U.S. v. Vinton, No. 07-3125.

• Decision Date: 05 February 2010
• Docket Number: No. 07-3125.
• Citation: 594 F.3d 14
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee v. Samuel H. VINTON, Jr., Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

594 F.3d 14

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee v. Samuel H. VINTON, Jr., Appellant.

No. 07-3125.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued December 10, 2009.

Decided February 5, 2010.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, (No. 06cr00298-01).

Beverly G. Dyer, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Neil H. Jafee, Assistant Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.

James M. Perez, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Roy W. McLeese III and Mary B. McCord, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: BROWN and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, and WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge BROWN.

BROWN, Circuit Judge:

Samuel Vinton, convicted of narcotics and firearm offenses after the contraband was found in a briefcase in his car during a traffic stop, appeals the denial of his motion to suppress. He argues the evidence was discovered during an unconstitutional search of his vehicle and property. In particular, he contends that Arizona v. Gant, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009), decided by the Supreme Court while this appeal was pending, establishes that the search of the briefcase cannot be upheld under the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement. Because it was "reasonable to believe" evidence relevant to Vinton's weapons-possession offense would be found inside the briefcase, we affirm.

I

On September 9, 2006, around 9:00 p.m., U.S. Park Police Officer William Alton, driving a marked cruiser in Southeast D.C., saw a green Nissan Maxima speeding, and also observed that its windows were excessively tinted. Tr. of Mot. Hr'g at 6, 8, 69, United States v. Vinton, No. 06-cr-298 (D.D.C. Feb. 9, 2007) (Suppression Tr.). As Alton followed the car, he noticed "a thin blue line sticker on the back of [the] car," which Alton assumed referred to the driver's probable affiliation with law enforcement, most likely the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD). Id. at 8, 70.

The driver promptly obeyed Alton's signal to pull over and, as Alton approached the car, the driver, Vinton, lowered all his windows. Id. at 10, 70. Alton asked if Vinton was in law enforcement and Vinton said he worked in "personal security." Id. at 11, 71. Alton immediately saw a knife with a five-and-a-half inch sheath on Vinton's backseat, in "close proximity" to Vinton, easily within reaching-distance. Id. at 11-12, 25, 37, 70-71. Vinton explained the knife was used when fishing with his grandfather, but Alton saw no other fishing equipment in the car. Id. at 12, 14, 71. He retrieved the knife and placed it on the roof of the car, "out of arm's reach of the driver." Id. at 14, 71. Alton asked if there were "any other weapons in the vehicle," and Vinton responded "no, he . . . ke[pt] that part of his trade at home." Id. at 14, 71. Alton then measured the car's windows with a tint meter and determined they exceeded D.C.'s seventy-percent tint limit. Id. at 15-17, 71. He returned to his cruiser to prepare a citation. Id. at 17, 72.

Officer Alton was working alone and had not called for Park Police backup. However, when an MPD officer appeared, Alton "asked him to stop" because he had found a large knife and desired assistance in conducting a protective search of the car. Id. at 19-20, 72. The officer told Alton there had been a double-stabbing homicide in the same vicinity approximately twenty hours earlier. Id. at 20, 72. Alton told Vinton he was going to conduct a search for weapons and asked twice more whether there were any weapons in the car; Vinton first responded "no" but then responded, "not that I know of." Id. at 22, 73. Alton removed Vinton from the car and handcuffed him, but informed him he was not under arrest. Id. at 22, 73. A search of the passenger compartment of the car revealed two cans of mace in the front armrest, a "butterfly knife" under the front passenger-side floor mat, a bag of Styrofoam earplugs, and a locked briefcase on the backseat. Id. at 23-24, 26, 73-74. Vinton claimed he used the earplugs as sleeping aids and said the briefcase did not belong to him and he was unaware of its contents. Id. at 26, 74. Officer Alton phoned headquarters to request guidance on how to proceed, and U.S. Park Police Investigator Hodge arrived shortly thereafter. Id. at 25-27, 74. Alton briefed him on the stop and Hodge conferred with a Park Police supervisor to assess whether Alton had probable cause to make an arrest. Id. at 27. They determined that he did. Id.

After placing Vinton under arrest for "possession of a prohibited weapon," Officer Alton pried open the locked briefcase. Id. at 27, 29, 74-75. Inside, he found three bags of ecstasy, three pistol magazines, a "fighting knife . . . like brass knuckles," and a .45 caliber semiautomatic pistol, cocked and loaded. Id. at 29, 75.

Vinton was charged in a two-count indictment with unlawful possession with intent to distribute ecstasy, 21 U.S.C. § 841; and using, carrying and possessing a firearm during a drug trafficking offense, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). He moved to suppress all of the tangible evidence recovered, and all of his statements made, during the traffic stop. Following a hearing, the district court denied the motion. Mem. Op., United States v. Vinton, No. 06-cr-298, 2007 WL 495799 (D.D.C. Feb. 12, 2007). Vinton was convicted by a jury of both counts and was sentenced to twenty-seven months' imprisonment on the first count and sixty months' on the second count, to run consecutively, as well as three years' supervised release. He brings this appeal arguing his motion to suppress was erroneously denied.

We review "determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause . . . de novo" but "review findings of historical fact only for clear error and . . . give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by" the district court. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996).

II

The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. "Time and again, [the Supreme] Court has observed that searches and seizures conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions." Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993). The government relies on several exceptions in urging us to uphold the denial of Vinton's motion to suppress. We will address each issue in sequence: Did Officer Alton have the right to search the passenger compartment of Vinton's car? Following this search, was Vinton properly arrested? Was the search of the briefcase permissible?

A

The Supreme Court has long "recognized that traffic stops are especially fraught with danger to police officers" and that the "risk of harm to both the police and the occupants [of a stopped vehicle] is minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation." Arizona v. Johnson, ___ U.S ___, 129 S.Ct. 781, 786, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alteration in original). Thus, during a traffic stop, in order "to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence," Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972), the officer may order the driver out of his car and may search the passenger compartment of the car for weapons if the officer develops a reasonable suspicion that the driver is "dangerous and . . . may gain immediate control of weapons" inside the car. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)) (footnote omitted); see Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n. 6, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (per curiam). Courts assess "the totality of the circumstances . . . to see whether the detaining officer ha[d] a particularized and objective basis" for suspecting the driver was armed and dangerous, acknowledging that the "likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard." United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273-74, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the facts that accumulated within the first few moments of the traffic stop established a particularized and objective basis for suspecting Vinton might be armed and dangerous. As an initial matter, Vinton does not argue that Officer Alton had an insufficient basis for pulling him over. Indeed, it is clear that Vinton was properly stopped because Officer Alton's firsthand observations gave him probable cause to believe that Vinton had been speeding and driving with windows tinted in excess of the legal limit. See Suppression Tr. at 8, 69; Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996).

Most crucially, upon approaching Vinton's car, Officer Alton saw a knife with a five-and-a-half-inch sheath in plain view on the backseat, easily within reaching-distance of Vinton. See Suppression Tr. at 11-12, 25, 37, 70. "[T]he presence of one weapon may justifiably arouse concern that there may be more in the vicinity." United States v. Christian, 187 F.3d 663, 669 (D.C.Cir.1999). For instance, in Long, the Supreme Court held that after the officers observed "a large knife in the interior of the car," they were justified in "conduct[ing] an area search of the passenger compartment" of the car "to ensure that there were no other weapons" in ...