587 F.Supp. 539 (W.D.La. 1984), Civ. A. 83-2030, Geyen v. Marsh
|Docket Nº:||Civ. A. 83-2030|
|Citation:||587 F.Supp. 539|
|Party Name:||Geyen v. Marsh|
|Case Date:||July 18, 1984|
|Court:||United States District Courts, 5th Circuit, Western District of Louisiana|
Lonnie R. Smith, SW La. Legal Services, Lake Charles, La., for plaintiff.
Lawrence W. Moon, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., Lafayette, La., Major Wayne H. Price, JAGC, for defendants.
VERON, District Judge.
RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Geyen filed suit in this court on August 24, 1983 alleging various improprieties by the Department of the Army during his tenure with them from 1969 to 1972. Plaintiff essentially seeks to have his undesirable
discharge from the service upgraded to an honorable one (with concomitant restoration of military benefits). Defendants John O. Marsh, Jr., Secretary of the United States Army and the United States Army (hereinafter "defendants" or the "Army") moved to dismiss or for summary judgment. After hearing oral argument on April 17, 1984 and analyzing the parties' submissions and applicable caselaw, the court grants defendants' motion to dismiss. Consequently, we do not reach defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff maintained throughout his checkered history with the Army that he be granted a hardship discharge in order to care for his aging and sickly parents. Plaintiff ultimately went AWOL for 2 years after denial of a second hardship discharge request, despite his being transferred back to Fort Polk, Louisiana, or 65 miles from his parents. Nonetheless, plaintiff's claim basically alleges that he was: (1) improperly activated from the reserves to active duty in 1969; (2) improperly denied a hardship discharge (twice) in 1970; (3) invalidly discharged in 1972 because his commanding officer lacked court-martial jurisdiction; and (4) improperly denied relief by the Army Board for Correction of Military Records ("ABCMR") finally in 1982 because its decision was arbitrary, capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence and contrary to law, regulation and fact. It is abundantly clear from the record, however, that plaintiff was a disciplinary problem from 1969 to 1972 and that he knowingly and voluntarily accepted an undesirable discharge in lieu of a criminal court martial after being AWOL for over two years prior to 1972.
Defendants' move to dismiss contending that 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a)'s 6-year statute of limitations bars all of plaintiff's claims against the United States since this suit was filed in 1983...
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