Mattos v. Agarano

• Decision Date: 12 January 2010
• Docket Number: No. 08-15567.,08-15567.
• Citation: 590 F.3d 1082
• Parties: Troy MATTOS; Jayzel Mattos, Plaintiffs-Appellees v. Darren AGARANO; Ryan Aikala; Stuart Kunioka; Halayudha MacKnight, Defendants-Appellants, and Maui County, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

590 F.3d 1082

Troy MATTOS; Jayzel Mattos, Plaintiffs-Appellees v. Darren AGARANO; Ryan Aikala; Stuart Kunioka; Halayudha MacKnight, Defendants-Appellants, and Maui County, Defendant.

No. 08-15567.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted May 15, 2009.

Filed January 12, 2010.

Brian T. Moto, Corporation Counsel for the County of Maui, Laureen L. Martin (argued), Moana M. Lutey, Richard B. Rost, Cheryl Tipton, Deputies Corporation Counsel, Wailuku, HI, for the defendants-appellants.

Eric A. Seitz (argued), Lawrence I. Kawasaki, Honolulu, HI, for the plaintiffs-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii, David A. Ezra, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 07-CV-00220-DAE.

Before: ALEX KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, JAY S. BYBEE and CONSUELO M. CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Maui police officers Darren Agarano, Halayudha MacKnight, Stuart Kunioka, and Ryan Aikala appeal the district court's order denying their motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity in this § 1983 action. The district court ruled that material questions of fact existed as to whether the officers' use of a Taser gun ("Taser") against plaintiff Jayzel Mattos was constitutionally reasonable and summary judgment was therefore inappropriate. Because we conclude that, even taking the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the defendant officers did not violate Jayzel's constitutional rights, we reverse the judgment of the district court.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 23, 2006, sometime after 11 p.m., a domestic disturbance broke out between Jayzel and Troy Mattos at their home. During the fight, Jayzel asked her fourteen-year-old daughter, Cheynice, to call the police. Cheynice told the dispatcher that Jayzel and Troy were engaged in a physical altercation and that things were being thrown around. Officers Agarano, MacKnight, Kunioka, and Aikala responded to the 911 call. When the officers arrived, they found Troy, a sixfoot-three-inch tall man weighing approximately 200 pounds, sitting at the top of the stairs just outside the front door of a second story residence with two bottles of beer lying nearby. Based on the beer bottles and the smell of alcohol, Officer Kunioka believed that Troy was intoxicated. When Kunioka approached and asked Troy what had happened, Troy responded that he and his wife had argued but that the argument had not gotten physical. Kunioka asked Troy to get Jayzel so that they could talk to her and make sure she was safe.

The parties differ in their accounts of what follows, but at this stage of the litigation, we take the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. See Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 693 (9th Cir.2005) (en banc).

Troy entered his home to get Jayzel, and Officer Agarano stepped inside the doorway. When Troy returned with Jayzel, Troy became upset that Agarano was in his house, and he demanded that the officers leave, insisting that they had no right to be in the house and yelling profanities at them. The officers asked Jayzel to speak to them outside. Jayzel agreed and asked her husband and the officers to calm down and not wake her sleeping children. Aikala then entered the hallway area to arrest Troy, who was still yelling at the officers. Jayzel asked Aikala why her husband was being arrested and again asked that the officers and her husband calm down, leave the house, and not disturb her children.

At this point, Jayzel was cornered between the officers and her husband — Officer Agarano was in front of her, Officer Aikala was at her right, and her back was against her husband's chest. Aikala moved to apprehend Troy and bumped against Jayzel. Feeling uncomfortable and exposed with Aikala squarely in front of her, Jayzel raised her hands, palms forward at her chest, to "keep [Aikala] from flushing his body against [hers]." Jayzel agrees that both of her hands touched Aikala's chest, but asserts that she did not put her hands up until Aikala was pressed up against her.

Aikala immediately stepped back and asked Jayzel if she was touching an officer. Jayzel testified that she was scared and again implored everyone to calm down and not wake her children. At that moment, Jayzel felt a pinch on the back of her right hand and then felt "an incredible burning and painful feeling locking all of [her] joints," she heard herself scream, and felt herself fall to the floor. Aikala had tased Jayzel and cycled it for five seconds.

Jayzel and Troy were taken into custody; both were charged with harassment, while Troy was charged with resisting arrest and Jayzel with obstructing government operations. A state court judge dismissed the charges against Jayzel, and it appears that the State later dropped all criminal charges against Troy.

Troy and Jayzel brought suit against the officers and others under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of their Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights based on the officers' warrantless entry into their residence, Jayzel and Troy's arrests, and the officers' use of the Taser on Jayzel. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims except an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment based on the officers' use of the Taser on Jayzel. With respect to excessive force, the court ruled that there were questions of fact material to deciding whether the use of the Taser was constitutionally reasonable. The officers brought this appeal.

II. ANALYSIS

It is well-settled that the party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Once the moving party has met this initial burden, the nonmoving party has the subsequent burden of presenting evidence to show that a genuine issue of fact remains. The party opposing the motion for summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [her] pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. If the party opposing the motion "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial" then summary judgment is proper. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

Once the officers moved for summary judgment as a matter of law, presenting evidence that the use of a Taser was not excessive force under the Fourth Amendment and that a reasonable officer would not have known that a Taser deployment in this situation would violate the Fourth Amendment, the Mattoses could not defeat summary judgment by relying on conclusory allegations in their pleading. They had the burden to come forward with specific facts — such as the force used in a deployment of a Taser or the injuries Jayzel suffered — to show that the officers' use of a Taser was indeed a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Despite the Mattoses failure to offer additional evidence to defeat summary judgment, we view the submitted evidence in the light most favorable to the Mattoses in determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact in their § 1983 claim. See Bingham v. City of Manhattan Beach, 341 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir.2003).

In evaluating a § 1983 claim against an officer, we generally proceed in a two-part analysis. The "threshold question" is "[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right?" Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (abrogated in part on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 808, 818, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009)). If the Constitution was not violated, that is the end of the inquiry. If there was a violation, however, we proceed to the question of qualified immunity. Officers are protected by qualified immunity, which is "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability," Pearson 129 S.Ct. at 815. When an officer asserts immunity, the court dismisses the case unless the officer knew that his conduct was "clearly unlawful," that is, unless the officer understood or should have understood that his actions violated a clearly established right. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151. Although we have flexibility in deciding which part of the analysis to address first, we think it important in this case to determine first whether a constitutional violation occurred. See Pearson, 129 S.Ct. at 818 (holding that "while the sequence set forth [in Saucier] is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory").

A. Constitutional Violation

Although we find the question to be a close one, on this record, we cannot conclude that the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures" U.S. CONST. amend. IV. When a plaintiff claims that she was not "secure in [her] person" because law enforcement officers used excessive and, therefore, "unreasonable" force in the course of an arrest, we balance "`the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests' against `the countervailing government interests at stake.'" Miller v. Clark County, 340 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir.2003) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989)). We have held that we conduct this inquiry in a three-step analysis. "First, we assess the gravity of the particular intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests by evaluating the type and amount of force inflicted." Id. Second, we analyze ...