595 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1979), 78-6213, Paine v. Baker
| Citation | 595 F.2d 197 |
| Party Name | Frederick Robert PAINE, Appellee, v. Ben L. BAKER, Supervisor of Records, and the North Carolina Department of Corrections, Appellants. |
| Case Date | March 30, 1979 |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals, U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
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Argued Jan. 9, 1979.
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James Peeler Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., Raleigh, N. C. (Rufus L. Edmisten, Atty. Gen., Raleigh, N. C., Jacob L. Safron, Special Deputy Atty. Gen., Raleigh, N. C., on brief), for appellants.
E. Ray Stanford, Third Year Student (R. Michael Wells, Frye, Booth & Porter, Winston-Salem, N. C., on brief), for appellee.
Before JACK R. MILLER, Judge, Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, sitting by designation, HALL and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
K. K. HALL, Circuit Judge:
Appellee Frederick Robert Paine, an inmate in the North Carolina Department of Corrections (hereinafter "Department"), filed this action in district court against the Department seeking to inspect his prison file and all interdepartmental memoranda relating to him. Although he styled his action Request for Production of Documents, Fed.R.Civ.P. 34, the district court properly construed the Pro se paper as a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). The court granted relief, holding that Paine's entitlement to inspect his file was grounded in N.C.G.S. §§ 148-74, 148-76. 1 In denying the Department's subsequent motion for reconsideration the court expanded its earlier holding, stating that "(the Department has) failed to justify the infringement upon this Constitutionally protected right (of access.)" (Emphasis added) The Department appeals, and we reverse.
On appeal Paine argues that an alternative ground for relief should be recognized by this court: the right of an inmate to have erroneous information expunged from his file. Although we agree and hold today that a limited right, grounded in the due process clause, does exist, we find it unnecessary to remand this case for reconsideration as the record conclusively shows that Paine has not been denied the right and thus cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
I.
The district court first held that Paine's right of access to his prison file derived from N.C.G.S. §§ 148-74 and 148-76. The court felt it unreasonable to make the records available "to almost anybody," See note 1 Infra, while denying access to the inmate himself on a theory of confidentiality. Paine v. Baker, No. 77-266-CRT (E.D.N.C., Dec. 14, 1977), Memorandum Opinion at 1. Without addressing the soundness of this reasoning, we note that the court's
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interpretation of North Carolina's statutory scheme directly contradicts the interpretation of the State's highest court. In Goble v. Bounds, 13 N.C.App. 579, 186 S.E.2d 638 (1972), the Court of Appeals of North Carolina held that prison records are confidential and are not subject to inspection by the inmate concerned, but only by those persons specifically named in the statute. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed. Goble v. Bounds, 281 N.C. 307, 188 S.E.2d 347 (1972). "It is too well settled to admit of argument that the federal courts are bound by the interpretation placed upon the statutes of a state by its highest court . . . ." Ferguson v. Manning, 216 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1954). Therefore the holding of the district court, insofar as it rests upon an interpretation of state law inconsistent with the interpretation of the North Carolina Supreme Court, is reversed.
II.
In denying the Department's motion for reconsideration the district court held, without elaboration, that a state prison inmate has a constitutionally protected right of access to his prison file. We find this holding to be in conflict with our opinion in Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1978) (en banc), Aff'g in part and rev'g in part 569 F.2d 784 (4th Cir. 1977), Cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1003, 98 S.Ct. 1659, 56 L.Ed.2d 92 (1978).
In Franklin, a panel of this court considered the nature and extent of procedural safeguards which are constitutionally required in state parole proceedings. The panel concluded, Inter alia, that a state prisoner has a right to inspect his file in order to ensure the accuracy of that file. 569 F.2d at 794-95. Although the district court had found that erroneous information was contained in the respondents' files, the panel's decision did not rest on that ground but was rather a broad prophylactic rule of access for Any prisoner who was to be considered for parole. A majority of the court sitting en banc reversed this portion of the panel's opinion, finding no constitutional requirement that a prisoner have access to his file. 569 F.2d at 800. "(T)he only explicit constitutional requisite is that the Board (of Parole) furnish to the prisoner a statement of its reasons for denial of parole." Id. at 801. The court did not address the issue of whether a prisoner's allegation that erroneous information is contained in his file may state a claim of constitutional magnitude.
Paine argues that the holding in Franklin should be limited to its facts right of access before parole hearing and that a general right of access is constitutionally mandated before or after other prison disciplinary proceedings involving forfeiture of statutory privileges. 2 We disagree. " The burden cast upon the State by such a requirement clearly outweighs any interest of the prisoner . . . ." Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d at 799 (Field, J. dissenting from panel opinion). The Department has represented to this court that it maintains a central record file on the prison records of more than 15,000 prisoners, who are housed in more than 80 separate locations. Any across-the-boards rule of access would clearly be an overwhelming administrative burden; and "what an inmate might find most often upon inspection of institutional files is that there is 'some evidence' to support (an adverse administrative decision), but evidence which he believes is outweighed by other facts." Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d 1143, 1160 (2d Cir.), Cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 944, 98 S.Ct. 469, 54 L.Ed.2d 323 (1977). The federal courts are not an appropriate forum to review the discretionary decisions of prison administrators which are based on evidence conflicting in nature and degree.
Therefore the holding of the district court, insofar as it rests on the court's view that a prisoner has a constitutional right of access to his prison file, is reversed.
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III.
After the Department filed its motion for reconsideration, Paine submitted a paper denominated Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint. 3 In this he asserted that he had been denied parole because of his past criminal record and poor prison adjustment, and implied that information in his file must be false to support such a finding. On appeal, Paine contends that he has a cognizable due process right to have his correctional file free from allegedly incorrect prejudicial information.
We hold today that in certain limited circumstances a claim of constitutional magnitude is raised where a prisoner alleges (1) that information is in his file, (2) that the information is false, and (3) that it is relied on to a constitutionally significant degree. We recognize that some burden will necessarily be cast upon the prison system and upon the federal courts; we also recognize that the limitations we impose on this cause of action may be viewed by prisoners as a halfway measure. But in this nascent area "the definition of minimum due process is often sensitive to what proves necessary In practice to a fair procedure," Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d at 1160, and we are confident that our decision today reflects a proper balancing of the inmates' need for some safeguard, the proper circumstances in which the safeguard may be invoked, and the potential burden on prison administrators.
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Substantive Elements
An inmate must first allege that particular information is contained in his file. It is, of course, difficult in the ordinary course of events for a prisoner who...
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