U.S. v. Myers

Decision Date09 December 2008
Docket NumberNo. 08-60064-CR.,08-60064-CR.
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Edward MYERS, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

Jennifer Andrene Keene, United States Attorney's Office, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Plaintiff.

Neison Max Marks, Federal Public Defender's Office, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Defendant.

FINAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL

WILLIAM J. ZLOCH, District Judge.

THIS MATTER is before the Court upon Defendant Edward Myers's Motion To Dismiss Indictment (DE 18). The Court has carefully reviewed said Motion and the entire court file and is otherwise fully advised in the premises.

Defendant Edward Myers is charged in a one-count Indictment (DE 7) with failure to comply with the registration requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901, et seq. & 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2006) (hereinafter "SORNA"). He seeks to dismiss the Indictment on several grounds, the most compelling of which is that both § 2250 and the registration requirements found at § 16913 exceed Congress's Commerce Clause power and are therefore unconstitutional.1

This Order centers upon the constitutionality of two statutes within the Adam Walsh Act. The thrust of the discussion centers on Congress's Commerce Clause power, where the intricacies of the law are divorced from any value judgment as to whether and how society should protect itself from sex offenders. Sex offenders have undermined the decency once assumed in our fellow man and made us think twice before sending our children and grandchildren outside for a day of carefree play; they have paralyzed our families with fear. The crimes the Adam Walsh Act is meant to prevent are among the most heinous anyone can imagine. To that end, no lawful measure is too great and few punishments are too severe to protect society from sex offenders. While this sentiment reflects the undersigned's personal feelings on the matter, it does not alter Congress's inability to bring about a manifold good through means it has been denied by the Founding Fathers. See Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138, 144, 29 S.Ct. 470, 53 L.Ed. 737 (1909).

I. Background

In response to the growing incidences of convicted sex offenders perpetrating further sexual assaults, particularly against minors, Congress passed the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, Pub.L. 103-322, Title XVII §§ 170101, et seq., 108 Stat.2038 (1994) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 14071, et seq.). It was passed as a federal funding statute that conditioned "federal law-enforcement funding on [each] state's adoption of sex offender registration laws and set minimum standards for state programs." Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 89-90, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003). These programs became commonly known as Megan's Laws and were enacted on a stateby-state basis. Id. at 89, 123 S.Ct. 1140. The Jacob Wetterling Act and its later amendments did not impose federal criminal liability on individuals who violated a state's Megan's Law. The punishment was left to the states. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(d) (2006).

Over the decade that followed passage of the Jacob Wetterling Act, crimes against minors became increasingly heinous and prevalent, and in response, Congress passed the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub.L. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 & 42 U.S.C.) (hereinafter "Adam Walsh Act"). The Adam Walsh Act is a comprehensive statute, broken into seven Titles with each addressed to a different form of sexual exploitation and violent crime involving children. Title I is the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, commonly known as SORNA.2 Two sections of SORNA are at issue in this Order: Pub.L. 109-248, §§ 113 and 141(a) (1) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16913 and 18 U.S.C. § 2250, respectively). Section 16913 outlines the registration requirements for those individuals considered sex offenders.3 Section 2250 gives these requirements teeth by imposing criminal liability on sex offenders who travel in interstate commerce and knowingly fail to register or update their registration.4

By enacting SORNA, Congress sought to establish a national sex offender registry that would aid local law enforcement in its effort to protect the public from sex offenders. 42 U.S.C. § 16901. It is structured to achieve this objective in two ways. First, it aims to increase the effectiveness of state sex-offender registries by eliminating the loopholes that accompany each state having its own unique registry system, 72 Fed.Reg. 8894-01 (Feb. 28, 2007), and replacing them with a single comprehensive system of federal registration requirements. 42 U.S.C. §§ 16912(a), 16914, et seq. Second, SORNA creates incentives and disincentives for those states that do not "substantially comply" with the same. Id. §§ 16925-16926.

In this action, the Indictment alleges that between February 2, 2008, and March 10, 2008, Defendant traveled in interstate commerce and did knowingly fail, in violation of § 2250, to update his registration as required by § 16913. Defendant maintains that neither statute can be sustained under Congress's Commerce Clause power. Specifically, he argues that Congress lacks the power to require all sex offenders to register under § 16913 and that § 2250 constitutes an impermissible attempt on the part of Congress to exercise police power reserved to the States. The Government rejoins, generally, that §§ 16913 and 2250 are licit exercises of Congress's authority over persons in interstate commerce.

Since SORNA was signed into law, many defendants have challenged various provisions as unconstitutional. Among the arguments raised in these challenges is that Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause when it enacted SORNA, particularly §§ 16913 and 2250. At this time, one appellate court and over eighty district courts have addressed Congress's authority to enact those provisions under its Commerce Clause power. See, e.g., United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912, 921-22 (8th Cir.2008) (upholding SORNA as constitutional); United States v. Mason, 510 F.Supp.2d 923, 931 (M.D.Fla.2007) (same); Tracy Bateman Farrell, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 30 A.L.R. Fed.2d 213, § 18 (2008) (collecting cases) (hereinafter "Farrell, Validity of SORNA"). With the exception of three district courts, every court to consider the constitutionality of these provisions has found them a permissible exercise of congressional power. E.g., Farrell, Validity of SORNA, supra § 17.

The courts sustaining challenges to these provisions have differed in their reasoning. For example, in United States v. Powers, the district court found that § 2250 did not regulate an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce, and thus was beyond Congress's commerce power. 544 F.Supp.2d 1331, 1335 (M.D.Fla.2008). In United States v. Waybright, the court found that § 2250 was constitutionally licit as a regulation of "persons in interstate commerce," but found that the registration requirement at § 16913, which § 2250 relies upon, exceeded Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. 561 F.Supp.2d 1154, 1163-64 (D.Mont.2008); see also United States v. Guzman, 582 F.Supp.2d 305 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding the same).

Against the great weight of persuasive authority on this matter, and for reasons other than those expressed in Powers and Waybright, the Court finds that both § 16913 and § 2250 exceed Congress's grant of authority under the Commerce Clause. Specifically, § 16913 is a universal regulation of certain persons without any regard for their place or participation in interstate commerce, and it is not part of an overlying economic scheme, the regulation of which Congress could reasonably anticipate would affect interstate commerce. Contrary to Powers, the Court finds that by enacting § 2250 Congress did not attempt to regulate an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. Rather, the statute's language regulates sex offenders who have traveled in interstate commerce. Congress, however, has no power to regulate a person simply because at some earlier time he has traveled in interstate commerce. Therefore, as more fully detailed below, the Court will grant the instant Motion To Dismiss Indictment (DE 18), and Defendant Edward Myers shall go hence without day.

II. Standard of Review

Defendant brought this Motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12, which provides that "at any time while the case is pending, the court may hear a claim that the indictment ... fails to invoke the court's jurisdiction or to state an offense." Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(3)(B). This includes a claim that the statute creating the offense is unconstitutional. United States v. Seuss, 474 F.2d 385, 387 n. 2 (1st Cir.1973) (citation omitted). Distilled to its essence, the Court's analysis is simply a matter of determining whether the laws Defendant is charged with violating are unconstitutional. If they are, then the Indictment must be dismissed. In re Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 8-9, 3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835 (1883) ("It is obvious that the primary and important question in all the cases is the constitutionality of the law; for if the law is unconstitutional none of the prosecutions can stand.").

III. Background: The Commerce Clause

Before turning to the question of whether Congress has the power to enact the statutes at issue, the Court must first clearly define the power that Congress has historically had and to this day enjoys over interstate commerce. The history recounted in this Section may at first appear superfluous. However, it is only a careful reading of the precise issues, holdings, and language of the cases discussed below that leads the Court to the conclusion it reaches today—one in...

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