Robinson v. Tyson Foods, Inc.

Decision Date05 February 2010
Docket NumberNo. 08-14991.,08-14991.
Citation595 F.3d 1269
PartiesBrenda ROBINSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TYSON FOODS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Janell M. Ahnert, Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C., Birmingham, AL, for Tyson Foods, Inc.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.

Before MARCUS, FAY and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

FAY, Circuit Judge:

While in the midst of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan, plaintiff-appellant Brenda Robinson brought an employment discrimination claim against her former employer, defendant-appellee Tyson Foods. The district court granted summary judgment for Tyson Foods on the threshold issue of judicial estoppel. The court reasoned that because Robinson failed to disclose her employment discrimination suit to the bankruptcy court, she had taken inconsistent positions under oath with the intent of misleading the court. Robinson contends that she did not take inconsistent positions under oath because she did not have a continuing duty to disclose changes in her asset schedule. Additionally, Robinson claims she had no reason to mislead the court as she paid off her debt in full. We hold that judicial estoppel was appropriate and affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDING BELOW:

There are two interlaced events in this case; a bankruptcy proceeding and an employment discrimination claim. In April 2002, Brenda Robinson voluntarily dismissed her Chapter 13 case because her payments increased to a rate "beyond her ability to pay," and filed a second Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding. The second bankruptcy plan proposed complete repayment to both secured and unsecured creditors over a period of sixty months. A bankruptcy judge confirmed the plan in May 2002, stating, in relevant part, that "the property of the estate shall not vest in the Debtor until a discharge is granted under § 1328 or the case is dismissed."1

In September 2005, Robinson resigned her employment with Tyson Foods ("Tyson"). In her letter of resignation, Robinson claimed that she had been subjected to "harassment, racial abuse and intimidation." In October 2006, Robinson brought a civil suit against Tyson, alleging unlawful employment practices and mistreatment on the basis of race severe enough to constitute constructive termination.2 Robinson sought compensatory, punitive and liquidated damages.

In May 2007, one of Robinson's creditors moved for a dismissal of her bankruptcy plan because her payments were delinquent, resulting in a material default. Before the hearing, Robinson brought her payments current and the motion was withdrawn. Two months later in July of 2007, Robinson completed her bankruptcy plan, repaying all of her debts and receiving a full discharge from bankruptcy.

In preparation for her employment discrimination suit, Tyson took Robinson's deposition in September 2007. During the deposition, Robinson revealed that she had not disclosed her suit against Tyson to the bankruptcy court. The deposition also revealed that following her husband's death in 1997, Robinson filed a worker's compensation claim against his employer, Drummond Coal. The claim was still pending when Robinson declared bankruptcy in April 2002. However, Robinson failed to list the claim anywhere on her bankruptcy schedules. When asked whether she had any suits or administrative proceedings pending, Robinson checked "NONE" on the schedule disclosure forms.

Due to her failure to disclose her claim against Tyson to the bankruptcy court, Tyson contended that Robinson was precluded from pursuing her suit on the basis of judicial estoppel. Tyson argued that Robinson's non-disclosure constituted inconsistent positions under oath that were calculated to make a mockery of the judicial system. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment for Tyson. This appeal followed. The only issue on appeal is whether the district court abused its discretion in applying judicial estoppel.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Generally, we review the granting of summary judgment de novo, and the district court's findings of fact for clear error. Levinson v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 245 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir.2001). However, we review the district court's application of judicial estoppel for abuse of discretion. Talavera v. School Bd. of Palm Beach County, 129 F.3d 1214, 1216 (11th Cir.1997). As this case is decided upon the theory of judicial estoppel, the applicable standard of review is abuse of discretion, with the finding of facts held to clear error. An abuse of discretion review requires us to "affirm unless we find that the district court has made a clear error of judgment, or has applied the wrong legal standard." United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir.2004) (en banc).

III. DISCUSSION

The purpose of judicial estoppel is "to protect the integrity of the judicial process by prohibiting parties from changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment." New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749, 121 S.Ct. 1808, 1814, 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001). Specifically, judicial estoppel is designed to "prevent a party from asserting a claim in a legal proceeding that is inconsistent with a claim taken by the party in a previous preceding." 18 Moore's Federal Practice § 134.30 (3d ed. 2008). In New Hampshire v. Maine, the Supreme Court recognized that while the circumstances under which a court might invoke judicial estoppel will vary, three factors typically inform the decision: (1) whether the present position is clearly inconsistent with the earlier position; (2) whether the party succeeded in persuading a court to accept the earlier position, so that judicial acceptance of the inconsistent position in a later proceeding would create the perception that either the first or second court was mislead and; (3) whether the party advancing the inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage. Id. at 750-51, 121 S.Ct. at 1815-16.

The seminal case in the Eleventh Circuit on the theory of judicial estoppel is Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir.2002). Incorporating the standards enumerated by the Supreme Court, Burnes outlined two primary factors for establishing the bar of judicial estoppel. "First, it must be shown that the allegedly inconsistent positions were made under oath in a prior proceeding. Second, such inconsistencies must be shown to have been calculated to make a mockery of the judicial system." Id. at 1285. Burnes recognized that these factors are not exhaustive; rather, courts must always give due consideration to the circumstances of the particular case. See id.

A. Duty to Disclose

Robinson took inconsistent positions under oath only if she had a continuing duty to disclose changes in her bankruptcy asset schedule. Robinson contends that as a Chapter 13 debtor, she did not have a continuing duty to disclose her assets to the bankruptcy court. We disagree.

Our court has emphasized the importance of full and honest disclosure in bankruptcy proceedings, stating that it is "crucial" to the system's "effective functioning." Id. A debtor seeking shelter under the bankruptcy laws has a statutory duty to disclose all assets, or potential assets to the bankruptcy court. 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(1), 541(a)(7). "The duty to disclose is a continuing one that does not end once the forms are submitted to the bankruptcy court; rather the debtor must amend [her] financial statements if circumstances change." Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1286. This duty applies to proceedings under Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 alike because "any distinction between the types of bankruptcies available is not sufficient enough to affect the applicability of judicial estoppel because the need for complete and honest disclosure exists in all types of bankruptcies." De Leon v. Comcar Industries, Inc., 321 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir.2003).

Robinson argues that our current case law mandating a continuing statutory duty to disclose can be traced back to dicta in Burnes and incorrectly perpetuated as law by subsequent cases. However, even if the reasoning in Burnes is dicta, it became the law of this circuit in the holdings of De Leon v. Comcar Industries, Ajaka v. BrooksAmerica Mortgage Corp., 453 F.3d 1339, 1344 (11th Cir.2006) and Waldron v. Brown, 536 F.3d 1239, 1244 (11th Cir.2008) (all of which are Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases citing Burnes for the proposition that "the duty to disclose is a continuing one that does not end once the forms are submitted to the bankruptcy court; rather the debtor must amend [her] financial statements if circumstances change"). Therefore, under the established law of this circuit, a Chapter 13 debtor has a statutory duty to disclose changes in assets.

The law is clear that "[u]nder the prior precedent rule, we are bound to follow a prior binding precedent unless and until it is overruled by this court en banc or by the Supreme Court." United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 1236 (11th Cir.2008) (per curiam). As noted above, this circuit's precedent holds that a Chapter 13 debtor has a statutory duty to amend her financial schedule to reflect her current assets. As such, we hold that Robinson had a statutory duty to amend her schedule of assets to reflect her claims against Tyson.

In addition to the general statutory duty, in this case there was a court ordered duty to disclose additional assets. The bankruptcy court's order specifically states that, "the property of the estate shall not vest in the Debtor until a discharge is granted under § 1328 or the case is dismissed." Therefore, all qualified property acquired by Robinson during the pendency of her bankruptcy belonged to her bankruptcy estate and not her personally.

It is undisputed that a pending lawsuit seeking monetary compensation qualifies as an asset. Parker v. Wendy's...

To continue reading

Request your trial
247 cases
  • Blanco v. Bayview Loan Servicing LLC (In re Blanco)
    • United States
    • United States Bankruptcy Courts. Fifth Circuit. U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Southern District of Texas
    • September 14, 2021
    ......46 West v. WRG Energy Partners LLC (In re Noram Res., Inc.) , 2011 WL 6936361, at *1, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 5183, at *3 (Bankr. S.D. ...McCaskey , 9 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 1993) ). 118 Love v. Tyson Foods, Inc. , 677 F.3d 258, 261 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Reed v. City of ...1993) ). 147 Love , 677 F.3d at 263 (quoting Robinson v. Tyson Foods, Inc. , 595 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 2010) ). 148 ......
  • Nilhan Developers, LLC v. Glass (In re Nilhan Developers, LLC)
    • United States
    • United States Bankruptcy Courts. Eleventh Circuit. U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • May 19, 2021
    ...must be intentional, but such intent may be inferred from the record. Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1285-87; Robinson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 595 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2010). While "there may be instances in which the plaintiff's intent is not clear from the pleadings," there are other cases in wh......
  • Nilhan Developers, LLC v. Glass (In re Nilhan Developers, LLC)
    • United States
    • United States Bankruptcy Courts. Eleventh Circuit. U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • May 19, 2021
    ......of Unsecured Creditors of Tousa, Inc. v. Technical Olympic, S.A. (In re Tousa) , 437 B.R. 447, 452 (Bankr. S.D. ... Burnes , 291 F.3d at 1285-87 ; Robinson v. Tyson Foods, Inc. , 595 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2010). While "there ......
  • Williams v. First Advantage LNS Screening Solutions Inc., No. 17-11447
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)
    • January 9, 2020
    ...court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Robinson v. Tyson Foods, Inc. , 595 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted).II. Reputational HarmPlaintiff asked for compensatory damages based on the emotional di......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT