Johnson v. Heckler, 83 C 4110.

Decision Date19 September 1984
Docket NumberNo. 83 C 4110.,83 C 4110.
PartiesEdna JOHNSON and Jerome Montgomery, on their own behalf and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Margaret HECKLER, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

Joseph A. Antolin, John Bouman, Cathleen Cohen, Shelley Davis, Robert E. Lehrer, Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs.

Dan K. Webb, U.S. Atty. by Linda A. Wawzenski, Asst. U.S. Atty., Chicago, Ill., for defendant.

ORDER

BUA, District Judge.

Plaintiffs in this class action are or have been applicants for or recipients of disability benefits under Title II and/or Title XVI of the Social Security Act (the "Act"). They have been denied benefits on the ground that their disabilities are not severe enough to prevent them from working. They challenge the validity of the applicable regulations, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c), 404.1522, 416.922 (1983) and Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 82-55 (cum. ed. 1982), as violative of the Act and the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The defendant is the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"), who administers the Old-Age and Survivors Disability Insurance ("OASDI") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") programs through the Social Security Administration ("SSA"), and promulgates regulations and rulings interpreting the applicable statute.

Plaintiffs submitted a motion for summary judgment, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The Secretary submitted a cross-motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated herein, the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is granted and the Secretary's cross-motion is denied.

I. THE CHALLENGED REGULATIONS AND THE ACT

Plaintiffs challenge the above regulations on two grounds: (1) 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c) do not consider vocational factors (age, education, and work experience) and residual functional capacities; and (2) 404.1522, 416.922, and SSR 82-55 do not combine "nonsevere" impairments. Before proceeding to consider the validity of these regulations, an overview of the regulations and the Act is helpful.

The OASDI and SSI programs provide for the payment of benefits to disabled persons. Under both programs, a person is considered disabled if he or she is unable

to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months...

42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A) & 1382c(a)(3)(A).

The Act provides that "for purposes of" applying this definition, an individual

shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy....

42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A) & 1382c(a)(3)(B).

The Secretary is authorized to establish rules and regulations, consistent with the Act, governing the determination of disability claims. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(a) & 1383(d)(1).

Pursuant to this authority, the Secretary established a five-step sequential procedure for determining whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (1983). Under the existing regulations, if the claimant is found not to be disabled under any one of the sequential tests, the analysis ends and the remaining steps of the analysis are not completed. See §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). As the first step, the Secretary ascertains whether the claimant is working; if so, a finding of "not disabled" follows. In the second step, the Secretary determines, solely on the basis of medical factors, whether the claimant has a "severe" impairment which "significantly limits his physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). The regulation specifically provides that at this second step the Secretary "will not consider your age, education, and work experience." Plaintiff's first ground relates to this refusal to consider vocational factors in the second step and the resulting possibility that vocational factors will be foreclosed if the inquiry stops after the second step.

If the claimant is determined to have a "severe" impairment under this definition, the Secretary next considers (Step 3) whether the impairment is one which is listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations; if so, the claimant is found to be disabled without requirement of further proof that the impairment prevents him from working. The fourth step comes into play if the claimant's impairment, though deemed "severe" under the second step, is not a "listed" impairment under the third step. In such cases, the Secretary determines (Step 5) whether, considering the claimant's age, education, and work experience, his impairment prevents him from doing any other work available in the national economy. If the claimant cannot, he is found to be disabled and his claim is approved. See Canon v. Harris, 651 F.2d 513, 517 (7th Cir. 1981).

The Secretary acknowledges that the effect of the sequential procedure is that denials of claims at the second step occur "on the basis of medical considerations alone." SSR 82-56 (cum. ed. 1982). To implement this policy, SSR 82-55 lists 20 impairments which are nonsevere per se on the basis of medical evidence alone. SSR 82-55 is binding on all SSA personnel, including administrative law judges and the Appeals Council.

The challenged regulations, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1522 and 416.922 (1983) provide: "We will consider the combined effects of unrelated impairments only if all are severe." In addition to these regulations, SSR 82-55 instructs Social Security administrators not to consider the combined effects of nonsevere impairments because inasmuch "as a nonsevere impairment is one which does not significantly limit basic work-related functions, neither will a combination of two or more such impairments significantly restrict the basic work-related functions needed to do most jobs."

II. CHALLENGED REGULATIONS APPLIED TO THE NAMED PLAINTIFFS

The named plaintiffs were found "not disabled" under the severity regulation (the second step of the sequential procedure), and thus were denied benefits on the grounds that the medical evidence alone failed to establish the existence of a "severe" impairment — one which significantly limited their ability to perform basic work activities. The application and effect of the challenged regulations is illustrated by the cases of the named plaintiffs.

Plaintiff Edna Johnson was denied SSI disability benefits. Examining the Administrative Record in the light most favorable to the Secretary, "the claimant has the following impairment(s): diabetes, lumbago, anxiety, neurosis and chronic duodenal ulcer." (J. 15). While the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") acknowledged and examined each of these impairments, it appears from the record that he held each impairment separately did not significantly limit the ability to perform basic work-related functions (J. 14). The ALJ did not expressly consider the combined effect of her impairments. The ALJ never considered the severity of Johnson's impairments in light of her vocational factors. The ALJ concluded that her claim is being denied on medical considerations alone without consideration of vocational factors. (J. 15). For support, the ALJ cited § 416.920(c).

Plaintiff Jerome Montgomery was denied continued OASDI disability benefits. Examining the record in the light most favorable to the Secretary, the "claimant has the following impairments: atypical chest pain, hypertension, diabetes mellitus, and status post fractures of the left hip, leg and foot" (M. 10). The Appeals Council ("AC") held each impairment to be nonsevere per se according to SSR 82-55 (M. 9). Even though the AC concluded that the claimant's impairments "did not constitute a severe impairment ... either singly or in combination" (M. 9), the record reveals that the AC held each impairment to be nonsevere without considering the combined effects of the nonsevere impairments. In addition, the AC did not consider the severity of Montgomery's impairments in light of his vocational factors (M. 8).

The plaintiff class, as defined, includes Title II and Title XVI claimants who, like the named plaintiffs, were and are denied benefits as a result of the application of the challenged regulations to them at the second step. See Order of December 7, 1983. 100 F.R.D. 70.

III. THE SEVERITY REGULATION

The challenged policies of refusing to consider vocational factors of age, education and work experience, and refusing to combine the effects of nonsevere impairments are embodied in the second step of the sequential procedure. The second step has been called the severity regulation since it determines whether a claimant's impairment is severe so as to continue to the next steps in the procedure. While the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has never addressed the validity of the severity regulation, other Circuit Courts acknowledge the conflict between the severity regulation and the letter of §§ 423(d)(2)(A) & 1382c(a)(3)(B). Delgado v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 570, 574 (9th Cir.1983); Chico v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 947, 953 (2d Cir.1983). In Chico, Judge Friendly noted:

the close question of the validity of the `severity' regulation, involving as it does a seeming conflict between the letter of § 423(d)(2)(A), on the one hand, and, on the other, the Secretary's understandable desire to supply ... some threshold that a claimant must pass before the Social Security Administration is required either to apply the Appendix 2 guidelines or to
...

To continue reading

Request your trial
17 cases
  • Moody v. Heckler, 84-2320.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. Central District of Illinois
    • 24 d1 Junho d1 1985
    ...considering the severity of the plaintiff's impairments in light of his vocational characteristics. (Tr. 77, 82.) In Johnson v. Heckler, 593 F.Supp. 375 (N.D.Ill.1984), the court determined that the "severity step" embodied in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c) impermissibly increases the claimant's st......
  • Johnson v. Heckler, s. 85-1254
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • 30 d2 Julho d2 1985
    ...and by declining to consider the combined impact of nonsevere impairments in determining whether the threshold step is met. On September 19, 1984, 593 F.Supp. 375, after cross motions for summary judgment, the district court enjoined the Secretary from applying the challenged regulations an......
  • Johnson v. Sullivan, 89-2676
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • 20 d3 Março d3 1991
    ...In an opinion issued September 19, 1984, Judge Bua granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on their complaint. Johnson v. Heckler, 593 F.Supp. 375. Judge Bua found the severity regulation to be facially invalid and inconsistent with the Social Security Act, as it impermissibly incre......
  • Pratt v. Heckler, Civ. A. No. 83-3508
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. United States District Court (Columbia)
    • 10 d1 Março d1 1986
    ...before having to conduct a full medical-vocational review. See Hall v. Heckler, 602 F.Supp. 1169 (N.D.Cal.1985); Johnson v. Heckler, 593 F.Supp. 375 (N.D.Ill.1984), aff'd, 769 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir.1985); Hundrieser v. Heckler, 582 F.Supp. 1231 (N.D.Ill.1984). In each of these cases, however, ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT