U.S. v. Jackson, 07-30981.

Citation596 F.3d 236
Decision Date03 February 2010
Docket NumberNo. 07-30981.,07-30981.
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Archie Roy JACKSON, James Bernis Midkiff, Defendants-Appellants.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

Camille Ann Domingue, Asst. U.S. Atty., Lafayette, LA, for U.S.

Wayne Joseph Blanchard, Lafayette, LA, for Jackson.

Michael Charles Piccione, Sr. (Court-Appointed), Barry & Piccione, Lafayette, LA, for Midkiff.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.

Before GARZA, DeMOSS and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:

Archie Roy Jackson and James Bernis Midkiff were convicted of charges stemming from a conspiracy to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine. Jackson challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence found during a search in and around his home. Midkiff contends that the district court erred by increasing the quantity of drugs attributable to him for sentencing purposes and allowing the government to amend the indictment.

I

Jackson and Midkiff were indicted by a federal grand jury for their participation in a conspiracy to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine. They, along with several co-conspirators, utilized a number of remote rural locations in Louisiana to set up methamphetamine labs. They used these labs to "cook" methamphetamine, which they later distributed. In addition to the drug crimes, both men were accused of knowingly possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Midkiff also was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Federal arrest warrants were issued for both men.

Before Jackson was arrested, the state case agent in the federal investigation sought a search warrant for Jackson's residence from a state court judge. The agent executed an affidavit supporting the warrant application, and, based on the affidavit, the state court issued a search warrant for Jackson's residence.

Thus, at the time the officers went to Jackson's residence, they had both a state search warrant and a federal arrest warrant. When the officers entered Jackson's home, they observed him place something under the couch on which he was sitting. They quickly arrested Jackson and then conducted a sweep of the home to ensure that no one else was present. They also examined the couch and discovered that the item Jackson placed under it was a bag of marijuana.

The officers continued their search of the residence and the outdoor area surrounding the home. Inside the house, they discovered a locked safe. Jackson provided the officers with the combination to the safe, inside of which they found guns and some crushed pseudoephedrine tablets, which are used to produce methamphetamine. Outside the house, they found chemicals and equipment used in the manufacturing of methamphetamine.

Before trial, Jackson filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the search of his home. The district court denied the motion. Following a jury trial both Jackson and Midkiff were convicted of, inter alia, conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, establishment of manufacturing operations, and attempt to manufacture methamphetamine. The jury indicated on a special jury form that it found Jackson and Midkiff guilty of a conspiracy involving 50 grams or less of methamphetamine, but not guilty of a conspiracy involving 50 to 500 grams or 500 grams or more. Midkiff was also convicted of the firearms violations.

The United States Probation Officer issued a presentence report ("PSR") attributing 1,318 grams of methamphetamine to Midkiff based on extrapolation from estimates provided by co-conspirators. Midkiff filed an objection to the PSR "in its entirety," along with two other objections that are not relevant to the appeal. The Probation Officer responded to the objection, and the district court credited the response as adequate. The court adopted the factual statements in the PSR and found that it reasonably addressed the relevant conduct and accurately reported the applicable statutory sentences. In accordance with the Sentencing Guidelines, the court sentenced Midkiff to 168 months for the drug crimes and 360 months for the gun crimes, to run consecutively.1

II

Jackson argues that the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence found in and around his home during a search authorized by a state search warrant. He contends that the affidavit supporting the search warrant was based on incorrect and incomplete information, thus rendering the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule inapplicable. He also argues that the search cannot be justified by the protective sweep rule because most of the evidence was found in the yard and not in the house itself.

We accept a district court's factual findings on a motion to suppress based on live testimony at a suppression hearing "unless clearly erroneous or influenced by an incorrect view of the law." United States v. Foy, 28 F.3d 464, 474 (5th Cir.1994). When reviewing the district court's ruling, we will "view[] the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party." United States v. Howard, 106 F.3d 70, 73 (5th Cir.1997). Our review of the district court's interpretation and application of law is de novo. See United States v. Blocker, 104 F.3d 720, 725 (5th Cir.1997).

Although the parties' briefing primarily addresses the good-faith exception, our examination of the record does not indicate that the district court based its decision to deny Jackson's motion to suppress on the good-faith exception. Before ruling on the motion, the district court heard testimony from the officer who provided the affidavit supporting the search warrant and from one of the officers who conducted the search. After hearing argument from counsel, the district court stated:

[T]he ruling of the court is going to be [that] it's not a bare bones affidavit. But I think that if it were based on the affidavit alone, it would be suppressed. However, I do agree with the government in this particular case that the inevitable discovery doctrine works. I also think that you've got the independent source verification by the officer who sees the marijuana when he comes into the residence, and he was a different officer from Officer Ortiz, in any event. So I think those two doctrines allow this particular search, that the items seized to be admissible, and so the motion to suppress in this case will be overruled on that basis.

Based on this oral ruling, it is unclear whether the district court found that the good-faith exception applied.2

What is clear, however, is that the district court based its ruling at least in part on the inevitable discovery doctrine. Because of this alternate grounds for denying the motion to suppress, we do not reach the merits of the good-faith exception argument. Instead, we analyze the district court's determination that the evidence from the search of Jackson's home and the surrounding areas is admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine. See United States v. Grosenheider, 200 F.3d 321, 327 (5th Cir.2000) (refusing to consider whether warrantless search was illegal because independent source doctrine applied); United States v. Register, 931 F.2d 308, 311 (5th Cir.1991) (refusing to consider whether exigent circumstances justified a warrantless entry because the independent source doctrine applied).3

"The exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment generally prohibits the introduction at trial of not only primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, but also evidence discovered later that is derivative of an illegality, or constitutes `fruit of a poisonous tree.'" Grosenheider, 200 F.3d at 327. "The primary limit on this rule is that otherwise suppressible evidence will still be admitted if the connection between the alleged illegality and the acquisition of the evidence is `so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.'" Id. (quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341, 60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939)). One example of this "attenuation" limit is known as the inevitable discovery doctrine, which renders the exclusionary rule inapplicable to otherwise suppressible evidence if that evidence would inevitably have been discovered by lawful means. See 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 11.4(a) (3d ed.1996).

The inevitable discovery rule applies if the Government demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) there is a reasonable probability that the contested evidence would have been discovered by lawful means in the absence of police misconduct and (2) the Government was actively pursuing a substantial alternate line of investigation at the time of the constitutional violation. United States v. Lamas, 930 F.2d 1099, 1102 (5th Cir.1991).

It is undisputed that, even without the state search warrant, the federal arrest warrant gave the officers the authority to enter Jackson's residence to arrest him. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) ("[A]n arrest warrant ... carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within."). Further, the officers had the authority to conduct a search of the area immediately surrounding the place where the arrest was made. See United States v. Virgil, 444 F.3d 447, 451 (5th Cir.2006) ("Any arrest may be accompanied by a search `incident to the arrest' of the immediate vicinity, limited to areas in which weapons might be found, regardless of probable cause or reasonable suspicion.") (quoting Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990)). Thus, the officers were acting within their authority when they discovered the bag of marijuana that Jackson had hidden...

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