Williamson v. State

• Decision Date: 20 September 2019
• Docket Number: No. 06-18-00199-CR,06-18-00199-CR
• Citation: 589 S.W.3d 292
• Parties: Rickey Donell WILLIAMSON, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

589 S.W.3d 292

Rickey Donell WILLIAMSON, Appellant

v.The STATE of Texas, Appellee

No. 06-18-00199-CR

Court of Appeals of Texas, Texarkana.

Date Submitted: September 5, 2019

Date Decided: September 20, 2019

Jason A. Duff, Attorney at Law, 2615 Lee St., Greenville, TX 75403, for Appellant.

Steven Lilley, Assistant District Attorney, Hunt County Courthouse, Noble D. Walker, Jr., Hunt County District Attorney, P.O. Box 441, Greenville, TX 75403, for Appellee.

Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ.

OPINION

Opinion by Justice Burgess

When Rickey Donell Williamson confronted Jaime Ramirez and his friend about disrespecting Williamson's girlfriend, the result was a brief, but violent, altercation between Williamson and Ramirez. The violent encounter ended when Williamson inflicted a deep, ten-inch gash to the left side of Ramirez' face with a box-cutting knife. Although Williamson maintained that he acted in self-defense, a Hunt County jury convicted him of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and sentenced him to forty years' imprisonment. On appeal, Williamson complains that (1) the trial court erred in ruling that two prior convictions were admissible under Rule 609 of the Texas Rules of Evidence and (2) insufficient evidence supports the jury's rejection of his self-defense claim. Because we find that (1) Williamson waived his complaint regarding the admission of his two prior convictions and (2) sufficient evidence supports the jury's rejection of his self-defense claim, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

I. Williamson's Rule 609 Complaint Was Waived

In his first issue, Williamson complains that the trial court erred in finding that evidence of two prior family violence assaults¹ was admissible to impeach his credibility under Rule 609 of the Texas Rules of Evidence. See TEX. R. EVID. 609(a). Under Rule 609(a), a trial court must admit a criminal conviction offered to impeach a witness' character for truthfulness if (a) the conviction was for a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude, (b) its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect, and (c) it is elicited from the witness or shown by public record. TEX. R. EVID. 609(a) ; see Theus v. State , 845 S.W.2d 874, 880 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (setting forth a nonexclusive list of factors to be considered in weighing the probative value of a conviction against its prejudicial effect). Williamson argues that the trial court misapplied the Theus factors in determining that the two convictions were admissible. The State argues that Williamson waived this complaint because the evidence of the two convictions was elicited from Williamson in his direct testimony, not by the State. We agree with the State.

In this case, after the State rested from its case-in-chief, the State informed the trial court that it intended to use several prior convictions, including the two convictions that are the subject of his complaint, to impeach Williamson's credibility, if he chose to testify. After some discussion, the trial court considered the Theus factors and found that the two family violence assault convictions would be admissible if Williamson chose to testify. In his direct examination, Williamson testified that he had pled guilty to the offense of family violence assault in 2007 and to another family violence assault offense in 2008. Thereafter, the State did not offer the judgments of conviction for those offenses into evidence in the guilt/innocence phase of the trial.

We have previously held under similar facts that any complaint that evidence of a prior conviction was not admissible has been waived. Gaffney v. State , 940 S.W.2d 682, 687 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1996, pet. ref'd) (op. on reh'g). In Gaffney , after the trial court had overruled the defendant's motion to exclude evidence of the prior convictions, Gaffney elected to bring out the matter of his prior convictions by his own testimony during his direct examination. We explained that since the State did not introduce the evidence or bring it out on cross-examination, and Gaffney had elected instead to do so on his direct examination, he had waived any complaint regarding the admissibility of the prior convictions. Id.

Subsequent to our decision in Gaffney , the United States Supreme Court addressed the same issue and concluded that "a defendant who preemptively introduces evidence of a prior conviction on direct examination may not on appeal claim that the admission of such evidence was error." Ohler v. United States , 529 U.S. 753, 760, 120 S.Ct. 1851, 146 L.Ed.2d 826 (2000). The Supreme Court explained that once the trial court makes its ruling, both the defendant and the State have choices to make, and those choices have consequences. See id. at 757–60, 120 S.Ct. 1851. The defendant may choose to introduce the prior conviction on direct examination in hopes of removing its sting, or he may take his chances with the State's introduction of the conviction on cross-examination. Id. at 758, 120 S.Ct. 1851. If the defendant does not introduce the prior conviction, the State must decide whether to impeach the defendant with the conviction and risk that its use would be reversible error on appeal. Id. By introducing the evidence on direct examination, the defendant denies the State this right to decide. Id. However, the consequence of introducing the evidence on direct examination is that the defendant waives any appellate complaint regarding the admission of the evidence. Id. at 760, 120 S.Ct. 1851.

Relying on Ohler , several of our sister courts of appeals have held that a defendant waives the right to complain about a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of prior convictions when he preemptively introduces them on direct examination. See Bryant v. State , 534 S.W.3d 471, 473 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2017, pet. ref'd) ; Roderick v. State , 494 S.W.3d 868, 881 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) ; Sargent v. State , No. 10-13-00158-CR, 2014 WL 505350, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Feb. 6, 2014, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication).² Since Williamson introduced the prior convictions on direct examination, he waived his complaint regarding their admissibility. We overrule his first issue.

II. Sufficient Evidence Supported the Jury's Rejection of Self-Defense

Williamson also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's rejection of his self-defense claim. Williamson contends that no reasonable jury could have rejected his claim of self-defense under the evidence produced in this case.

A. The Law of Self-Defense

The use of deadly force is a defense to prosecution for aggravated assault if the use of deadly force is justified. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 9.02, 9.31 –.32. "[A] person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31(a). However, "[t]he use of force ... is not justified ... in response to verbal provocation alone," or "if the actor provoked the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31(b). Further, a person's use of deadly force against another is justified if use of force would be justified under Section 9.31, and "when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary ... to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force."³ TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32(a)(2)(A). "Reasonable belief" is defined as "a belief that would be held by an ordinary and prudent man in the same circumstances as the actor." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(42).

Under certain circumstances, the actor's belief that deadly force was immediately necessary is presumed to be reasonable. One of these circumstances is when (1) the actor "knew or had reason to believe that the person against whom the deadly force was used" was committing or attempting to commit certain enumerated offenses, (2) the actor did not provoke the other person, and (3) the actor was not engaged in criminal activity, other than a Class C misdemeanor or a traffic violation. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32(b).

In addition, an actor is not required to retreat before using deadly force if "[he] has a right to be present at the location where the deadly force is used, [he] has not provoked the person against whom deadly force is used, and [he] is not engaged in criminal activity at the time deadly force is used." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32(c).

B. Standard of Review

In evaluating legal sufficiency, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's judgment to determine whether any rational jury could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Brooks v. State , 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ); Hartsfield v. State , 305 S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, pet. ref'd). Our rigorous review focuses on the quality of the evidence presented. Brooks , 323 S.W.3d at 917–18 (Cochran, J., concurring). We examine legal sufficiency under the direction of the Brooks opinion, while giving deference to the responsibility of the jury "to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Hooper v. State , 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Jackson , 443 U.S. at 318–19, 99 S.Ct. 2781 ); Clayton v. State , 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In drawing reasonable inferences, the jury "may use common sense and apply common knowledge, observation, and experience gained in the ordinary affairs of life." Duren v. State , 87 S.W.3d 719, 724 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. struck) (citing Manrique v. State , 994 S.W.2d 640, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (Meyers, J., concurring)). The jury is also...