588 F.3d 202 (4th Cir. 2009), 08-5269, United States v. Rumley
| Citation | 588 F.3d 202 |
| Opinion Judge | DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge: |
| Party Name | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Clinton Lee RUMLEY, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Attorney | Allegra Mathilde Catha Black, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant. Jean Barrett Hudson, Office of the United States Attorney, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee. Larry W. Shelton, Federal Public Defender, Christine Madeleine Lee, Research and Writing Attor... |
| Judge Panel | Before MOTZ and KING, Circuit Judges, and ANTHONY J. TRENGA, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation. Affirmed by published opinion. Judge MOTZ wrote the opinion, in which Judge KING and Judge TRENGA joined. |
| Case Date | December 07, 2009 |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals, U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
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Argued: Oct. 29, 2009.
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ARGUED:
Allegra Mathilde Catha Black, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant.
Jean Barrett Hudson, Office of the United
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ON BRIEF:
OPINION
A jury found Clinton Lee Rumley guilty of possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e) (2006). On appeal, Rumley challenges the court's denial of his motion to suppress a firearm the police seized from his vehicle during a traffic stop. We affirm.
I.
On December 12, 2007, Deputy Michael Wagner initiated a traffic stop of a Chevrolet pickup truck owned and driven by Rumley. Deputy Wagner believed that the truck lacked working taillights, in violation of Virginia law. The deputy approached the truck and asked Rumley for his license and registration; Rumley responded that his license was suspended. After learning that Rumley had two prior convictions for driving with a suspended license, Deputy Wagner arrested Rumley, handcuffed him, and placed him in the backseat of the deputy's patrol car.
Deputy Wagner then returned to the passenger side of Rumley's truck and requested that the front seat passenger, Fletcher Ross, step out of the truck. At that time, Deputy Wagner intended to search the truck incident to Rumley's arrest. When Ross moved his right leg to step out, Deputy Wagner noticed a silver pistol lying on the floorboard in front of the passenger-side seat.
After conducting a pat-down search of Ross and securing him in the backseat of a second patrol car, Deputy Wagner seized the pistol from Rumley's truck. The deputy then returned to his own patrol car, read Rumley his Miranda rights, and questioned him about the pistol. Rumley admitted that the gun was his and that he had placed it on the floor-board when Deputy Wagner stopped him. The record suggests that, at some point after seizing the pistol, Deputy Wagner searched Rumley's truck.
The Government charged Rumley with possession of a fire-arm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). In the district court, Rumley moved to suppress the pistol on the ground that Deputy Wagner violated the Fourth Amendment by stopping Rumley's truck. Specifically, Rumley contended that Deputy Wagner lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Rumley had violated the Virginia taillight statute, which requires that every motor vehicle " carry at the rear two red lights plainly visible in clear weather from a distance of 500 feet to the rear of such vehicle." Va.Code Ann. § 46.2-1013 (2009). The district court found that any mistake that Deputy Wagner made in assessing whether Rumley's taillights were visible was an " honest" one, and denied Rumley's motion to suppress. Rumley appealed.
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II.
On appeal, Rumley no longer challenges the constitutionality of the stop of his vehicle. Rather, for the first time, Rumley challenges the constitutionality of Deputy Wagner's asserted search of the truck and ultimate seizure of the pistol.
The Fourth Amendment protects " [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. This guarantee contemplates distinct protections against unreasonable searches and unreasonable seizures. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990) (" A search compromises the individual interest in privacy; a seizure deprives the individual of dominion over his or her person or property." ).
The " plain-view" exception to the requirement that police obtain a warrant before seizing property " does not involve an invasion of privacy and, consequently, does not constitute a search implicating the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Jackson, 131 F.3d 1105, 1108 (4th Cir.1997); see also Horton, 496 U.S. at 133-34, 110 S.Ct. 2301. Pursuant to this plain-view doctrine, an officer may, without a warrant, seize " incriminating evidence when (1) the officer is lawfully in a place from which the object may be plainly viewed; (2) the officer has a lawful right of access to the object itself; and (3) the object's...
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