59 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 1995), 94-1911, Homola v. McNamara
|Docket Nº:||94-1911, 94-2898, 95-1545 & 95-1573.|
|Citation:||59 F.3d 647|
|Party Name:||Raymond HOMOLA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Paul McNAMARA, et al., Defendants-Appellees.|
|Case Date:||July 05, 1995|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit|
Submitted June 16, 1995.
Raymond Homola, Granite City, IL (submitted), pro se.
Randolph E. Schum, Edwardsville, IL, pro se.
Deborah L. Ahlstrand, Asst. Atty. Gen., Civil Appeals Div., Chicago, IL, for Daniel J. Stack.
Kevin F. Blaine, Madelyn J. Lamb, Coppinger, Carter, Schrempf & Blaine, Alton, IL, for Debra J. Meadows, Paul McNamara, City of Edwardsville, IL.
Before BAUER, EASTERBROOK, and MANION, Circuit Judges.
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge.
Litigation is society's way to resolve disputes. Courts invite parties to make their evidence and arguments known. Appellate courts correct errors. After the process has run its course, there should be peace between the former adversaries. Many persons do not see litigation this way, however. They adopt a never-say-die attitude. If the first case goes against them, then some chicanery must be to blame. Now if the courts are unable to separate truth from fiction--the premise of this attitude toward the results of litigation--one would suppose that the remedy lies in a political forum, or perhaps is an occasion for writing an expose. Yet many litigants who refuse to accept judgments against them see their balm as--more litigation! If the judicial process is as inept as these litigants believe, then one wonders why they try, try again. Do they hope that their adversary will be more placid than they have been and will accept an adverse judgment? Yet why, if judgments are not final when adverse, should they be final when favorable? Or is the new suit just an effort to heap costs on one's nemesis, without regard to any prospect of obtaining a favorable judgment? Either way, the new suit is vexatious and intolerable, a ground of sanctions and, if the offense recurs, an order closing the courthouse doors. See Support Systems International, Inc. v. Mack, 45 F.3d 185 (7th Cir.1995); Sassower v. ABA, 33 F.3d 733 (7th Cir.1994); Sato v. Plunkett, 154 F.R.D. 189 (N.D.Ill.1994).
Raymond Homola is such a litigant. Some years ago he applied for admission to the law school of Southern Illinois University at Carbondale. He was turned down and sued. He lost. Homola v. Southern Illinois University, 1993 U.S.App. (7th Cir.). Homola promptly filed a fresh suit, making identical allegations, and lost again, this time on the ground of claim
preclusion (res judicata). Homola v. Southern Illinois University, 1995 U.S.App. (7th Cir.). While suing the Law School, Homola was suing a number of defendants whom he accused of battery and other torts. He lost and did not appeal. Instead he filed another, identical suit, which he lost on identical grounds. Homola v. Miles, 1994 U.S. Dist. (S.D.Ill.), affirmed, 1995 U.S.App. (7th Cir.).
Homola has been a defendant as well as a plaintiff. Ross Construction Company sued Homola in a state court, which issued an order directing Homola to take down a fence that violated a restrictive covenant. In retaliation, Homola filed a federal suit against Randolph E. Schum, attorney for Ross Construction in the state case. Homola and Schum are citizens of Illinois, so diversity jurisdiction is unavailable; realizing this, Homola alleged that Schum was a state actor and asserted that he is liable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. The district judge thought the complaint deficient because Schum is not a state actor, and because the complaint does not allege that the state court's procedures fell short of constitutional norms. He dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Homola's appeal is before us as No. 95-1573.
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