State v. Martinez
| Decision Date | 11 May 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 15744,15744 |
| Citation | 595 P.2d 897 |
| Parties | The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ronald John MARTINEZ, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Phil L. Hansen of Hansen & Hansen, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Earl F. Dorius, Asst. Atty. Gen., Theodore L. Cannon, Salt Lake County Atty., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.
Defendant Ronald Martinez appeals from a jury conviction of unlawful possession of a controlled substance (heroin) with intent to distribute for value. 1 He assigns error in admitting evidence of statements made by him when he had not been properly informed of and protected in his constitutional rights.
On July 18, 1977, at about 7:30 p. m., the defendant was driving east on 3900 South at about 900 West in Salt Lake City when he was stopped by Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriffs Michael George and Randall Anderson. The deputies advised the defendant of his constitutional rights and informed him that they had a warrant to search his person and residence. 2 The officers searched the defendant and told him that they were going to his residence to search it. They also told him that he could come along and let them into the home, but if he did not, they would use force to gain access to his residence.
The defendant accompanied the two officers to his residence, a mobile home located at 1158 Warbler in Salt Lake City, where they met other narcotic officers. The officers conducted a search and discovered a container of heroin, and various items used in handling and purveying such drugs including, a blender, a quarter teaspoon measure, an aluminum funnel, a package of toy balloons, a strainer, and two packages of lactose.
Following the search, at about 8:00 p. m. the defendant was placed under arrest and taken into custody. Deputy George testified:
I again asked him if he understood his Miranda rights, as I had read them to him before. He stated yes, I do understand them. I asked him if he would mind answering a few questions. He stated no, that he would answer a few questions to me.
The defendant answered the five or six questions posed to him by the officers and then volunteered, "Yeah, I deal dope, but I sold my last bag last night."
The basis of the defendant's contention that his constitutional rights were violated is that even though he had been advised of his rights when first accosted by the officers, he was entitled to a renewed warning of such rights after he was formally placed under arrest at about 8:00 p. m.; and he couples with this the assertion that the officers failed to tell him that while under custodial interrogation he could cease answering questions or making statements at any time.
In analyzing these contentions, it is important to have in mind the origin and purpose of those rights. They came into being as a safeguard against oppressive methods and abuses by which innocent persons were imposed on and sometimes unjustly convicted and punished. We have no desire to pursue a policy which is anything less than a zealous respect for those rights. But neither their purpose, nor the safeguarding of the peace and good order of society are served if the protection of individual rights is so distorted as to give irresponsible protections to criminal conduct and impose such restrictions on peace officers that they are thwarted in their efforts to combat crime.
If it appears that an accused has been in any way abused or unfairly dealt with, so that there is any reasonable doubt that he was justly convicted, the conviction should not be permitted to stand. On the other hand, unless there is something of that character, these salutary protections of law should not be so perverted as to permit guilty persons to escape conviction. 3
We have no disposition to disagree with the proposition that the status of being in custody exists when any words or action of the police can...
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State v. Sampson
...warnings would have sufficed had Sgt. Elliot elicited a clear waiver of those rights from defendant at that time. See State v. Martinez, 595 P.2d 897, 899-900 (Utah 1979) (the law does not require repetition of Miranda rights within a short period of time and a continuous sequence of events......
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State v. Streeter
...warning under the totality-of-circumstances test as ' "one detail[ ] of the interrogation" ' " (citations omitted)); State v. Martinez, 595 P.2d 897, 899-900 (Utah 1979) (holding defendant advised of Miranda rights need not be re-advised half hour later); State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 358 ......
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Salt Lake City v. Carner
...and did perform the field sobriety tests under "some substantial physical or psychological control or restraint." In State v. Martinez, Utah, 595 P.2d 897, 899 (1979), we held such restraint requires that a person be advised of his Miranda rights. 2 Since he was not so advised, defendant ar......
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State v. Pilling
...placed defendant under their physical and psychological control; thus he was in custody at the time of the assault. Cf. State v. Martinez, 595 P.2d 897, 899 (Utah 1979) (defining custody in context of police interrogations as existing "when any words or action of the police can reasonably b......