Lewiston Raceway, Inc. v. Maine State Harness Racing Com'n
| Decision Date | 16 July 1991 |
| Parties | LEWISTON RACEWAY, INC. v. MAINE STATE HARNESS RACING COMMISSION. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Alfred C. Frawley (orally), Peter Lowe, Brann & Isaacson, Lewiston, for plaintiff.
Michael E. Carpenter, Atty. Gen., James Bivins, Gwendolyn D. Thomas (orally), Asst. Attys. Gen., Augusta, for defendant.
Before McKUSICK, C.J., and ROBERTS, WATHEN, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, COLLINS, and BRODY, JJ.
Defendant Maine State Harness Racing Commission appeals a decision of the Superior Court (Androscoggin County, Delahanty, C.J.) reversing a Commission order denying plaintiff Lewiston Raceways, Inc. stipend monies for capital improvements. Defendant argues that it is authorized to withhold the payment of the stipend pursuant to 8 M.R.S.A. § 275 (Supp.1990). We disagree and affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
Plaintiff was a commercial, extended meet 1 harness racing licensee during the 1989 calendar year. In that year, plaintiff deposited a percentage of the handle 2 with the Treasurer of the State as required by statute, 8 M.R.S.A. §§ 274 & 275 (Supp.1990). The statutes direct the Treasurer to return a portion of the funds in the form of stipends to the licensee. Section 274 provides an "extended meet" stipend and section 275, at issue here, provides a "commercial meet" stipend. One half of the commercial meet stipend is used to supplement purse money and one half is used for capital improvements of the racing facility. Because plaintiff did not seek a license for 1990, the Commission voted to withhold that portion of the 1989 commercial meet stipend allocated to capital improvement. It interpreted the statute as referring to future improvements only and concluded that plaintiff was not entitled to the stipend because it was no longer licensed. Pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 80C, Lewiston Raceway, Inc. sought judicial review in the Superior Court. The court reversed the decision of the Commission and ordered that the stipend be paid. This appeal followed.
When the Superior Court acts as an intermediate appellate tribunal and receives no additional evidence, we will review directly the record developed before the governmental agency. Robinson v. Board of Trustees of the Maine State Retirement System, 523 A.2d 1376, 1378 (Me.1987); Spain v. City of Brewer, 474 A.2d 496, 498 (Me.1984). The standard of review is "limited to whether the [governmental agency] abused its discretion, committed an error of law, or made findings not supported by substantial evidence in the record." Robinson, 523 A.2d at 1378. The question in this case is whether the Commission erred as a matter of law in withholding the stipend.
After a licensee has paid the State Treasurer the requisite amount of its handle, the applicable statute describes the process for distributing the stipend as follows:
If the total of the regular and exotic wagers exceeds $37,000,000 for any calendar year, 72% of the revenue credited to the General Fund under this section attributable to this excess shall be returned by the treasurer of state to commercial meet licensees.... This payment shall be divided in the proportion that the contributors of regular and exotic wagers of pari-mutuel pools made or conducted at the commercial meets of each licensee during the calendar year bear to the total contributions of regular and exotic wagers to parimutuel pools made or conducted at the commercial meets of all licensees during that calendar year. Licensees sharing in the distribution shall use 1/2 of the fund so received for the purposes of supplementing purse money. The other 1/2 of this distribution is to be used by the commercial licensees for improving their racing facilities for the benefit of the public, horse owners, horsemen and horsewomen, and to increase revenue to the State from the increase in pari-mutuel wagering resulting from such improvements. For the purposes of this section, "improvements" means the amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements made to improve the facilities utilized by the licensee for conduct of its racing meetings; or the amount expended in restoring the property or in improving the facility or in any part of the facility which results in the addition or replacement of a fixed asset. In general, the amounts referred to as improvements include amounts paid which add to the value, improve or substantially prolong the useful life of the race track utilized by the licensee for the conduct of its racing meeting. Amounts...
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