Coleman v. Frantz

• Decision Date: 12 January 1984
• Docket Number: Civ. No. F 83-227.
• Parties: Meredith COLEMAN, Plaintiff, v. Nyal FRANTZ, Sheriff of Wells County, Indiana, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

593 F. Supp. 28

Meredith COLEMAN, Plaintiff, v. Nyal FRANTZ, Sheriff of Wells County, Indiana, Defendant.

Civ. No. F 83-227.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.

January 12, 1984.

Joseph S. Northrop, Huntington, Ind., for plaintiff.

Alan VerPlanck, Barrett, Barrett & McNagny, Fort Wayne, Ind., for defendant.

ORDER

LEE, District Judge.

This matter is before the court for review and resolution of defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed November 7, 1983. Plaintiff filed a response to said motion on December 22, 1983; the court will consider plaintiff's response in addressing and resolving defendant's motion. Having examined defendant's motion and plaintiff's response, the court will grant defendant's motion for summary judgment.

Discussion

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment may only be granted if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Thus, summary judgment serves as a vehicle with which the court "can determine whether further exploration of the fact is necessary." Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 464 (1st Cir.1975).

In making this determination, the court must keep in mind that the entry of summary judgment terminates the litigation, or an aspect thereof, and must draw all inferences from the established or asserted facts in favor of the non-moving party. Peoples Outfitting Co. v. General Electric Credit Corp., 549 F.2d 42 (7th Cir.1977). A party may not rest on the mere allegations of his pleadings or the bare contentions that an issue of fact exists. Posey v. Skyline Corp., 702 F.2d 102, 105 (7th Cir.1983). See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). See generally C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts, § 99 (4th ed. 1983); 6 Moore's Federal Practice, § 56.15 (2d ed. 1983).

Thus, the moving party must demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The court views all evidence submitted in favor of the non-moving party. Even if there are some disputed facts, where the undisputed facts are the material facts involved and those facts show one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment is appropriate. Egger v. Phillips, 710 F.2d 292, 296-97 (7th Cir.1983); Collins v. American Optometric Ass'n., 693 F.2d 636, 639 (7th Cir.1982). Further, if the court resolves all factual disputes in favor of the non-moving party and still finds summary judgment in favor of the moving party is correct as a matter of law, then the moving party is entitled to summary judgment in his favor. Egger, 710 F.2d at 297. See also Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348, 348 n. 11, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 2079, 2079 n. 11, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976).

The facts in this matter are virtually undisputed and are as follows. Defendant is the Sheriff of Wells County, Indiana and was acting in his official capacity during the events in question. Plaintiff is a resident of Wells County. The Wells Circuit Court issued a bench warrant for plaintiff's arrest on June 23, 1981. The bench warrant was issued after an affidavit of probable cause supporting the proposed warrant was submitted and examined by the Wells Circuit Court. The warrant instructed the Sheriff of Wells County to arrest Meredith Coleman on a charge of receiving stolen property, I.C. XX-XX-X-X(b). The warrant also ordered the Sheriff of Wells County to return the bench warrant. Bond or bail was set for plaintiff in the amount of $10,000.00.

Plaintiff turned himself in at the Wells County jail on June 30, 1981. At that time, defendant read the bench warrant to plaintiff and plaintiff was informed of the amount of his bail. Defendant returned service of the warrant to the Wells Circuit Court on July 1, 1981. Plaintiff was held in defendant's custody, pursuant to the bench arrest warrant, until July 18, 1981, when he was released on his own recognizance. The prosecutor's office ordered defendant to release plaintiff. The actual O.R. bond was not filed as of record until July 20, 1981. During this period of detention, plaintiff repeatedly asked defendant when he was going to be taken to court. Plaintiff also protested his innocence. Defendant, when so asked, would check with the prosecuting attorney's office and never received a reply as to when plaintiff's next court appearance was to be. Defendant believed and it was a fact in June-July 1981 that it was the responsibility of the prosecuting attorney's office to secure a court date for plaintiff.

Also during this period of detention plaintiff had access to a telephone for his personal use, to visitors, and to the defendant and his staff. Plaintiff remembers speaking to an attorney during his first week of detention concerning his lack of court appearances. Plaintiff did not retain that attorney as counsel at that time. Plaintiff was not mistreated, abused, or denied necessary items while incarcerated.

Defendant notified the prosecuting attorney's office July 1, 1981 that he had the plaintiff in custody. Defendant did not take plaintiff before a judge for further proceedings during plaintiff's detention nor was he instructed or notified so to do. The criminal charge for which a bench warrant was issued and for which plaintiff was arrested and detained was dismissed August 23, 1982.

Plaintiff brings this section 1983 claim for damages, alleging violations of the fourth, sixth and fourteenth amendments to the constitution. Plaintiff also brings pendent state claims, alleging false imprisonment, unnecessary rigor in arrest, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence.¹

Qualified good faith immunity is available to enforcement officers acting in their official capacities. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). See also Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 98 S.Ct. 855, 55 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978); Lenard v. Argento, 699 F.2d 874 (7th Cir.1983); Brubaker v. King, 505 F.2d 534 (7th Cir.1974). The test for determining good faith of a person acting in his or her official capacity is an objective one. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).

Public officials acting in their official capacities "are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Id. 102 S.Ct. at 2738. Plaintiff claims violations of the fourth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments to the constitution. While Harlow does not address specifically whether this objective rule applies to state officials being sued under section 1983, it sets out a very broad hint that it would not make a distinction between suits against state officials and suits against federal officials in applying the objective test for determining good faith. Id., 102 S.Ct. at 2738 n. 30. See also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978). The Seventh Circuit applies the Harlow test to suits involving state officials being sued for damages under section 1983. Johnson v. Brelje, 701 F.2d 1201 (7th Cir.1983); Crowder v. Lash, 687 F.2d 996 (7th Cir.1982).

If the arrest here is based on a valid warrant, then this case is governed by Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). Cf. Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1981) ("Where an arrest is based on an invalid warrant, Baker does not preclude recovery under section 1983 for an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty.") Baker reaffirmed Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975), which held that the fourth amendment as incorporated into the fourteenth amendment requires that states fairly and reliably determine probable cause as a condition of any significant pretrial restraint of liberty and that probable cause "must be made by a judicial officer either before or promptly after arrest." Id. at 125, 95 S.Ct. at 869, quoted in Baker, 443 U.S. at 143, 99 S.Ct. at 2694. Here, the situation is not the same as the situation in Gerstein. In Gerstein, the detainee had not had a judicial determination of probable cause. The Gerstein court held that a judicial determination of probable cause is a "prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest." Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114, 95 S.Ct. at 863. A judicial officer of the Wells Circuit Court made a determination probable cause existed for Coleman's arrest prior to his arrest on a bench warrant. Plaintiff was lawfully committed to pretrial detention. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1872, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979).

The Wells Circuit Court, in issuing the arrest warrant for plaintiff, had before it an affidavit purportedly supporting the proposed issuance of an arrest warrant. The affidavit was based on information received from a non-professional informant. Further, the affidavit showed that independent corroboration by the Sheriff's Office had been made of several of the facts related by the informant. It is also clear from the affidavit that the non-professional informant spoke from personal knowledge and observation. See United States v. Marino, 682 F.2d 449 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Ward, 703 F.2d 1058 (8th Cir.1983); United States v. Massey, 687 F.2d 1348 (10th Cir.1982); United States v. Stevens, 543 F.Supp. 929 (N.D.Ill. 1982); United States v. Martinez-Torres, 556 F.Supp. 1236 (S.D.N.Y.1982). Thus, the Wells Circuit Court had before it an affidavit which demonstrated probable cause because it contained facts sufficient to demonstrate that the informant was credible or the information reliable and that the informant based her conclusions on adequate knowledge. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); ...