Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.

Decision Date20 September 1984
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 83-2864.
PartiesRose CIPOLLONE and Antonio Cipollone, Plaintiffs, v. LIGGETT GROUP, INC., Philip Morris Incorporated, and Loew's Theatres, Inc., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

Myron J. Bromberg, Marc Z. Edell, Porzio, Bromberg & Newman, Morristown, N.J., Alan M. Darnell, Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, Woodbridge, N.J., for plaintiffs.

Raymond F. Drozdowski, Brown, Connery, Kulp, Wille, Purnell & Greene, Camden, N.J., for defendant Philip Morris.

Charles J. Walsh, Barry L. Shapiro, Marc S. Klein, Sills, Beck, Cummis, Zuckerman, Radin & Tischman, Newark, N.J., for defendant Loew's Theatres, Inc.

Paul A. Rowe, Alan S. Naar, Greenbaum, Rowe, Smith, Raven, Davis & Bergstein, Newark, N.J., for defendant Liggett Group, Inc.

OPINION

SAROKIN, District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Despite the growing evidence that cigarette smoking is indeed hazardous to one's health, as recognized in the warning mandated by Congress, a legislative decision has been reached not to prohibit it. Although that decision may be due in some measure to the ongoing medical dispute as to the risks involved, it is predicated to a large extent on economic considerations and the apparent willingness of millions of persons to continue smoking despite the known and unknown risks. Congress, in order to avoid another Prohibition, has decided to permit the manufacture and sale of cigarettes to continue, but has attempted to assuage its critics by regulating the industry and requiring it to affix a warning to each package sold.

The legislative history of the Act here involved reflects a candid concern for the economy of the entire country if cigarette manufacturing were curtailed or eliminated. One would hope that those fiscal considerations were weighed against the costs of illness and death caused by cigarette smoking as well as the moral responsibility of protecting the young and future generations who have not yet begun to smoke.

In any event, that branch of the government which is charged with the responsibility of protecting the health and welfare of our society has determined that the cigarette industry shall be permitted to flourish after consideration of the consequences of permitting it to do so. This case presents the issue of whether cigarette manufacturers can be subjected to tort liability, if they have complied with the federal warning requirement: "Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health." In effect, the cigarette industry argues that such compliance immunizes it from liability to anyone who has chosen to smoke cigarettes notwithstanding the warning, that the federal legislation has created an irrebutable presumption that the risk of injury has been assumed by the consumer. This court rejects that contention.

The clear purpose of the federal legislation was to establish a uniform warning which would prevail throughout the country. By so doing, cigarette manufacturers would not be subjected to varying requirements from state to state. However, the existence of the present federally mandated warning does not prevent an individual from claiming that the risks of smoking are greater than the warning indicates, and that therefore such warning is inadequate. The court recognizes that it will be extremely difficult for a plaintiff to prove that the present warning is inadequate to inform of the dangers, whatever they may be. However, the difficulty of proof cannot preclude the opportunity to be heard, and affording that opportunity will not undermine the purposes of the Act.

Defendants' argument that the statute was intended to foreclose such claims is not borne out by either the language or legislative history of the Act. Simply stated, defendants contend that a cigarette manufacturer who utilizes the federal warning cannot be held liable in tort. Just as simply, that statement could have been incorporated into the statute, if that were the intention, but it was not. Before this court or any other court so cavalierly rejects fundamental principles of the common law, it should demand a much more definitive statement from Congress.

The information regarding disease from smoking is growing. Medical and scientific opinion is divided. The impact on the economy is a factor considered by Congress and may well have caused a compromise in the content of the warning. Even Congress, which once declared that cigarette smoking "may be" hazardous, now finds that it "is" hazardous. This court believes that an individual injured while the warning was that cigarette smoking "may be hazardous to your health" would have been able to prevail if he or she was able to prove that "cigarette smoking is was hazardous to your health." Today even some greater warning may be appropriate, and variations are now being considered. In any event, no one should be deprived by virtue of congressional compromise of the opportunity of proving that contention absent a clear showing that Congress intended that they be so precluded.

There are further claims asserted by plaintiff which likewise deserve their day in court. Thus, even if utilizing the federal warning relieves cigarette manufacturers of liability for failure to warn, the question remains whether they can be held liable for collateral efforts to neutralize or negate the effects of the warning. Efforts to convince the public that the risks do not exist or that they are minimal or unsupported by medical or scientific data may in and of themselves give rise to a cause of action; indeed they may even constitute a violation of the very statute which defendants brandish as a shield. Whether the present federally mandated warning is adequate and whether defendants have wrongfully attempted to neutralize that warning are thus issues which survive the federal statute and are not preempted by it.

Certainly, as in all such cases, the federal standard is strong evidence of the adequacy of the warning, but it is not conclusive. The federal government regulates many industries, not least of which is the ethical drug industry. The fact that the safety, efficacy, literature and warnings pertaining to drugs are reviewed and approved by the government pursuant to the authority of Congress has never relieved drug manufacturers of liability in tort if the risks exceeded the warnings given. These cases, among others, recognize that even the federal government is fallible. The fact that it finds a product safe or a warning adequate does not necessarily make it so. The private citizen should not be deprived of the opportunity to establish such fallibility and vindicate his or her rights to recover for injuries sustained if supported by competent proofs.

THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Rose Cipollone is dying of lung cancer. She brings this products liability action against three cigarette companies, alleging that they are responsible for her current state. Her fourteen-count complaint sounds in strict liability (Counts 2, 3 and 9), negligence (Counts 4 and 5), intentional tort (Counts 6 and 8) and breach of warranty (Count 7). She claims that defendants have produced an unsafe and defective product (Counts 2 and 7), the risk of which outweighs its utility (Count 2), but have negligently (Count 4) or intentionally (Count 8) failed adequately to warn consumers of the hazards associated with cigarette smoking. See also Count 3 (strict liability for failure to warn). Indeed, she contends, defendants have negligently (Count 5) or intentionally (Count 6) advertised their products so as to neutralize and render ineffective those warnings actually given, warnings which are made meaningless in any event by the addictive qualities of cigarettes (Count 9).1

Defendants have each answered, asserting as an affirmative defense, inter alia, that plaintiff's claims are preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling Act, as amended by the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq. Plaintiff has moved to strike such defense. With the cross-motion of defendant Loew's Theatres, Inc. for judgment on the pleadings, the parties are now before the court on this difficult issue.

The Act
The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act

Originally enacted in 1965, the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act ("the Act") followed a report of the Surgeon General of the United States concluding that cigarette smoking comprised a significant health hazard to Americans, warranting remedial action by Congress. As amended in 1970, the Act sets forth the following statement of policy:

It is the policy of the Congress, and the purpose of this chapter, to establish a comprehensive federal program to deal with cigarette labeling and advertising with respect to any relationship between smoking and health, whereby —
(1) the public may be adequately informed that cigarette smoking may be hazardous to health by inclusion of a warning to that effect on each package of cigarettes; and
(2) commerce and the national economy may be (A) protected to the maximum extent consistent with this declared policy and (B) not impeded by diverse, non-uniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations with respect to any relationship between smoking and health.

15 U.S.C. § 1331. In order to effectuate these purposes, Congress provided that

It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, import, or package for sale or distribution within the United States any cigarettes the package of which fails to bear the following statement: "Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health." Such statement shall be located in a conspicuous place on every cigarette package, and shall appear in conspicuous and legible type in contrast by typograph, layout, or color with other printed matter on the package.

15 U.S.C. § 1333. The Federal Trade Commission was given the authority to regulate...

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