Daniel, Deborah and Leslie H., Matter of

Citation591 P.2d 1175,1979 OK 33
Decision Date06 March 1979
Docket NumberNo. 49830,49830
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma
PartiesIn the Matter of DANIEL, DEBORAH AND LESLIE H., children under 18 years of age, to-wit: 11, 10 & 8 years.

Appeal from the District Court, Tulsa County, Juvenile and Family Relations Division; Joe Jennings, Trial Judge, from order adjudicating children dependent. The appeal challenges the constitutionality of 10 O.S.Supp.1972, § 1101(d) on ground of vagueness.

JUDGMENT OF TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED.

Charles R. Hogshead, Tulsa, for appellant.

Donald M. Bingman, Asst. Dist. Atty., Juvenile Bureau of the District Court, Tulsa, for appellee.

SIMMS, Justice:

Barbara H., natural mother of Daniel, Deborah and Leslie, brings this appeal from an order of the Juvenile Division of the Tulsa County District Court adjudicating the children dependent within the purview of the Juvenile Code and making them wards of the court. Appellant challenges the constitutionality of 10 O.S.Supp.1972, § 1101(d) 1 as void for vagueness and she contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the adjudication. We affirm the trial court.

The action was initiated by the state upon a petition filed March 15, 1976, which alleged that the children were residing at the Turley Children's Home because their natural parents had been unable to provide "proper and necessary care" for them. Petitioner alleged that the whereabouts of the natural father, Dan H. were unknown, that he had abandoned the children for at least the preceding year and had neither supported nor visited them. Their mother, petitioner alleged, was hospitalized at Eastern State Hospital for psychological problems and during her hospitalization the children had been living with their grandmother but that she could no longer provide for their care. It was for this reason that the children were residing at Turley Children's Home and petitioner prayed the court adjudicate the children dependent and place their temporary custody with the Turley Home, as it was in their best interests.

Appellant challenged the sufficiency of the petition's allegations and the constitutionality of the statute through demurrers. All her objections were overruled by the trial court however, and hearing on the petition was held on May 18, 1976.

Appellant and the children's father appeared personally and were represented by counsel. The father stipulated to all the allegations of the petition which pertained to him. Appellant stipulated that she had been involuntarily committed on December 11, 1975, and that she had been hospitalized at Eastern State until several days prior to the adjudicatory hearing. The state called only one witness, the children's grandmother, appellant's mother, who testified that she and her husband had initiated the commitment procedure against appellant as she had suffered hallucinations and exhibited extreme reactions to her family. The grandmother stated that she had taken care of the children for some time but they were getting older and she felt unable to cope with teenagers, so she placed them in Turley Children's Home for their own good and protection, thinking that Turley "would do more good" for them than she could.

Appellant's demurrer to the evidence was overruled and the trial court found the evidence sufficient to adjudicate the children dependent and make them wards of the court. Subsequently, a disposition hearing was held and the children were placed in the temporary custody of Turley Home.

Appellant contends that the "proper parental care and guardianship" provision of § 1101(d) at issue here is void for vagueness. She argues that this provision 2 violates due process as it does not give fair warning of what parental conduct is proscribed and that it permits arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by the juvenile authorities and the courts. We do not agree and hold the provision is constitutionally sufficient for a dependency proceeding.

Appellant's vagueness arguments proceed from the premise that this action came about only because she was suffering from a mental illness and that she was deprived of her recognized right to arrange for others to care for her children while she was incapacitated. 3 While that factual situation, had it occurred, would add strength to her constitutional challenge, it did not occur and such was not the basis of this proceeding. Appellant's children were alleged to be dependent because their grandmother, in whose care appellant had placed them, could no longer care for them and wished to be relieved of their custody.

Appellant misapprehends both the nature of this provision and the purpose of a dependency action. This provision does not proscribe any parental conduct or omission but is concerned only with the welfare of children and whether or not their essential needs are being met. These children were alleged to have no home and no custodian. The only purpose of the dependency hearing was to protect and assist the children by placing their custody with one able and willing to care for them. Appellant's conduct was never an issue. As appellant concedes, the terms "dependent" and "neglected" are not synonymous. See, In re Vikse, 147 Mont. 417, 413 P.2d 876 (1966).

Under our juvenile code, "dependent" and "neglected" are separate adjudicative categories and a proceeding may be brought to declare a child only "dependent" or only "neglected" or both "dependent and neglected", depending upon the facts. We have held that in a neglect action there must be a showing of parental "disregard of duty owing to indifference or willfulness". In re Sweet, Okl., 317 P.2d 231 (1957). In a strict dependency action such as this, however, the only inquiry is whether a child is in need of care which for any reason is not being provided. There was no issue of parental fault or misconduct here.

While it is certainly...

To continue reading

Request your trial
14 cases
  • Lee v. Bueno
    • United States
    • Oklahoma Supreme Court
    • 20 d2 Setembro d2 2016
    ...Guthrie , 2010 OK 51, ¶ 15, 253 P.3d 38 ; Kimery v. Public Serv. Co. of Oklahoma , 1980 OK 187, ¶ 6, 622 P.2d 1066 ; Matter of Daniel, Deborah and Leslie H. , 1979 OK 33, ¶ 10, 591 P.2d 1175. If two possible interpretations of a statute are possible, only one of which would render it uncons......
  • St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Getty Oil Co.
    • United States
    • Oklahoma Supreme Court
    • 24 d2 Outubro d2 1989
    ...inconsistent with the constitution." Reherman v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., 679 P.2d 1296 (Okl.1984); Matter of Daniel, Deborah and Leslie H., 591 P.2d 1175 (Okl.1979); Black v. Ball Janitorial Serv., Inc., 730 P.2d 510 (Okl.1986). We measure legislation not merely against a single const......
  • Gerald M. v. Dep't of Child Safety
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • 4 d3 Maio d3 2016
    ...not being provided.'" Santa Cruz Cty. Nos. JD-89-006 & JD-89-007, 167 Ariz. at 102, 804 P.2d at 831, quoting In re Daniel, Deborah & Leslie H., 591 P.2d 1175, 1177 (Okla. 1979).¶19 "On review of an adjudication of dependency, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining th......
  • Biggers, In re, 8019DC447
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • 20 d2 Janeiro d2 1981
    ...486 P.2d 567, 569 (1971) (rejecting a vagueness claim to the Oregon statute for termination of parental rights). Accord, In re Daniel H., 591 P.2d 1175 (Okla. 1979). This context requires flexibility in the weighing of each case's facts in order to give the child, as well as the parent, the......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT