Veazey v. Bd. of Educ. of Rich Twp. High Sch. Dist. 227

• Decision Date: 20 July 2016
• Docket Number: No. 1–15–1795.,1–15–1795.
• Citation: 59 N.E.3d 857,406 Ill.Dec. 79
• Parties: Frederick C. VEAZEY, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. The BOARD OF EDUCATION OF RICH TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT 227; Bridget Imoukhuede; and Emmanuel Imoukhuede, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

59 N.E.3d 857

406 Ill.Dec. 79

Frederick C. VEAZEY, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.The BOARD OF EDUCATION OF RICH TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT 227; Bridget Imoukhuede; and Emmanuel Imoukhuede, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 1–15–1795.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division.

July 20, 2016.

Center for Open Government Law Clinic of Chicago–Kent College of Law and Krislov & Associates, Ltd. (Clinton A. Krislov, of counsel), both of Chicago, for appellant.

Johnson, Jones, Snelling, Gilbert & Davis, P.C. (Jeffrey B. Gilbert, of counsel), and Robert E. Lehrer, both of Chicago, for appellees Bridget Imoukhuede and Emmanuel Imoukhuede.

Franczek Radelet P.C., of Chicago (John A. Reiias, Jacqueline F. Wernz, and Nicki B. Bazer, of counsel), for appellee Board of Education of Rich Township High School District 227.

OPINION

Presiding Justice MASON

delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Plaintiff Frederick Veazey filed suit seeking, among other relief, a declaratory judgment that a vote by defendant the Board of Education of Rich Township High School District 227 (Board) to reinstate defendant Dr. Bridget Imoukhuede's employment with back pay and attorney fees was illegal because the Board allowed Imoukhuede's husband and Board member, defendant Emmanuel Imoukhuede, to cast the tie-breaking vote in violation of defendant Rich Township High School District 227's (District) anti-nepotism policy. The trial court sua sponte invoked the Administrative Review Law (Review Law) (735 ILCS 5/3–101 et seq.

(West 2014)) and dismissed Veazey's second amended complaint, finding that he lacked standing to challenge the Board's vote because he was not a party to the administrative proceedings. We agree with Veazey that his challenge was directed to the legality of the Board's vote and not the propriety of Imoukhuede's reinstatement thus rendering the Review Law inapplicable. We also agree that Veazey has standing to pursue that challenge. But because Veazey's second amended complaint fails to sufficiently plead facts supporting taxpayer standing, an issue not addressed by the trial court, we remand and direct the trial court to grant leave to amend. Consequently, we reverse the trial court's dismissal of Veazey's second amended complaint and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 During the 2012–13 school year, the District employed Imoukhuede, a tenured teacher, as the assistant principal of alternative programs. The District hired Imoukhuede in 1990; her husband was first elected to the Board in 2007.

¶ 4 On March 19, 2013, the District adopted the following anti-nepotism policy:

“For the purposes of this section, a relative is defined as a child, parent, grandparent, sibling, cousin, or spouse who is connected to another in that regard by way of legal (adoption, marriage, or otherwise), blood, in-law, step, or foster relationship.

An individual who is a relative of either a District employee or a Board member is ineligible to be hired by the District unless there are no other qualified applicants for the position. This policy does not apply to individuals who have already been hired, even if their relative is subsequently elected to the board.

Employees and Board members will not participate in employment decisions concerning either their relative or the position for which their relative has applied/currently holds. This includes, but is not limited to, decisions regarding hiring, employment status, reappointment, placement, evaluation, pay rate, salary increases, promotion, tenure, and awards.”

¶ 5 At a Board meeting held on July 30, 2013, with a quorum of Board members present, four members voted in favor of a resolution to suspend Imoukhuede without pay and discharge her. The record does not reflect whether Emmanuel voted on the resolution. The Board's resolution was adopted and became effective on August 6, 2013.

¶ 6 Pursuant to the School Code (105 ILCS 5/34–85 (West 2014)

), Imoukhuede contested the Board's resolution and requested a hearing. Following the hearing, the hearing officer found that the Board's decision to discharge Imoukhuede was arbitrary and capricious and against the manifest weight of the evidence. The hearing officer also found that the Board violated Imoukhuede's due process rights. The hearing officer recommended Imoukhuede's reinstatement to the same position or a substantially equivalent position and reimbursement for all lost income and benefits, including reasonable attorney fees.

¶ 7 The Board held a special meeting on June 9, 2014, to vote on whether to accept the hearing officer's recommendation to reinstate Imoukhuede. Emmanuel initially indicated he would abstain from voting. When the matter was called for a vote, three members voted in favor of adopting the hearing officer's recommendation and three members voted against. A tie vote would have meant that the resolution did not pass and Imoukhuede would not be reinstated. Emmanuel reversed his position and ultimately cast the deciding vote in favor of reinstating his wife, creating a 4 to 3 majority.

¶ 8 On July 15, 2014, the Board held another meeting to consider whether to adopt the hearing officer's recommendation that Imoukhuede be awarded back pay and attorney fees. Five members of the Board—constituting a quorum—were present. This time, Emmanuel expressed no reservations about participating in the vote. Three board members, including Emmanuel, voted in favor of payment of back pay and attorney fees and two members voted against it. One of the board members voting against the resolution explained that payment was not mandated by any court, but merely reflected the hearing officer's recommendation.

¶ 9 After the Board's vote, Veazey, as a taxpayer residing within the District's boundaries, filed a complaint against Imoukhuede, the Board and Emmanuel. Veazey initially proceeded pro se, but was later represented by counsel who amended his complaint twice. Veazey's second amended complaint included the following counts: (1) a claim under the declaratory judgment provision of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2–701 (West 2014)

) seeking a determination that the Board conducted an illegal vote by permitting Emmanuel to cast votes in favor of resolutions benefitting his wife in violation of the District's anti-nepotism policy; (2) a claim asserting it was “inequitable” for Imoukhuede to retain the funds received from the Board's illegal vote; and (3) a claim seeking recovery of fraudulently obtained public funds (735 ILCS 5/20–103 (West 2014) ) based on the allegation that Emmanuel engaged in a fraudulent scheme to reinstate his wife with back pay in violation of the anti-nepotism policy. Veazey withdrew a previously pled count asserting a taxpayer claim to recover funds improperly expended belonging to a municipality (65 ILCS 5/1–5–1 (West 2014) ) in recognition of the fact that the Board was not a municipality.

¶ 10 Imoukhuede responded with a section 2–619.1 (735 ILCS 5/2–619.1 (West 2014)

) combined motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2–615 (735 ILCS 5/2–615 (West 2014) ) and section 2–619(a)(9) (735 ILCS 5/2–619(a)(9) (West 2014)) of the Code. The Board and Emmanuel together filed a section 2–619(a)(9) motion to dismiss. Both motions to dismiss asserted primarily that no actual controversy existed to support a cause of action for declaratory judgment and that the anti-nepotism policy lacked the force and effect of law.

¶ 11 During the hearing on the motions, the trial judge sua sponte determined that the Review Law was the only avenue of review, and because Veazey was not a party to the administrative proceeding, he lacked standing to bring his claims. The trial court granted the motions to dismiss with prejudice “for reasons stated in open court.”

¶ 12 After the trial court's ruling, Emmanuel lost his bid for re-election to the Board. Following the election, the new Board was granted leave to appear through substitute counsel. The Board's new counsel filed a motion seeking “clarification” as to whether the trial court based its ruling on the Review Law, and, if so, the Board claimed error arguing, in part, that the Review Law had no applicability to the reinstatement, and not dismissal, of an employee.

¶ 13 The court clarified its conclusion that the Review Law applied and Veazey could not challenge the Board's decision. The court also observed that the Board likewise could not have sought review under the Review Law, but refrained from addressing any rights the Board may have in any other proceeding.

¶ 14 Shortly after that ruling, the Board's new counsel filed a complaint against the Imoukhuedes. In the new action, the Board, contrary to its defense of the vote in Veazey's case, took the position that Emmanuel: (1) violated the anti-nepotism policy by voting in favor of reinstating his wife; (2) created a conflict of interest by voting in favor of reinstating his wife; and (3) fraudulently concealed from the Board that his wife had announced her retirement prior to the vote to reinstate her. The Board also asserted that Imoukhuede acted in bad faith when she requested a hearing regarding her suspension even though she had already retired. The Board further contended that the Imoukhuedes were unjustly enriched by the funds paid to Imoukhuede and sought recovery of the fraudulently obtained public funds (735 ILCS 5/20–103 (West 2014)

). The Board's complaint against the Imoukhuedes is not at issue in this appeal.

¶ 15 ANALYSIS

¶ 16 We are cognizant of the fact that the Board in the trial court advocated against Veazey and defended the legality of its vote. Although the Board still takes the position that it was not guilty of any wrongdoing, in this court the Board is now advocating in favor of Veazey's position both that the Review Law is not applicable and that Veazey has taxpayer standing. The Board's about-face was occasioned by the intervening election and not by any change in the law. But the doctrines of...