People v. Egbert

• Citation: 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 913,59 Cal.App.4th 503
• Decision Date: 21 November 1997
• Docket Number: D028400,Nos. D028399,s. D028399
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8862, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14,299 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Laurie EGBERT, Defendant and Appellant. The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Sonya Alisia WEEKS, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 913

68 Cal.Rptr.2d 913

59 Cal.App.4th 503, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8862,

97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14,299

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Laurie EGBERT, Defendant and Appellant.

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Sonya Alisia WEEKS, Defendant and Appellant.

Nos. D028399, D028400.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Nov. 21, 1997.

Review Denied March 11, 1998.

Steven J. Carroll, Public Defender, Gary R. Nichols, and Greg S. Maizlish, Deputy Public Defenders, for Defendant and Appellant in case no. D028399.

Steven J. Carroll, Public Defender, and Dawnella Gilzean, Deputy Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant in case no. D028400.

Casey Gwinn, City Attorney, Susan M. Heath, Assistant City Attorney and Kurt D. Mechals, Deputy City Attorney, for Plaintiff and Respondent in case no. D028399.

Paul J. Pfingst, District Attorney, Thomas F. McArdle, Robert W. Knox III and James E. Atkins, Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Respondent in case no. D028400.

McINTYRE, Associate Justice.

These cases come to us on certification from the appellate department of the superior court to decide whether a defendant, after pleading guilty to a misdemeanor, may challenge on appeal the denial of a motion to dismiss on constitutional or statutory speedy trial grounds. We conclude a claimed speedy trial violation, statutory or constitutional, does not survive a guilty plea in misdemeanor prosecutions. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments.

People v. Egbert--D028399

On October 30, 1995, Laurie Egbert was arraigned in the municipal court and pleaded not guilty to five misdemeanor counts involving domestic violence. Although jury trial was set for November 27, 1995, Guy Haines, the prosecution's complaining witness, failed to appear on that date despite having been served with a subpoena. The court granted the People's request to trail the matter to November 29 and on November 27 issued a bench warrant to secure Haines's presence.

Haines again failed to appear when the case was called on November 29, the 30th day after Egbert's arraignment, despite the prosecutor's efforts to secure his presence. Over defense counsel's objection, the court found good cause to trail the case to the next day. Haines was arrested that evening on outstanding warrants and became available as a witness.

On November 30, Egbert unsuccessfully moved to dismiss on the ground she had been denied her right to speedy trial under PENAL CODE SECTION 1382¹ in that she had not been tried within 30 days of her arraignment. Egbert then pleaded guilty to one of the five misdemeanor counts. The court sentenced her to three years' probation on the condition she complete a domestic violence class.

People v. Weeks--D028400

Sonia Alisia Weeks was arrested on October 16, 1994, for suspicion of driving under the influence of drugs. She was issued a notice to appear on December 19, and released. However, 10 days before her appearance date, Weeks was arrested and incarcerated for a parole violation, due in part to the October 16 arrest. She remained in prison until February 17, 1996.

On December 16, 1994, Weeks was charged in a two count misdemeanor complaint. When she failed to appear on December 19, 1994, the date listed on the complaint, the court issued a bench warrant.

Shortly after her release from prison and 15 months after the complaint was filed, Weeks was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. She unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground her constitutional speedy trial rights had been violated due to unreasonable pre-arraignment delay. She then pleaded guilty to both counts. Sentence was imposed but stayed pending the outcome of her appeal.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Weeks and Egbert appealed to the appellate department of the superior court, arguing the municipal court erroneously denied their motions to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. The appellate department affirmed the municipal court's judgment in both cases, finding a claimed speedy trial violation does not survive a guilty plea. The appellate department also issued an order certifying transfer to this court "to secure uniformity of decision" in light of the seemingly contrary holdings in People v. Hernandez (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1355, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 324 and Avila v. Municipal Court (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 807, 196 Cal.Rptr. 286. We transferred the cases to this court for hearing and decision under rule 62(c), and consolidated them for purposes of appeal.

DISCUSSION

The issue presented here is whether a claimed speedy trial violation, either constitutional (Weeks) or statutory (Egbert), survives a guilty plea in misdemeanor prosecutions. Courts have consistently held a guilty plea waives appeal of a speedy trial claim, either constitutional or statutory, in felony prosecutions. (People v. Gutierrez (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 105, 113, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 526 [statutory]; People v. Hernandez, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1357-1358, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 324 [constitutional]; People v. Stittsworth (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 837, 841, 267 Cal.Rptr. 280 [statutory]; People v. Draughon (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 471, 473-474, 164 Cal.Rptr. 440 [statutory]; People v. Lee (1980) 100 Cal.App.3d 715, 717, 161 Cal.Rptr. 162 [constitutional]; People v. Hayton (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 413, 419, 156 Cal.Rptr. 426 [both]; People v. Hocking (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 778, 780, 296 P.2d 59 [constitutional].) Only one court has held denial of the statutory right to speedy trial is cognizable on appeal following a guilty plea to a misdemeanor. (Avila v. Municipal Court, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d at p. 812, 196 Cal.Rptr. 286.) Although we recognize there may be procedural differences in the prosecution of misdemeanors and felonies, we believe those differences have no bearing on the appealability of a speedy trial claim following a guilty plea. Accordingly, we formulate a bright-line rule precluding such appeals in misdemeanor as well as felony cases.

I. Appeals Following Guilty Plea

Appeals from the superior court following a guilty plea are limited to those that raise "reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings" and require a defendant to obtain a certificate of probable cause. (§ 1237.5; rule 31(d); People v. Hobbs (1994) 7 Cal.4th 948, 955, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 651, 873 P.2d 1246.) Unlike appeals from the superior court, appeals from a conviction in the municipal court following a guilty plea do not require a defendant to obtain a certificate of probable cause under section 1237.5. (People v. Woods (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 149, 154, 148 Cal.Rptr. 312; Avila v. Municipal Court, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d at p. 812, 196 Cal.Rptr. 286.) Nevertheless, appealable issues from a municipal court judgment following a guilty plea are similarly restricted to those that raise "reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings." (§ 1237.5, subd. (a); People v. DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 896, 135 Cal.Rptr. 786, 558 P.2d 872; In re Olsen (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 386, 390, 221 Cal.Rptr. 772; People v. Singer (1976) 128 Cal.Rptr. 920, 56 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 5.)

In essence, a guilty plea "concedes that the prosecution possesses legally admissible evidence sufficient to prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Turner (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 116, 125, 214 Cal.Rptr. 572.) Thus, a guilty plea waives any right to raise questions regarding the evidence, including its sufficiency or admissibility, even if the claim of evidentiary error is based on constitutional violations. (Ibid.) "Other than search and seizure issues which are specifically made reviewable by section 1538.5, subdivision (m), all errors arising prior to entry of a guilty plea are waived, except those which question the jurisdiction or legality of the proceedings resulting in the plea." (People v. Kaanehe (1977) 19 Cal.3d 1, 9, 136 Cal.Rptr. 409, 559 P.2d 1028.)

Because a guilty plea also waives any irregularity in the proceedings that would not preclude a conviction, irregularities that could be cured, or that would not preclude subsequent proceedings to establish guilt, may not be asserted on appeal after a guilty plea. "In other words, by pleading guilty the defendant admits that he did that which he is accused of doing and he thereby obviates the procedural necessity of establishing that he committed the crime charged.... A defendant thereafter can raise only those questions which go to the power of the state to try him despite his guilt." (People v. Turner, supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at p. 126, 214 Cal.Rptr. 572.)

II. Federal and State Constitutional Rights to Speedy Trial

The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed under both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution. (Klopfer v. North Carolina (1967) 386 U.S. 213, 223, 87 S.Ct. 988, 993, 18 L.Ed.2d 1; Harris v. Municipal Court (1930) 209 Cal. 55, 60-61, 285 P. 699.) The speedy trial right, applicable in both felony and misdemeanor prosecutions, is meant to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration, minimize the accused's anxiety and concern and limit possible impairment of the defense. (Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2193, 33 L.Ed.2d 101; Serna v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 239, 248, 219 Cal.Rptr. 420, 707 P.2d 793.) "Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system." (Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 532, 92 S.Ct. at p. 2193.)

Once the right to speedy trial attaches under the Sixth Amendment, "a balancing test, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed," is used to evaluate a claimed violation. (Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192, fn. omitted; Doggett v. United States (1992) 505 U.S. 647, 651, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 2690, ...