Hicks v. Feeney

• Decision Date: 08 November 1984
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 83-185 LON.
• Citation: 596 F. Supp. 1504
• Parties: Roy HICKS, Plaintiff, v. Robert C. FEENEY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

596 F. Supp. 1504

Roy HICKS, Plaintiff, v. Robert C. FEENEY, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 83-185 LON.

United States District Court, D. Delaware.

November 8, 1984.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Joseph M. Bernstein, Wilmington, Del., for plaintiff.

Matthew J. Lynch, Jr., Dept. of Justice, Wilmington, Del., for defendant.

OPINION

LONGOBARDI, District Judge.

This case is a civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Plaintiff, Roy Hicks ("Hicks"), was formerly a patient at the Delaware State Hospital ("DSH"). The Defendant, Robert C. Feeney ("Feeney"), the director of the DSH, is a Defendant in both his individual and official capacities. The Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against the Defendant in his official capacity and compensatory damages from him as an individual.

The basis for the complaint is that Hicks was confined at DSH without legal authority and the confinement deprived him of a liberty interest in violation of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. The Plaintiff also alleges that even if his confinement by the hospital was entirely lawful, his fourteenth amendment liberty interest was still violated because he was not granted the least restrictive conditions of possible confinement.

Background

Presently before the Court are cross motions for summary judgment. The facts underlying the claims are not in dispute. On November 18, 1982, the Plaintiff was found guilty of contempt of court by Family Court Judge Jay H. Conner. Judge Conner sentenced Hicks to 30 days in jail and suspended the sentence in favor of one year's probation. Two of the conditions of probation were that Hicks present himself at DSH for a period of 72 hours for evaluation and then follow the Hospital's recommendation for continued treatment or hospitalization. The commitment order signed by Judge Conner authorized Hicks to stay in DSH "for such time as may be permitted by law, unless sooner discharged according to law."

Hicks was sent directly to DSH from Family Court and arrived on the afternoon of November 18, 1982. Upon admission, he was examined by Dr. Felix Vergara and assigned to the Comegys Building. Shortly thereafter, he was examined by the forensic treatment team who concluded that the "court is to be informed of the situation that the patient needs some in-patient treatment gradually phased to an out-patient program."

On November 23, 1982, 5 days after Hicks' admission, Dr. Levy, a member of the forensic team, wrote to Judge Conner that Hicks required further evaluation at DSH. On November 24, Dr. Levy again wrote to the judge and stated that Hicks had "been exhibiting signs and symptoms of a major mental illness .... It is recommended that he receive further treatment ... by way of a Civil Commitment."

No formal action was initiated until almost 3 weeks later. On December 13, 1982, Dr. Levy prepared a certificate determining that Plaintiff was mentally ill. A verified complaint seeking a judicial determination of Plaintiff's mental status was signed by Defendant Feeney on December 20, 1982, and was filed in the Superior Court on December 27, 1982. The complaint noted that Hicks "was provisionally admitted as an involuntary mental patient on December 13, 1982."

On December 22, 1982, Hicks was transferred to the M-2 ward from the Comegys Building, a building designed to house criminals who were mentally disturbed.

After the complaint seeking a hearing on Hicks' mental status was filed on December 27, the Superior Court scheduled a probable cause hearing for January 14, 1983. That hearing never took place because the Plaintiff was discharged from the Delaware State Hospital on January 12, 1983.

Statutory Involuntary Commitment Procedure

The Plaintiff contends that the events surrounding his stay at DSH must be examined in light of the provisions of the Delaware Involuntary Commitment Statute, 16 Del.C., Ch. 50, and the fourteenth amendment. The Involuntary Commitment Statute limits the power of the State to involuntarily confine an individual in a mental hospital, 16 Del.C. § 5002, and establishes a three step procedure for the involuntary commitment of an individual. The first step requires that an individual be provisionally admitted only pursuant to the particularized, written certification of a psychiatrist that the individual is mentally ill. 16 Del.C. § 5003.

If the provisional admission certificate is done by a psychiatrist other than an employee of the hospital, the hospital has 3 days to "independently determine whether or not the involuntary person is a mentally ill person."¹ 16 Del.C. § 5005(2). If the hospital then finds an individual to be mentally ill, it has "6 working days from the date of the provisional admission" to file a verified complaint seeking a judicial determination of the involuntary patient's mental status. 16 Del.C. § 5007(a). Judicial proceedings must begin no later than 18 working days from the filing of the complaint. 16 Del.C. § 5008(1). The proceedings begin with a probable cause hearing to determine whether an individual is legally being held at the hospital. Once probable cause is found by the court, a hearing to determine whether or not the patient is mentally ill must be held on the "earliest practicable date." 16 Del.C. § 5008(4).

Contentions of the Parties

This statutory procedure was obviously not followed in Hicks' case. The provisional admission certificate was prepared 16 days after Hicks' admission rather than 3 days after admission as mandated by statute. 16 Del.C. § 5005. The verified complaint was filed 26 days after Hicks' admission rather than within 9 days as required by statute. 16 Del.C. § 5007. Hicks' probable cause hearing was scheduled 40 days after his admission rather than within 27 days as prescribed by statute. The Plaintiff maintains that the procedure followed deprived him of his fourteenth amendment interest in remaining free from unwarranted confinement in a mental hospital without due process of law. On the other hand, the Defendant maintains that Hicks' constitutional rights were not violated and that he is entitled to summary judgment on three grounds. First, he contends that the statutory commitment procedure was not necessary because Judge Conner had the legal authority to impose as a condition of Plaintiff's probation his compliance with the directives of the Delaware State Hospital and that the condition could include continuing hospitalization. Next, he states that even if the probation order could not properly authorize an indefinite stay, the Plaintiff has no cause of action because neither count of his complaint alleges a deprivation of due process actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Finally, he claims that even if a constitutional violation occurred, he is entitled to official immunity which bars the imposition of any monetary liability.

In deciding these motions for summary judgment, the Court is mindful of the clearly established summary judgment standard. Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, upon motion of a party, summary judgment shall be granted if the record before the court shows that there is no issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The burden of proving that the standard has been met is on the moving party. In the instant case, where both sides have moved for summary judgment, the record reveals no material factual disputes between the parties.

Requirements for a 1983 Action

In any section 1983 action, the initial inquiry must focus on two elements: (1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law, and (2) whether the conduct deprived the person of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535-36, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1912-1913, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981). In this case, Feeney, as director of the state mental hospital, was clearly acting under color of state law. Thus, the Court's inquiry must focus on whether his conduct deprived the Plaintiff of any rights protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

The Plaintiff has alleged violations of procedural and substantive due process rights under the fourteenth amendment. The Court will first address his procedural claim.

Procedural Due Process

In order to prevail in an action alleging a violation of the fourteenth amendment right to procedural due process, a plaintiff must show:

(1) that the interest deprived was protected under the fourteenth amendment;

(2) that the deprivation was without due process; and

(3) that the charged defendant subjected the plaintiff or caused him to be subjected to the deprivation.

Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 536-37, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1912-13, 68 L.Ed.2d 420.

Both sides agree that the Plaintiff had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in remaining free from unwarranted hospitalization in a state mental hospital.² Also, there is no dispute that Feeney, as director of the DSH, was the person officially charged with the care and custody of the Plaintiff. If there was a deprivation of a liberty interest, Feeney would be the person held accountable. Thus, the question facing the Court is whether the deprivation of Hicks' liberty interest took place without due process of law.

The Defendant first contends that the Plaintiff's stay at DSH was not without due process of law because it was pursuant to a probation order of the Family Court. He maintains that the proceeding in which Hicks was found in contempt of court gave him all the process he was due prior to confinement at DSH. This argument has only a facial appeal. Even though an individual may be referred to a mental hospital for evaluation and treatment as a condition of probation, United States v. Mercado, 469 F.2d 1148 (2d Cir.1972), precedent suggests that an indefinite confinement in a mental hospital...