Keaukaha-Panaewa Community Ass'n v. Hawaiian Homes Commission

• Citation: 588 F.2d 1216
• Decision Date: 18 September 1978
• Docket Number: KEAUKAHA-PANAEWA,No. 77-1044,77-1044
• Parties: COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, Keaukaha-Panaewa Farmers Association, Isabel Leinani Knutson, Erma Kalanui and April Kamakaokalanimalunao'e Kalanui, by her guardian ad litem, Erma Kalanui, Individually and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. HAWAIIAN HOMES COMMISSION, Bille Beamer, in her capacity as Chairman of the Hawaiian Homes Commission, the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands, Defendants-Appellants, and County of Hawaii, Edward Harada, in his capacity as Chief Engineer, County of Hawaii, Defendants, and James W. Glover, LTD., a Hawaii Corporation, Defendant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

Page 1216

588 F.2d 1216

KEAUKAHA-PANAEWA COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, Keaukaha-Panaewa Farmers Association, Isabel Leinani Knutson, Erma Kalanui and April Kamakaokalanimalunao'e Kalanui, by her guardian ad litem, Erma Kalanui, Individually and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. HAWAIIAN HOMES COMMISSION, Bille Beamer, in her capacity as Chairman of the Hawaiian Homes Commission, the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands Defendants-Appellants and County of Hawaii, Edward Harada, in his capacity as Chief Engineer, County of Hawaii, Defendants and James W. Glover, LTD., a Hawaii Corporation, Defendant.

No. 77-1044.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Sept. 18, 1978.

As Amended on Denial of Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Jan. 9, 1979.

George K. K. Kaeo, Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen. (argued), Honolulu, Hawaii, for defendants-appellants.

Ben H. Gaddis (argued), Hilo, Hawaii, for plaintiffs-appellees.

George R. Hyde, Atty., Washington, D. C., for amicus curiae.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii.

Before CHAMBERS, WALLACE, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

WALLACE, Circuit Judge:

Agencies of the State of Hawaii appeal from a judgment of the district court that the agencies have violated their obligations in connection with certain lands held in trust by the State of Hawaii for the benefit of native Hawaiians. This appeal raises complex jurisdictional and jurisdiction-related issues. We reverse.

I

In 1921, Congress enacted the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act (Commission Act), 42 Stat. 108, which created the Hawaiian Homes Commission (Commission) and designated some 200,000 acres (the Hawaiian home lands) for the welfare and rehabilitation of native Hawaiians. The Commission Act empowers the Commission to lease parcels of land within its jurisdiction to native Hawaiians at nominal rates. Although the underlying purpose of the statute has been questioned, it was ostensibly designed to rehabilitate the declining indigenous Hawaiians by facilitating their access to farm and homestead lands. See Levy, Native Hawaiian Land Rights, 63 Cal.L.Rev. 848, 865-66, 876-80 (1975).

With the admission of Hawaii into the Union in 1959, responsibility for the administration of the Hawaiian home lands was transferred to the state. Section 4 of the Hawaii Admission Act, Pub.L. No. 86-3, 73 Stat. 5 (1959) provides:

As a compact with the United States relating to the management and disposition of the Hawaiian home lands, the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, as amended, shall be adopted as a provision of the Constitution of said State . . ..

In addition, the Admission Act conveyed the United States' title to the Hawaiian home lands to the state, Id. at § 5(b), ¹ and requires Hawaii to hold these lands "as a public trust . . . for the betterment of the conditions of native Hawaiians . . . and their use for any other object shall constitute a breach of trust for which suit may be brought by the United States. Id. at § 5(f). ²

In accordance with section 4 of the Admission Act, the Commission Act was adopted as a provision of Hawaii's constitution, Hawaii Const. art. XI, and was thereafter deleted from the United States Code, although it was not formally repealed.

In the early 1970s, the County of Hawaii proposed the construction of a flood-control project in the Waiakea-Uka area. Because the proposed project was to be constructed on approximately 12 acres of Hawaiian home lands, the County presented its proposal to the Commission. The Commission apparently concluded that the project would alleviate flood problems experienced by some of its lessees in the Panaewa area and accordingly approved the project. On this basis, the Commission agreed to convey the 12 acres of affected home lands to the County in exchange for equivalent acreage of county land. ³

In January 1975, construction began on the proposed flood-control project. Shortly thereafter the County determined that the survey on which the project was based was inaccurate and that as a result an additional 5.5 acres of home lands would be required. It is now undisputed that the entire project, if completed, will require approximately 25.5 acres of Hawaiian home lands. It is also undisputed that no lands have been exchanged in order to compensate the Commission for the home lands used in the project.

In July 1975, a group of native Hawaiians (plaintiffs) brought this action against the Commission, the County, and various individuals involved with the construction of the Waiakea-Uka Project, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs are all lessees of Hawaiian home lands in the Panaewa area or are qualified applicants for such leases.

Plaintiffs asserted five distinct claims each of which is premised on either the Admission Act or the Commission Act. First, plaintiffs claim that the Commission has violated section 204(4) of the Commission Act by agreeing to exchange lands for a purpose other than those permitted by the Act. ⁴ Second, plaintiffs claim that the Commission has violated section 204(4) by permitting the County to render home lands useless for their designated purpose without first receiving title to lands received in compensation. Third, plaintiffs claim that the Commission violated section 204(4) by failing to obtain the consent of the Governor and Secretary of Interior for the proposed exchange. Fourth, plaintiffs allege that the project is "illegal" because it will consume twice the amount of home lands originally approved by the Commission. ⁵ Finally, plaintiffs claim that the Commission has violated fiduciary obligations imposed upon it by sections 4 and 5 of the Admission Act.

The Commission moved to dismiss the action on the ground that it does not "arise under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States." See 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a); U.S.Const. art. III, § 2. The district judge denied the motion and held that because both the Commission Act and the Admission Act are federal statutes, federal question jurisdiction would exist as to each claim.

In September 1976, the district judge granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on their second, third, fourth and fifth claims. The district judge ordered the Commission and the other defendants to "complete a land exchange as soon as reasonably possible in compliance with § 204(4)" of the Commission Act. The defendants were also enjoined from "using" the Waiakea-Uka Flood Control Project until the district court had approved a land exchange schedule.

On appeal, the Commission renews its jurisdictional arguments and also attacks the merits of the district court's ruling. Because of the unique and substantial nature of the jurisdictional questions, we requested the Department of Justice to present its views as amicus curiae.

The problem which the parties and amicus have treated under the general heading of jurisdiction really involves two discrete issues: whether there exists (1) a private cause of action, and (2) federal question jurisdiction. The Supreme Court recently explained the distinct nature of these separate inquiries in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 94 S.Ct. 690, 38 L.Ed.2d 646 (1974) (Amtrak ):

In this Court and in the Court of Appeals, the parties have approached the question from several perspectives. The issue has been variously stated to be whether the Amtrak Act can be read to create a private right of action to enforce compliance with its provisions; whether a federal district court has jurisdiction under the terms of the Act to entertain such a suit; and whether the respondent has standing to bring such a suit. . . . (T)he threshold question clearly is whether the Amtrak Act or any other provision of law creates a cause of action whereby a private party . . . can enforce duties and obligations imposed by the Act; for it is only if such a right of action exists that we need consider whether the respondent had standing to bring the action and whether the District Court had jurisdiction to entertain it.

Id. at 455-56, 94 S.Ct. at 692.

Based upon Amtrak, therefore, our threshold inquiry is whether the Commission Act and the Admission Act create private causes of action for enforcement of their terms. Only if such a right of action exists need we determine whether the district court had jurisdiction. We hold that the Admission Act does not provide a private right of action and we therefore do not reach the jurisdictional issue as to the Admission Act claims. We do consider this subsequent issue as regards the claims alleged to arise under the Commission Act, but conclude that the district court was without jurisdiction. We therefore reverse.

II

We turn first to plaintiffs' claims which are based on the trust language of sections 4 and 5 of the Admission Act. Section 5 expressly provides that the improper use of Hawaiian home lands "shall constitute a breach of trust for which suit may be brought by the United States." The Act is silent, however, on the question of whether suit may be brought by a private individual to enforce its terms. Thus, the threshold question is squarely presented: Does the Admission Act create an implied cause of action by which a private party may enforce the duties and obligations imposed by the Act? The Supreme Court has recently decided a series of cases which guide us to the proper resolution of this question.

A

In Amtrak, supra, 414 U.S. 453, 94 S.Ct. 690, 38 L.Ed.2d 646, an association of railroad passengers challenged the discontinuance of certain passenger lines as violative of the Rail Passenger Service Act. In reaching its conclusion that the Act does not imply a private cause of action of this type, the Court focused principally on the fact that the Act specifically permits enforcement suits by the Attorney General or, in cases involving a labor agreement, by employees. It was argued that the...