the existence of the mental state which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 4-8.) In the present case, the trial court, while acknowledging that defendant's tendered mistake of fact instruction was an accurate statement of the law, refused to give it to the jury on the basis that the standard jury instructions adequately covered the mental state requirement. In the instant case, the jury was instructed:

"To sustain the charge of murder, the State must prove the following propositions: first, that the defendant performed the acts which caused the death of Robert P. Gahan; and second, that when the defendant did so, he intended to kill or do great bodily harm to Robert P. Gahan or he knew that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to Robert P. Gahan; and third, that the defendant was not justified in using the force which he used. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each one of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant guilty. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant not guilty."

This instruction, while sufficiently informing the jury of the mental state requirements, does not expressly draw to the jury's attention the concept of mistake of fact. Since Illinois recognizes the defense of mistake of fact, when this defense is supported by the evidence it is not sufficient to merely inform the jury of the mental state requirements, but it must also be informed of the validity of the mistake of fact defense. Since (1) defendant's whole case rested upon the concepts of self-defense and mistake of fact, and (2) there exists some evidence upon which a jury could reasonably conclude that defendant burned Gahan under the mistaken belief that he was dead, the failure to give the mistake of fact instruction to the jury cannot be considered harmless.

REDDICK VIOLATION

Defendant argues that the jury instructions given by the trial court...

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