People v. Vargas
| Citation | 328 P.3d 1020,174 Cal.Rptr.3d 277,59 Cal.4th 635 |
| Decision Date | 10 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. S203744.,S203744. |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Darlene A. VARGAS, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court (California) |
Melanie K. Dorian, Glendale, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Taylor Nguyen, David Zarmi, Lawrence M. Daniels, Noah P. Hill and Kimara A. Aarons, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
We consider in this case whether two prior convictions arising out of a single act against a single victim can constitute two strikes under the Three Strikes law. We conclude they cannot.
The consequences in this state of repeated criminal conduct changed dramatically in 1994. First the Legislature,1 and then the electorate,2 introduced into this state's jurisprudence what is now known collectively as the Three Strikes law. Under that law, if a defendant reoffends after having suffered a first qualifying felony conviction, a doubled sentence is mandatory. If, after having suffered two qualifying felony convictions, an offender commits a third qualifying felony, the Three Strikes law presumes he or she is incorrigible and requires a life sentence.
"Sentence enhancement based on recidivism flows from the premise that the defendant's current criminal conduct is more serious because he or she previously was found to have committed criminal conduct and did not thereafter reform." ( People v. Nguyen (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1007, 1024, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 615, 209 P.3d 946.) The typical third-strike situation thus involves a criminal offender who commits a qualifying felony after having been afforded two previous chances to reform his or her antisocial behavior, hence the law's descriptive baseball-related phrase, " ‘Three Strikes and You're Out.’ " ( People v. Hazelton (1996) 14 Cal.4th 101, 104, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 443, 926 P.2d 423.)
Despite this paradigm, situations have occurred that have challenged the assumption that an offender has had two prior opportunities to reform. For example, in a case in which an offender's two previous qualifying felony convictions were for crimes so closely connected in their commission that they were tried in the same proceeding, we held that such convictions can nevertheless constitute two separate strikes because the Three Strikes law does not require that prior convictions, to qualify as strikes, be brought and tried separately. ( People v. Fuhrman (1997) 16 Cal.4th 930, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 941 P.2d 1189.) Similarly, in a case in which the offender's previous two crimes could not be separately punished at the time they were adjudicated because they were committed during the same course of conduct ( § 654 ), we held such close factual and temporal connection did not prevent the trial court from later treating the two convictions as separate strikes when the accused reoffended. ( People v. Benson (1998) 18 Cal.4th 24, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 294, 954 P.2d 557 (Benson ).)
The instant case presents a more extreme situation: Defendant's two prior felony convictions—one for robbery and one for carjacking—were not only tried in the same proceeding and committed during the same course of criminal conduct, they were based on the same act, committed at the same time, against the same victim. As we explain, because neither the electorate ( § 1170.12 ) nor the Legislature ( § 667, subds. (b) - (i) ) could have intended that both such prior convictions would qualify as separate strikes under the Three Strikes law, treating them as separate strikes is inconsistent with the spirit of the Three Strikes law, and the trial court should have dismissed one of them and sentenced defendant as if she had only one, not two, qualifying strike convictions.
The facts of the present crimes have no bearing on the legal issue we resolve in this case and so may be stated briefly. Petitioner Darlene Vargas and codefendant Oscar Velasquez illegally entered the Claremont home of victims Lynn Burrows and William Alves and stole various items, including a suitcase and a trash can. Defendants were detained while prowling near another home in the same neighborhood; police found them in possession of both burglary tools and items taken from the Burrows/Alves home. A witness later identified Velasquez and Vargas as the man and woman she saw walking near the victims' home with the suitcase and trash can.
Vargas was charged and convicted of first degree burglary (§ 459), grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a)), and conspiracy to commit grand theft (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)). In addition, the court sustained allegations that she had suffered a prior serious felony conviction ( § 667, subd. (a) ), as well as two strikes within the meaning of the Three Strikes law: a 1999 conviction for carjacking ( § 215 ) and another for robbery (§ 211). Because her three present crimes (burglary, grand theft, conspiracy) were qualifying felonies under the version of the Three Strikes law applicable at the time,3 all three felonies were potentially subject to enhancement by her two alleged strikes, rendering her vulnerable to three consecutive terms of 25 years to life, or an aggregate prison term of 75 years to life. She moved to dismiss the carjacking strike as to all counts. The trial court granted the motion in part, dismissing the carjacking strike conviction as to the grand theft and conspiracy counts, but declining to dismiss the remaining conviction for burglary.
Defendant appealed and also filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court of Appeal denied relief on appeal but granted the habeas corpus petition in part, finding Vargas's defense counsel had been constitutionally ineffective for failing to place before the trial court the transcript of the preliminary hearing in the 1999 case. Because the preliminary hearing transcript demonstrated Vargas's carjacking and robbery convictions were based on the same act of taking the victim's car by force, the appellate court concluded that "a different outcome was reasonably probable had the trial court known that a single act was involved [in 1999],...." Accordingly, it directed the trial court to conduct a new sentencing hearing after considering these additional facts.
On remand, the trial court denied defendant's motion to dismiss one of the 1999 prior convictions. It noted that under our decision in Benson, supra, 18 Cal.4th 24, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 294, 954 P.2d 557, "the central focus is not on the single act[,] ..., it's on the defendant's status as a repeat felon" and observed, further, that defendant had received a benefit in 1999 when she was allowed to plead to a negotiated plea of only three years in prison for two serious felonies. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the trial court concluded defendant fell "squarely within the spirit of [Three] Strikes."
On appeal from the resentencing, defendant contended the trial court erred by declining to strike one of her prior convictions and sentence her as a two-strike offender. The Court of Appeal found no abuse of discretion and affirmed. We granted review.
The issue we decide today is whether the trial court should have dismissed one of defendant's two prior felony convictions, alleged as strikes under the Three Strikes law, where both convictions were based on the same act. The question has two potential aspects: First, when faced with two prior strike convictions based on the same act, is the trial court required to dismiss one of them? Second, assuming the sentencing court retains discretion to dismiss a strike or not, did the trial court here, on the facts of this case, abuse its discretion by declining to dismiss one of defendant's two strikes? Because we find the first question dispositive, we need not continue and discuss whether the trial court abused its discretion.
Given the intent of both the Legislature and the drafters of the initiative version of the Three Strikes law to punish repeat criminal offenders severely, to drastically curtail a sentencing court's ability to reduce the severity of a sentence by eliminating alternatives to prison incarceration, and to limit an offender's ability to reduce his or her sentence by earning credits, a question arose soon after enactment of the parallel Three Strikes schemes whether a trial court retained its traditional authority under section 1385 to dismiss an enhancement "in furtherance of justice."4 We settled the issue in People v. Superior Court (Romero ) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 529–530, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789, 917 P.2d 628 (Romero ), where we concluded "that section 1385 [, subdivision] (a) does permit a court acting on its own motion to strike prior felony conviction allegations in cases brought under the Three Strikes law." Accordingly, the trial court below had the power under the law to grant defendant's motion and dismiss one of her two strike convictions.
In order to guide the lower courts when ruling on such motions to dismiss, People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 917, 948 P.2d 429, explained that when facing a motion to dismiss a strike allegation, the trial court "must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of [the defendant's] present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of [the defendant's] background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme's spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies." (Italics added.) We quoted this language with approval in People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 880, 92 P.3d 369, and further explained that "[b]ecause the circumstances must be ...
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