Billings v. People

• Decision Date: 20 February 1901
• Citation: 189 Ill. 472,59 N.E. 798
• Parties: BILLINGS v. PEOPLE (two cases).
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

189 Ill. 472

59 N.E. 798

BILLINGS

v.PEOPLE (two cases).¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 20, 1901.

Appeal from Cook county court; O. N. Carter, Judge.

Proceedings to subject the estate of Cornelius K. G. Billings to the tax imposed by the inheritance tax law. From a decree assessing and fixing the amount of tax, the widow, Augusta S. Billings, and others appeal. Affirmed.

Winston & Meagher, for appellants Cornelius K. G. Billings and Albert M. Billings Ruddock.

Julius A. Johnson, Co. Atty., for the People.

CARTER, J.

Albert M. Billings died testate in Chicago, February 7, 1897, leaving a large estate. He left surviving him Augusta S. Billings, his widow, and Cornelius K. G. Billings, his son (who was married and had two children), and Albert M. Billings Ruddock, a minor grandson, who was the son of a deceased daughter, who had intermarried with Charles H. Ruddock. He left also a son by a former marriage, Henry A. Billings. These were his only heirs. The first clause of his will was as follows: ‘I give unto and bequeath to my beloved wife, Augusta S. Billings, for her use and benefit during her natural life (and at her death to be divided as hereinafter set forth), my entire estate, both real and personal, wherever located, excepting such reservations as are hereinafter set forth and made.’ Then followed devises of certain real estate to his said son Cornelius, and his grandson, Albert M. Billings Ruddock, and certain annuities to his son Henry A. Billings, and to his sister. The will then provided as follows: ‘I do also herein give and bequeath to my son Cornelius Kingsley Garrison Billings, and to my grandson, Albert M. Billings Ruddock, to be held and owned by them at the death of my wife, Augusta S. Billings, as is hereinafter explained and set forth, all the property and estate herein bequeathed to her, my wife, not otherwise disposed of by my said executors hereinafter named, in the manner following, to wit: Two-thirds thereof to my son C. K. G. Billings, and one-third thereof to my grandson, Albert M. Billings Ruddock, to be held and owned by them, as above stated, during their lifetime; and, should my son C. K. G. Billings die not leaving a living child or children of his own issue, the property herein bequeathed to him shall revert and he held and owned by my grandchild, Albert M. Billings Ruddock, during his lifetime; and should my grandson, Albert M. Billings Ruddock, die not leaving a child or children of his own issue, then all the property and estate herein bequeathed to him shall revert and become the property and estate of my brother, John D. Billings (should he be alive at that time), and my living nephews and nieces, who shall be living at the time of the death of my said grandson, as aforesaid, said brother, nieces, and nephews to share and share alike in said estate. I hereby make, constitute and appoint my dear wife, Augusta S. Billings, and my dear son Cornelius Kingsley Garrison Billings, and my dear son-in-law, Charles H. Ruddock, to be the sole executors of this, my last will and testament.’

The widow renounced the provision made for her in the will, and elected to take her dower and legal share in the estate under statute. The county court appointed an appraiser to fix the fair market value of the estate for the purpose of assessing the inheritance tax, as providing by an act entitled ‘An act to tax gifts, legacies and inheritances in certain cases and to provide for the collection of the same,’ approved June 15, 1895 (Hurd's Rev. St. 1899, p. 1460). The widow's dower award and one-third of the personalty were appraised at the total sum of $2,363,151.75, the tax upon which, after deducting the $20,000 exemption, was fixed at $23,443.53. The life interest (as it was decreed to be) of said Cornelius in the two-thirds bequeathed to him was appraised at $2,472,118.75, and, after deducting his exemption of $20,000, the tax to be paid by him was assessed at $24,821.18. This included the specific devise of real estate valued at $30,000. The life interest of Albert M. Billings Ruddock in the one-third interest bequeathed to him was appraised at $1,408,374.77, and, after deducting his exemption of $20,000, his tax was assessed at $14,043.74. This included also the tax on a specific devise to him of real estate valued at $16,000. The court, in approving the appraiser's report, found that Cornelius K. G. Billings took a life estate in the two-thirds of the residuary estate bequeathed to him, and that there was a remainder therein of the value, at the testator's death, of $864,584.70, which had not vested, and that there was a remainder in the one-third bequeathed to Albert M. Billings Ruddock for life, of the value of $250,976.95, which had not vested, and ordered that the tax on these remainders be postponed until they shall have become vested. The said Augusta S. Billings alone, and said Cornelius K. G. Billings and Albert M. Billings Ruddock together, have appealed from the order and decree assessing and fixing the amount of said tax. The two appears will be considered together as one case.

The widow having renounced the life estate given her by the will in the whole estate, the estates given to the son Cornelius and the grandson, Albert, were severallly accelerated, and they became entitled at once to their several interests without waiting until the death of the widow. Blatchford v. Newberry, 99 Ill. 11. But we shall consider, first, the objections to the tax interposed by the widow, Augusta S. Billings, on her appeal.

It will be seen, by reference to the first section of the statute taxing inheritances, that the tax is confined to property ‘which shall pass by will or by the intestate laws of this state’ (Hurd's Rev. St. 1899, p. 1460), and it was contended below, and is contended here, that the property which came to the widow by reason of the death of her husband and of her renunciation did not pass from him either by will or the intestate laws of the state, and was not, therefore, subject to the tax. The total sum of $2,363,151.75 fixed as the value of the property which passed to the widow was made up of $13,070 for her award, $69,266.70 for her dower, and the balance for her one-third of the personalty. It must, of course, be conceded that no part of this property passed to her on the death of Mr. Billings by his will, for she renounced the provision made for her in the will, and therefore became entitled to the same share or interest in the estate that she would have been entitled to if her husband had died intestate. Section 1 of the statute relating to dower (Hurd's Rev. St. 1899, p. 657) provides that ‘the surviving husband or wife shall be endowed of the one-third part of all of the lands whereof the deceased husband or wife was seised of an estate of inheritance, at any time during the marriage, unless the same shall have been relinquished in legal form.’ And section 10 of the act provides that ‘any devise of land, or estate therein, or any other provision made by the will of a deceased husband or wife for a surviving wife or husband, shall, unless otherwise expressed in the will, bar the dower of such survivor in the lands of the deceased, unless such survivor shall elect to and does renounce the benefit of such devise or other provision, in which case he or she shall be entitled to dower in the lands and to one-third of the personal estate, after the payment of all debts.’ Section 1 of the act in regard to the descent of property (Hurd's Rev. St. 1899, p. 652) provides ‘that estates, both real and personal, of residents and nonresident proprietors in this state dying intestate, or whose estates or any part thereof shall be deemed and taken as intestate estate, after all just debts and claims against such estates are fully paid, shall descend to and be distributed in manner following, to-wit: * * * Fourth. When there is a widow or a surviving husband, and also a child or children or descendants of such child or children of the intestate, the widow or surviving husband shall receive, as his or her absolute personal estate, one-third of all the personal estate of the intestate.’

The widow's award is provided for by the act in regard to the administration of estates. It is true, as contended, that the legal institution of dower is of great antiquity, and was not created by our statute, but was fully established and provided for by the common law. Still, it is also true that it may be and has been not only recognized, but also modified and regulated, by statute. The estate by the curtesy also existed by the common law, but it has been abolished in this state, and the surviving husband given the right of dower in lieu of it, and no one doubts the legislature had the power to change or abolish the estate by the curtesy. Nor can it be doubted that the institution of dower is subject to full legislative control, and may be modified or changed at any time before it has become a vested estate by the death of the spouse owning the land. Henson v. Moore, 104 Ill. 403;Best v. Jenks, 123 Ill. 447, 15 N. E. 173; Randall v. Kreiger, 23 Wall. 148, 24 L. Ed. 124; McNeer v. McNeer, 142 Ill. 388, 32 N. E. 681,19 L. R. A. 256. True, the husband cannot deprive his wife of her inchoate right of dower, but the state may. She does not hold by contract, but holds by laws which the state may change.

It is contended, however, that whatever the power of the legislature may be to control dower or to impose burdens upon it, the act imposing a tax upon inheritances, when strictly construed, as it should be, does not include dower, because, it is said, dower does not ‘pass by the intestate laws of this state,’ and the act does not, by any necessary terms, include dower. There are no laws of this state which are specifically designated as ‘intestate laws,’ and we are called upon to determine what laws or system of laws were referred to under that appellation by the act in question. The...