Earhart v. Konteh

Decision Date18 December 2009
Docket NumberNo. 07-4127.,07-4127.
Citation589 F.3d 337
PartiesErik EARHART, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Khelleh KONTEH, Respondent-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Molly S. Crabtree, Porter Wright Morris & Arthur LLP, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Gene D. Park, Office of the Ohio Attorney General, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee.

ON BRIEF:

Molly S. Crabtree, James B. Hadden, Porter Wright Morris & Arthur LLP, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Gene D. Park, Office of the Ohio Attorney General, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee.

Before: MOORE, GIBBONS, and FRIEDMAN, Circuit Judges.*

GIBBONS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRIEDMAN, J., joined. MOORE, J. (pp. 351-52), delivered a separate opinion dissenting in part.

OPINION

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge.

Petitioner Erik Earhart appeals the order of the district court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Earhart alleges that the district court erred in failing to grant the writ because the State of Ohio violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by 1) forcing him to wear a stun belt during the entirety of his trial and 2) admitting into evidence the testimony of alleged victim F.T.1 by video deposition without a proper finding that the witness was unavailable. Finding that Earhart's second issue has merit, we hold that the admission of the videotape deposition without a proper finding that the witness was constitutionally unavailable violated Earhart's clearly established right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the district court and grant Earhart a conditional writ as to count four of the indictment, charging him with gross sexual imposition against F.T. Because Earhart is not entitled to relief upon the remainder of his claims, we affirm the judgment of the district court as to the remainder of the petition.

I.

In May 2001, an Ohio grand jury charged Earhart in an indictment with one count of rape of a child under thirteen years of age, in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2907.02(A)(1)(b), and four counts of gross sexual imposition on a child under thirteen years of age, in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2907.05(A)(4). The indictment concerned conduct that occurred at a birthday party at the Preston Hotel in Sharonville, Ohio, that the Ohio Court of Appeals succinctly summarized as follows:

In May 2001, Earhart, a bus driver and chaperone for a group of Michigan children participating in a band competition visited the Preston Hotel in Sharonville, Ohio. A young girl not affiliated with the band was celebrating her tenth birthday with friends at the hotel pool. Earhart approached the girls, spoke with them, and asked one of the girls to accompany him to his hotel room while he changed into his swimsuit. She declined. When Earhart returned to the pool, he joined the girls' games. He picked the children up and threw them into the air. Each of the four female victims described that while Earhart was picking them up, he forcefully rubbed their pubic regions.

Earhart followed the children into a nearby hot tub. There he digitally raped one of the ten-year-old victims. One of the other victims saw the rape. With the rape victim in tears, the girls left the hot tub. The victim told her mother about the attack. The mother summoned Sharonville police and Earhart was arrested. The rape victim was examined at Children's Hospital. Doctors found vaginal abrasions consistent with sexual abuse.

State v. Earhart, 2004 WL 2008236 (Ohio Ct.App. Sept. 10, 2004).

Earhart proceeded to trial in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas in July 2002, acting as his own attorney. Prior to the start of the trial, Earhart objected to the State's requiring him to wear a Remote Electronically Activated Control Technology (REACT) belt (the "stun belt"), arguing that it infringed upon his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself. Specifically, Earhart argued that because he had no idea what type of outbursts or actions might cause the deputy to activate the belt, Earhart would necessarily have to curtail the content of questions he might ask as he sought to present his defense. The state trial court agreed to hold a hearing in which the officer in charge of training courtroom deputies as to the proper use of the belt, Lieutenant John Adkins, could testify as to the department's procedures regarding the belt's activation.

Adkins testified that the REACT belt is capable of subjecting its wearer to a 50,000-volt shock of electricity for a period of eight seconds when activated. Despite the fact that Hamilton County authorities had used the belt several hundred times, the deputies had never once activated the belt, intentionally or otherwise.2 The deputies' training instructed them to activate the belt should a defendant have "any hostile outbursts, any type of combativeness towards anyone in the courtroom, any means of escape." (Trial Tr. at 55.) These training sessions lasted for a minimum of fourteen hours of classroom time. When asked for a more detailed definition of what could constitute a hostile outburst, Adkins refused, explaining "[s]o if you wanted a specific definition for an outburst, I don't have the answer for you." (Trial Tr. at 58.) Ultimately, the decision to activate the stun belt was "up to the officer's discretion" guided by the officer's "common sense." (Trial Tr. at 58.) The officers did receive training that allowed them to avoid mistaking a fervent objection to trial testimony with a hostile outburst. Earhart also questioned Adkins about how the Hamilton County Sheriff's Department determines which prisoners must wear the stun belt during their trials. Adkins explained that "[e]very pro se defendant or control subject that we've had, we utilize the belt." (Trial Tr. at 59.) This policy applied to every pro se defendant charged with a felony without regard to the specific characteristics of the defendant.

Following this testimony, the state trial court held that it would defer to the policy of the Hamilton County Sheriff's Department and require Earhart to wear the stun belt at all court proceedings. The trial court made no findings that Earhart was a particularly dangerous defendant, had a propensity to attempt to escape, or was generally unable to conduct himself in a proper manner. The trial court also restricted Earhart's movements within the courtroom to the area in front of the two counsels' tables and the podium. This order forbade Earhart from approaching the witnesses during his questioning. The trial court imposed the same movement restrictions on the prosecution to avoid the jury's drawing an improper inference.

The trial proceeded before a jury and each alleged victim personally testified about Earhart's actions on the evening of the birthday party with the exception of F.T. The State sought to introduce a videotape deposition of F.T. in place of her live testimony, explaining that F.T. had a long-planned vacation that the State did not wish to interrupt. Earhart was present at the deposition, was able to fully cross-examine F.T., and understood that the deposition could be used at trial. However, Earhart objected to the admission of the deposition, arguing that the State had failed to show that F.T. was constitutionally unavailable. The trial court overruled Earhart's objection and found that the State had complied with the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure, which allow for the admission of videotape depositions if a witness is out-of-state. See Ohio Crim. R. 15(F).

At the conclusion of all the testimony, the jury convicted Earhart of all five counts of the indictment. The state trial court sentenced Earhart to ten years' imprisonment on the rape count and five years' imprisonment on each count of gross sexual imposition. The trial court further ordered that each sentence was to run consecutively, resulting in a total sentence of thirty years. The sentence represented the maximum possible under the pertinent statutes. See Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2924.14(C) (establishing the requirements to impose "the longest term authorized for the offense[s]"). Earhart appealed his conviction and sentence to the Ohio Court of Appeals, which affirmed both and rejected his assignments of error as to the trial court's rulings concerning the stun belt and the admission of F.T.'s deposition. Earhart, 2004 WL 2008236. The Ohio Supreme Court denied Earhart leave to appeal. State v. Earhart, 104 Ohio St.3d 1462, 821 N.E.2d 578 (2005).

On January 19, 2006, Earhart petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The petition was transferred to the Southern District of Ohio on February 3, 2006. Earhart raised three claims: 1) the trial court's ruling requiring him to wear a stun belt violated his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights; 2) his sentence violated the Sixth Amendment because it found its basis in facts not found by the jury; and 3) the admission of F.T.'s deposition violated the Confrontation Clause. Earhart v. Konteh, No. C-1-06-62, 2007 WL 2492307, at *2-3, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63816, at *7-8 (S.D.Ohio Aug.29, 2007). The district court held that Earhart had procedurally defaulted his second claim regarding his sentence. Id. at *21, 2007 WL 2492307, at *7. As to the two remaining claims, the district court held that the Ohio courts' holdings were objectively unreasonable under clearly established Supreme Court precedents. Analogizing a stun belt to shackles, the district court found that the Ohio state courts erred by requiring Earhart to wear a restraint absent any individualized finding of dangerousness or risk of escape. Id. at *25-29, 2007 WL 2492307, at *8-10. The district court also found that the admission of F.T.'s videotape deposition was error because F.T. was not unavailable within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at *40-42, ...

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