Los Angeles Met. Trans. Auth. v. Public Util. Com'n

• Citation: 31 Cal.Rptr. 463,59 Cal.2d 863,382 P.2d 583
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Decision Date: 20 June 1963
• Parties: , 382 P.2d 583 LOS ANGELES METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, Respondent. S. F. 21190.

Page 463

31 Cal.Rptr. 463

59 Cal.2d 863, 382 P.2d 583

LOS ANGELES METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, Respondent.

S. F. 21190.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

June 20, 1963.

Hearing Denied July 17, 1963.

Musick, Peeler & Garrett, Gerald G. Kelly and Thomas J. Reilly, Los Angeles, for petitioner.

Walter N. Anderson, City Atty., Manhattan Beach and Gardena, E. K. Davis, Sacramento, Alan M. Firestone, City Atty., San Diego, Everett M. Glenn, City Atty., Sacramento, Thomas M. O'Connor, City Atty., City and County of San Francisco, William F. Bourne, San Francisco, Robert E. Nisbet, Oakland, Stanley E. Remelmeyer, City Atty., Torrance, and Spencer Thomas, Jr., City Atty., Fresno, as amici curiae on behalf of petitioner.

William M. Bennett, Roderick B. Cassidy, Mary Moran Pajalich, Bernard F. Cummins, San Francisco, and Richard E. Tuttle, San Andreas, for respondent.

Bodle & Fogel, George E. Bodle and Stephen Reinhardt, Los Angeles, as amici curiae on behalf of respondent.

PEEK, Justice.

The Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority seeks review of the validity of an order of respondent Public Utilities Commission compelling it to 'comply immediately with the safety rules and other regulations governing the operation of passenger stage corporations and street railroad corporations as contained in General Order No. 98 of the Commission (a compilation of safety and safety-related rules), or any modifications thereof, * * *' and in connection therewith to 'make available to the representatives of the Commission any and all of its records, equipment, and other instrumentalities and property. * * *'

The order was entered pursuant to the mandate of the 1961 amendment to section 3.2 of the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act providing that: 'The authority shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission with respect to safety rules and other regulations governing the operation of passenger stage corporations and street railroad corporations as contained in General Order No. 98 of the commission, or any modification thereof.' (Italics added.) (Stats.1961, ch. 1571, p. 3396.)

The essential contention is that so subjecting petitioner to the jurisdiction of respondent commission is contrary to section 23 and related sections of article XII of the California Constitution. It is urged that article 12 allows the Legislature to grant to the commission regulatory jurisdiction over private transportation utilities only, and prohibits the exercise of such jurisdiction by the commission over public transportation corporations such as petitioner.

Petitioner was created in its present legal form by legislative enactment designated the 'Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of 1957' (hereinafter referred to as the 1957 act), for the purpose of providing mass transportation in the Los Angeles area. (See Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority v. Public Utilities Comm., 52 Cal.2d 655, 659, 343 P.2d 913; Stats.1957, ch. 547, p. 1610, § 1.2.) It operates in Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, and San Bernardino Counties, transporting passengers, baggage, and mail. Although the authority was tranted considerable independence concerning routes, rates, acquisitions, and other aspects of operations (see Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority v. Public Utilities Comm., supra, 52 Cal.2d 655, 659-661, 343 P.2d 913), section 3.11 of the 1957 act provided that 'In the operation of transit facilities, the authority, and any corporation, association, or individual acting for the authority, shall adopt and comply with safety regulations prescribed by the Public Utilities Commission applicable to comparable street railway and bus systems.' (Italics added.) (Stats.1957, ch. 547, p. 1617.) The authority was thus directed to 'adopt and comply with' respondent commission's passenger system safety regulations in its operations, which began in March 1958.

Apparently the commission made no effort to supervise the authority's safety practices during the period March 1958 through September 15, 1961, the effective date of the amendment to section 3.2 causing petitioner to be 'subject to the jurisdiction' of the commission respecting General Order No. 98. Subsequent to that effective date the commission's safety officials contacted the authority concerning the filing of accident reports, equipment, and excess hours reports, as required by General Order 98. ¹ The general manager of the authority stated, according to testimony by a commission staff member, that '* * * (upon advice of counsel) he would not submit accident reports or any other reports to the Commission in connection with compliance with General Order No. 98.' Said refusal was notwithstanding the occurrence of reportable accidents.

In March 1962 respondent commission on its own motion instituted an investigation into the operations and practices of the authority, in order to determine the extent of compliance with General Order 98 and to issue any appropriate orders pursuant to that compilation of safety regulations. Petitioner entered a special appearance at the hearing and moved to dismiss the investigation for lack of jurisdiction.

In determining the constitutionality of the 1961 amendment to section 3.2 of the 1957 act (see Pub.Util.Code, Appendix, § 1.1 et seq.), we are confronted with the fundamental doctrine that 'Courts should exercise judicial restraint in passing upon the acts of co-ordinate branches of government; the presumption is in favor of constitutionality, and the invalidity of the legislation must be clear before it can be declared unconstitutional.' (Italics add ed.) (Dittus v. Cranston, 53 Cal.2d 284, 286, 1 Cal.Rptr. 327, 328, 347 P.2d 671, 672.) Unlike the federal Constitution 'our Constitution is not a grant of power but rather a limitation or restriction upon the powers of the Legislature.' (Collins v. Riley, 24 Cal.2d 912, 916, 152 P.2d 169, 171.) Accordingly, we must determine whether the Constitution of this state prohibits the Legislature from granting to the Public Utilities Commission jurisdiction over petitioner to secure compliance with the safety regulations contained in General Order 98 or any modification thereof by the commission.

It is true, as petitioner contends, that section 23 of article XII of our Constitution speaks principally to the vesting of regulatory jurisdiction in respondent commission over privately owned public utilities. But section 23 provides that 'Every private corporation * * * operating * * * any commercial railroad, interurban railroad, street railroad, canal, pipe line, plant, or equipment * * * for the transportation or conveyance of passengers, or express matter, or freight of any kind * * * or for the transmission of telephone or telegraph messages, or for the production, generation, transmission, delivery or furnishing of heat, light, water or power * * * to or for the public, and every common carrier, is hereby declared to be a public utility subject to such control and regulation by the Railroad Commission (Public Utilities Commission) as may be provided by the Legislature * * *.' (Italics added.) The italicized clause, 'and every common carrier,' appears to be severable and independent from the preceding portion of section 23 beginning with 'Every private corporation.'

Thus the implication arises from the terms of section 23 that the Legislature, rather than being restricted by that section from conferring jurisdiction over entities such as petitioner, may grant the commission regulatory powers over a common carrier, however organized. The nature of petitioner's passenger, baggage, and mail carrying operations for hire would appear to assure its status as a common carrier. Section 211 of the Public Utilities Code provides that "Common carrier' includes: * * * (c) Every 'passenger stage corporation' operating within this State,' and section 226 of that code states that "Passenger stage corporation' includes every corporation or person engaged as a common carrier, for compensation, in the ownership, control, operation, or management of any passenger stage over any public highway in this State between fixed termini or over a regular route * * *.' The fact that petitioner is a publicly owned, as opposed to a privately owned common carrier, does not take it out of the general category of 'common carrier.' (See California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553, 561-564, 77 S.Ct. 1037, 1 L.Ed.2d 1034; People v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 42 Cal.2d 621, 635, 268 P.2d 723.)

The observation was made in City of Pasadena v. Railroad Commission, 183 Cal. 526, 530-532, 192 P. 25, 10 A.L.R. 1425, that the apparent intent of the framers of section 23 of article XII was to provide for regulation by the commission of privately owned and operated public utilities, as opposed to publicly...