Penobscot Chem. Fibre Co. v. Inhabitants of Town of Bradley

• Decision Date: 19 November 1904
• Citation: 59 A. 83,99 Me. 263
• Parties: PENOBSCOT CHEMICAL FIBRE CO. v. INHABITANTS OF TOWN OF BRADLEY.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

59 A. 83

99 Me. 263

PENOBSCOT CHEMICAL FIBRE CO.

v. INHABITANTS OF TOWN OF BRADLEY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Nov. 19, 1904.

(Official.)

Report from Supreme Judicial Court, Penobscot County, at Law.

Appeal by the Penobscot Chemical Fibre Company from assessments of taxes in the town of Bradley for the years 1901 and 1902. After the evidence had been taken out in the court below, the case was sent to the law court on report "for determination upon so much of the evidence as is legally admissible." Judgment for appellant.

Argued before WISWELL, C. J., and EMERY, SAVAGE, POWERS, PEABODY, and SPEAR, JJ.

C. F. Woodard and C. J. Dunn, for plaintiff.

G. T. Sewall and Matthew Laughlin, for defendant.

SAVAGE, J. Appeal from assessments of taxes in the defendant town for the years 1901 and 1902, brought under Pub. Laws 1895, c. 122, § 1 (Rev. St. 1903, c. 9, § 79). The property assessed consisted of (1) a mill privilege, including the shore, embracing about eight acres of land, and a small mill used for cutting and splitting poplar wood; (2) about 11 acres of land, upon which was a two-story house; and, (3) in the assessment of 1902 only, 14 lots of land. As to the third class, it is claimed that these fourteen lots are embraced in the general descriptions of land contained in the first and second classes, and that the assessors assessed them as part of the larger tracts described, and also separately and specifically, thereby creating double taxation. In the written notice of their decision upon the application of the appellant for abatement of these taxes, which they were required by statute to give to the applicant (Pub. Laws 1895, c. 122, § 6; Rev. St. 1903, c. 9, § 77), the assessors, not conceding that these lots were embraced in the larger descriptions, but expressing a wish "to avoid any possibility of double taxation," stated that they had abated all the taxes upon these 14 lots. That statement is conclusive as to the abatement so far. Those taxes were abated before the appeal was taken. But as it appears that the taxes had been previously paid, it is conceded that the appellant is entitled to judgment for the amount of the abatement.

The controversy argued before us relates solely to the first and second classes of property assessed. The essential claims of the appellant are these: That, in assessing the taxes complained of, the assessors did not rate and value the property of the appellant equitably and proportionately as compared with other property of like nature and kind in the same town, and that the valuations placed upon such property were greatly in excess of the true values thereof.

It appears that the appellant, by owning the land on both sides of the river, is the owner of the entire dam and mill privilege in the Penobscot river as it flows between Old Town and Bradley at the point called "Great Works," in Old Town. By the dam as at present constructed, a waterfall of 2,000 horse power has been created. The appellant's principal works—a pulpmill and a sawmill—are situated at Great Works, on the Old Town side; and about 1,500 horse power, under varying conditions, is used in the operation of the pulpmill and sawmill. About 25 horse power is used at the cutting-up mill in Bradley, and the rest runs to waste. The tract of land in Bradley assessed as the mill privilege and shores, and containing about eight acres, extends along the river from the Milford line to the vicinity of the dam, about a half mile in a straight line, or a mile, following the windings of the river. At the Milford line it is 570 feet wide. Proceeding thence southerly it narrows until at the distance of about 1,500 feet it is only 90 feet wide. The remaining distance it has no appreciable width above high-water mark. A portion of the land is used for piling purposes, as is also a portion of the land in the 11-acre tract. The latter tract does not border upon the river. The appellant company is accustomed to cut several thousand cords of poplar each year at the cutting-up mill on the Bradley side, and pile it upon these piling lands until it can be taken across the river to the pulpmill on the ice in winter. Otherwise the company does not make any specific use of either tract of any value worth mentioning.

The case is now before us upon report, to be determined "upon so much of the evidence in the case as is legally admissible." At the outset we are met with the objection that much of the evidence which the appellant was permitted to introduce below was not admissible.

Briefly stated, the important objections are to evidence showing (1) the valuation of the other lots in the town for the purposes of taxation, as also of one other mill privilege and (2) the valuation placed upon the appellant's property by assessors in other years. The admissibility of evidence of the first kind depends in part, at least, upon whether it is competent in proceedings of this character to inquire into the disproportionate valuation of the property in question as compared with that of other property in the town. Some courts, deciding under the statutes of their respective states, have held that when assessors have designedly made a general undervaluation of the property in their town, but have assessed some property for more than the general rate, justice requires that the latter valuation should be reduced to compare with the general valuation, and have ordered a corresponding abatement of the taxes assessed. Manchester Mills v. Manchester, 57 N. H. 309; Randall v. Bridgeport, 63 Conn. 321, 28 Atl. 523. The appellant contends that the rule thus stated is applicable in this case, and that the evidence referred to was admissible because it had some tendency to show a general undervaluation, or, if it did not, then because it tended to show a disproportionate valuation. That is to say, if the other pieces of property were valued fairly at their just value, then, it is claimed, the evidence shows that the appellant's property was greatly overvalued, or, if the other property was undervalued, then the appellant's property, valued even at its just value, was proportionately overvalued. We may dismiss the first proposition with a word. If we assume that the evidence is properly in the case, it entirely fails to show a general and designed undervaluation. It relates to the three or four pieces of property only. It furnishes no sufficient basis by which we may judge whether the assessors designedly undervalued the property in the town generally or not. Accordingly we refrain from deciding what should be the rule in a case where such a design was proved.

The other proposition is fairly before us. Can the appellant show itself entitled to an abatement in these proceedings by proving that, while other pieces of property were undervalued, its own property was assessed its full value? We think not. If its property was assessed for more than its just value, it has a remedy here and now. But if its property is assessed for no more than its fair value, it cannot complain by this appeal that some of its neighbors have escaped for less.

The Constitution of this state declares that "all taxes upon real and personal estate, assessed by authority of this state, shall be apportioned and assessed equally, according to the Just value thereof." It is therefore incumbent upon every citizen to bear his full proportion of the expenses of the government, according to the value of his estate. It is the duty of assessors to so apportion the burdens of taxation. And in an ideal state of existence they are so apportioned. A decent regard for the equal rights of citizens, as well as the constitutional provision, requires that assessors shall use their best judgment so to apportion them. If one citizen pays less than he ought, the others must pay more than they ought, and the constitutional provision is violated. Some are thereby made to bear unjust as well as illegal burdens.

But we are not living in a perfectly ideal state of existence. With the imperfections of human judgment, no way has yet been found by which the burdens of taxation may be adjusted in individual instances with perfect equality and true proportion. Necessarily the apportionment is left to men—to the assessors. They constitute a board which acts judicially. They inquire and determine. But they are only men, after all. The judgment of one man is not that of another. The judgment of one board is not that of another board. Men look at things differently—value them differently. There is no fixed standard of value by which assessors may be governed. It may happen that assessors, even after the exercise of due diligence, may fail to understand fully the conditions surrounding a particular piece of property, or properly to appreciate its value. There probably never was a case in this or in any other state where assessors succeeded in rating all property according to its just value, or in apportioning all taxes with perfect equality. Neither the Constitution nor common sense expects so nice a result. To say that a way to an abatement is opened wherever it happens that a few other pieces of property are undervalued would probably undermine every assessment in every town. The law does not impose so strict a test.

The statute provides that, if the county commissioners think an applicant to them for an abatement "is overrated, he shall be relieved by them" (Rev. St. 1883, c. 6, §...