590 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1979), 77-5032, United States v. Malatesta
|Citation:||590 F.2d 1379|
|Party Name:||UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daniel|
|Case Date:||March 12, 1979|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit|
Certiorari Denied March 19, 1979.
See 99 S.Ct. 1508.
Michael Brodsky, Miami, Fla., for Malatesta.
Bernard S. Yedlin, Miami, Fla. (Court-appointed), for Victor Dodaro.
Michael J. Doddo, Miami, Fla. (Court-appointed), for Jacquelin Champlin Dodaro.
Murray M. Silver, Atlanta, Ga., for Bertolotti.
Alan E. Weinstein, Miami Beach, Fla. (Court-appointed), for Lynch.
Jack V. Eskenazi, U. S. Atty., Miami, Fla., John F. Evans, Sp. Atty., U. S. Dept.
of Justice, Miami, Fla., Paul J. Brysh, T. George Gilinsky, Sydney M. Glazer, Attys., App. Section, Crim. Div., Washington, D. C., for plaintiff-appellee.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
Before BROWN, Chief Judge, and COLEMAN, GOLDBERG, AINSWORTH, GODBOLD, CLARK, RONEY, GEE, TJOFLAT, HILL, FAY, RUBIN and VANCE, Circuit Judges.
COLEMAN, Circuit Judge.
The panel opinion in this case is reported, United States v. Malatesta, 5 Cir. 1978, 583 F.2d 748.
During the course of that opinion it was written:
However, once the existence of a conspiracy and the defendant's participation in it are both established, slight evidence of the defendant's knowledge of the scheme may be sufficient to sustain the jury's finding that he or she was a member. E. g., United States v. Evans, 5 Cir. 1978, 572 F.2d 455, 469; United States v. Trevino, 5 Cir. 1977, 556 F.2d 1265, 1268; United States v. Barnard, 5 Cir. 1977, 553 F.2d 389, 393; United States v. Alvarez, 5 Cir. 1977, 548 F.2d 542, 544. See United States v. Dunn, 9 Cir. 1977, 564 F.2d 348, 357 n. 21.
A member of the panel wrote a concurring opinion, 583 F.2d 760-765, reciting the history and the development in this Circuit of the "slight evidence rule" in conspiracy cases. Another member of the panel concurred in the view there expressed that when the sufficiency of the evidence to connect a particular defendant to a conspiracy is challenged on appeal Substantial evidence should be...
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