Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp.

• Decision Date: 26 July 1995
• Docket Number: No. 92-4711,92-4711
• Citation: 59 F.3d 1496
• Parties: , 64 USLW 2093 Domingo GUEVARA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARITIME OVERSEAS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 1496

59 F.3d 1496

1995 A.M.C. 2409, 64 USLW 2093

Domingo GUEVARA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARITIME OVERSEAS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 92-4711.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

July 26, 1995.

Robert L. Klawetter, Jeffrey R. Bale, Eastham, Watson, Dale & Forney, L.L.P., Houston, TX, for appellant.

Robert B. Acomb, Jr., Edward J. Koehl, Jr., Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevant, Carrere & Deneare, New Orleans, LA, for Central Gulf Lines & Waterman Steamship.

Dennis Michael McElwee, Schechter & Eisenman, Houston, TX, for appellee.

Harvey J. Lewis, Lawrence S. Kullman, New Orleans, LA, for amicus curiae Louisiana Trial Lawyers Ass'n.

Gerard T. Gelpi, C. Gordon Starling, Jr., G. Beauregard Gelpi, James D. Bercaw, Gelpi, Sullivan, Carroll & Gibbens, New Orleans, LA, for amicus curiae American Institute of Merchant Shipping, et al.

Jerry C. Von Sternberg, for Maritime Overseas Corp.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, GOLDBERG, ^* KING, GARWOOD, JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS, JONES, SMITH, DUHE, WIENER, BARKSDALE, EMILIO M. GARZA, DeMOSS, BENAVIDES, STEWART and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

KING, Circuit Judge:

We reheard this case en banc to reconsider our 1984 decision in Holmes v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 734 F.2d 1110 (5th Cir.1984), that an award of punitive damages under the general maritime law may be made when an employer willfully and callously refuses to pay maintenance or cure to an injured seaman. Developments in the law since 1984 have caused us to reevaluate the basis for such a punitive award and to conclude that Holmes should be overruled.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The facts and procedural history of this case are set forth in the panel opinion, Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 34 F.3d 1279, 1290 (5th Cir.), reh'g en banc granted, 34 F.3d 1279 (5th Cir.1994), but we summarize them here for the reader's convenience.

Domingo Guevara was injured on May 29, 1990 while serving as a crewmember on the vessel Overseas Philadelphia. The vessel was owned and operated by Guevara's employer, Maritime Overseas Corporation ("Maritime"). The crew was preparing the ship to sail from Freeport, Texas, and Guevara was helping to secure the gangway. Because of the gangway's size, the ship's crane was used to lift it, and the task was being performed in the midst of considerable wind and rain.

Guevara was standing on a catwalk on the vessel pursuant to the orders of his superior, the vessel's bosun, who was operating the crane. As the gangway was lifted, it swayed in Guevara's direction, and the bosun ordered Guevara to move away from where he was standing. When Guevara tried to move, however, he momentarily caught the tread of his boot in the catwalk grating. After freeing himself, Guevara jumped from the catwalk to the deck below to avoid being hit by the gangway.

Unfortunately, Guevara injured his knee while falling to the deck. He promptly reported his injury to the third mate and he was given assistance. Despite his injury, Guevara continued to work on the vessel for a period of four months, apparently to qualify for union benefits. Upon the vessel's return to port, Guevara saw a doctor who diagnosed him as having a torn medial meniscus and a torn anterior cruciate ligament. Although Guevara was initially reluctant to undergo surgery, his knee was operated on in February of 1991. Beginning on February 5, 1991, Guevara made a number of formal demands on Maritime for maintenance and cure. Maritime, however, made no payment until June 24, 1991 at the earliest. Despite subsequent demands, Guevara did not receive his second and final payment until December 29, 1991.

Guevara brought a negligence claim under the Jones Act and an unseaworthiness claim under the general maritime law against Maritime. Guevara also sought punitive damages for Maritime's failure to pay maintenance on a timely basis. The jury returned a verdict for Guevara, finding Maritime negligent, the Overseas Philadelphia unseaworthy, and Guevara not negligent. Further, the jury awarded Guevara $131,000 in compensatory damages for his injury and $60,000 in punitive damages for Maritime's arbitrary and capricious failure to pay maintenance. ¹ Maritime now appeals.

In this opinion, we only address the question of whether punitive damages are still available in maintenance and cure cases. As a consequence, the portions of the panel opinion addressing the jury's finding of negligence (Part IIA), see Guevara, 34 F.3d at 1281-82, and the jury's finding of Maritime's arbitrary and capricious behavior (Part IIB), see id. at 1282-83, are reinstated.

II. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

A. The Doctrine of Maintenance and Cure

When a seaman becomes ill or injured while in the service of his ship, the shipowner must pay him maintenance and cure regardless of whether the shipowner was at fault or whether the ship was unseaworthy. See Morales v. Garijak, Inc., 829 F.2d 1355, 1358 (5th Cir.1987). "Maintenance" is the right of a seaman to food and lodging if he falls ill or becomes injured while in the service of the ship. "Cure" is the right to necessary medical services. This duty to pay maintenance and cure is of ancient vintage, and its origin is customarily traced back to the medieval sea codes. See The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 169, 23 S.Ct. 483, 484-85, 47 L.Ed. 760 (1903); see generally Grant Gilmore & Charles L. Black, Jr., The Law of Admiralty Sec. 6-6, at 281 (2d ed. 1975); Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law Sec. 6-28, at 348 (2d ed. 1994). Only "seamen" can assert the right to maintenance and cure, but the legal test for seaman status in maintenance and cure actions is the same as the inquiry for standing under the Jones Act. See, e.g., Hall v. Diamond M Co., 732 F.2d 1246, 1248 (5th Cir.1984) ("The standard for determining seaman status for the purposes of maintenance and cure is the same as that established for determining status under the Jones Act.").

In the United States, the doctrine of maintenance and cure appears to have been recognized by Justice Story in two cases which he decided while riding on circuit. See Harden v. Gordon, 11 F.Cas. 480 (C.C.D.Me.1823) (No. 6,047); Reed v. Canfield, 20 F.Cas. 426 (C.C.D.Mass.1842) (No. 11,641). These cases generally explain the seaman's right to maintenance and cure partly on humanitarian grounds and partly on economic grounds. As Gilmore and Black write:

The doctrine not only protected the childlike and improvident seaman (who is usually "poor and friendless" and apt to acquire "habits of gross indulgence, carelessness and improvidence"), but served "the great public policy of preserving this important class of citizens for the commercial service and maritime defence of the nation." Even the shipowners derived an ultimate benefit from being made to assume these charges, since, as Story shrewdly pointed out, seamen were thereby encouraged "to engage in perilous voyages with more promptitude, and at lower wages."

Gilmore & Black, supra, Sec. 6-6, at 281 (quoting Harden v. Gordon, 11 F.Cas. 480 (C.C.D.Me.1823) (Case No. 6,047)) (footnote omitted). This obligation to provide maintenance and cure "embraces not only the obligation to pay a subsistence allowance and to reimburse the seaman for medical expenses he incurs; the employer must take all reasonable steps to insure that the seaman who is injured or ill receives proper care and treatment." Schoenbaum, supra, Sec. 6-28, at 348; see also Morales, 829 F.2d at 1358.

B. Legal Developments and their Effect on Holmes v. J. Ray McDermott

Until 1984, we had never upheld an award of punitive damages for the willful nonpayment of maintenance and cure. In our 1984 Holmes opinion, however, we did uphold such a punitive award, and we supported the award with the following analysis:

In Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 82 S.Ct. 997, 8 L.Ed.2d 88 (1962), the Supreme Court held that an employer's willful and arbitrary refusal to pay maintenance and cure gives rise to a claim for damages in the form of attorneys' fees in addition to the claim for general damages. Subsequent decisions have established that, in addition to such attorneys' fees, punitive damages for such refusal are available under the general maritime law. See Complaint of Merry Shipping, Inc., 650 F.2d 622, 625 (5th Cir.1981) (collecting cases); see also Robinson v. Pocahontas, Inc., 477 F.2d 1048 (1st Cir.1973).

734 F.2d at 1118 (citations omitted). Thus, at the time of our Holmes decision, we relied upon three cases--the Supreme Court's Vaughan, this court's Merry Shipping, and the First Circuit's Pocahontas--and there was not a great deal of additional guidance to be found. Judge Garwood's well-considered concurrence to the panel opinion, see Guevara, 34 F.3d at 1284-90 (Garwood, J., concurring), together with significant developments in the law of admiralty and elsewhere, have caused us to rethink our position. We begin, therefore, by reexamining the precedents that form the foundation of our Holmes opinion, and in the end, we conclude that Holmes 's approval of punitive damages is no longer justifiable in cases of willful nonpayment of maintenance and cure.

1. Vaughan v. Atkinson

In Holmes, we cited Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 82 S.Ct. 997, 8 L.Ed.2d 88 (1962), only for the proposition that a willful and arbitrary failure to pay maintenance and cure gave rise to a claim for attorney's fees as well as general damages. See 734 F.2d at 1118. We did not cite Vaughan as an example of the Supreme Court's approval of punitive damage awards in the maintenance and cure context; indeed, we explicitly noted that it was "subsequent decisions" that made punitive damages available. See id. Nevertheless, it is possible that Vaughan, while only upholding an award of attorney's fees, announced a principle broader than its result. Thus, we now attempt to determine how broad this...