Petrucelli v. Palmer
| Decision Date | 09 January 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:07-CV-01783(CSH).,3:07-CV-01783(CSH). |
| Citation | 596 F.Supp.2d 347 |
| Parties | Michael J. PETRUCELLI and Margaret C. Petrucelli, Plaintiffs, v. Jeannine J. PALMER, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
Anthony J. Interlandi, Jeffrey J. Tinley, Tinley, Nastri, Renehan & Dost, Waterbury, CT, for Plaintiffs.
Richard D. Arconti, Law Offices of Richard D. Arconti, Danbury, CT, for Defendant.
I. PRELIMINARY
This is a case of mistake in a real estate transaction. Plaintiffs Michael and Margaret Petrucelli mistakenly believed that a weekend home they were buying from defendant Jeannine Palmer was fully contained within the boundaries of its plot, and that there were no problems with encroachment onto adjacent properties.
The mistake may or may not have been mutual: defendant Palmer claims she did not know that the property had any such problems, but plaintiffs question her credibility. The mistake also might or might not have been caused by Palmer's representations on a schedule attached to the contract for sale—the Petrucellis say they relied on this form, but Palmer disputes that claim. But these disputes, while important, are not dispositive.
It is undisputed that within weeks of the closing, a survey revealed to the Petrucellis, for the first time, that a corner of the house itself as well as most or all of the septic system are located beyond the rear boundary of the property, on the strip of shoreline that surrounds the lake and is controlled by a power company.1
Once this fact was revealed, it imposed considerable restraints on what the Petrucellis could do with their newly acquired property. They promptly demanded a rescission of the transaction. Defendant refused, and this lawsuit followed. Plaintiffs invoke the Court's diversity jurisdiction.
Discovery is complete, and the parties have cross-moved for summary judgment. The Petrucellis ask the Court to rescind the transaction entirely.2 Palmer seeks a judgment that any recovery is barred because the mistake was more the fault of the Petrucellis than her own.
In the final analysis, whether Palmer had absolutely no knowledge of the problems or whether she knew everything and lied is not material. Similarly, there is no genuine issue as to whether or not the Petrucellis relied on her representations. For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that this case is tailor-made for application of the equitable remedy of rescission.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs properly invoke this Court's diversity jurisdiction. The Petrucellis are residents of Riverside, Connecticut, Compl. [doc. # 1] ¶ 1, while Palmer "considers her residence in New York as her home," and the only other properties she has ever owned are two condos in Florida and the Premises at issue in this case. Pls.' Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement [doc. # 27] ¶ 75 (citing deposition transcript); Def.'s Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement [doc. # 25] ¶ 3.3 I find that taken as a whole, the record demonstrates that there is complete diversity of citizenship between the plaintiffs and defendant.
The property in controversy was sold to the plaintiffs for $898,000. Although the remedy sought by plaintiffs—rescission of the contract—is equitable in nature, the Supreme Court has stated that in situations where other equitable or non-pecuniary relief is sought, such as declaratory or injunctive relief, "it is well established that the amount in controversy is measured by the value of the object of the litigation." Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 347, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977); see also DiTolla v. Doral Dental IPA of New York, 469 F.3d 271, 276 (2d Cir.2006). Even in the face of the problems arising from the property's boundary line, the plaintiffs have submitted a conservative assessment showing that the property is worth at least $200,000. I conclude, therefore, that "the value of the object of the litigation" satisfies the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
The property that changed hands, located at 9 Lakeshore North, New Fairfield, Connecticut (the "Premises"), is a small plot of land measuring 0.109 acres. It backs up against the shoreline of Candlewood Lake. The location of that rear boundary was originally determined based on a fixed elevation of 440 feet above sea level.4 The parties' submissions refer to this line as the "440' contour line." I will do so in this opinion.
Palmer put the Premises up for sale. She received and rejected at least four offers to purchase the property in 2006 and 2007. On August 18, 2007, the Petrucellis made an offer of $900,000, which Palmer decided to accept because it was higher than other offers she had received.
After that offer was accepted, Margaret Petrucelli "hired professionals to conduct a home inspection, test the domestic water, test the air for radon and test the septic system." [doc. # 27] ¶ 11. Both parties were represented by legal counsel in this transaction. The Petrucellis were considering tearing down the existing structure and building a new home in its place. In anticipation of such a plan, Mrs. Petrucelli visited the lot on more than one occasion and took measurements there. The home itself was also professionally inspected to provide an estimate of how much such work would cost. Also prior to the closing, the septic tank was inspected by Dennis Carlson, the owner of A-1 Septic Co. The Petrucellis also consulted Rich Jackson, the Sanitarian for the Town of New Fairfield, prior to the closing.
During the course of these professional inspections—performed by persons who were experienced with properties on Candlewood Lake and who might have known that such properties had problems with encroachment below the 440' contour line—nobody advised the Petrucellis that their property might face similar problems.5
Margaret Petrucelli even visited, at one point, a public records office, where she reviewed the file concerning the property she was acquiring. But after reviewing the file, she had no new concerns or questions about the configuration of the property.
The uncontroverted testimony is that Margaret Petrucelli knew, prior to the closing, that the 440' contour line determined the rear boundary of her property. But crucially, she did not know what that line was, or where precisely on the property it was located. The Petrucellis allege, and Palmer admits, that "[u]pon receipt and review of the Property Survey ... the plaintiffs were shocked to learn that a portion of the house at the Premises and almost all of the rear yard, including the area where the septic tank and leaching fields are located, are beyond the rear boundary line of the Premises." [doc. # 27] ¶ 54; [doc. # 30-2] ¶ 54.
Less clear from the record is how much Palmer knew about the location of the 440' contour line or the encroachment problems posed by the rear corner of the house and the septic system. In her statement of material facts as to which she contends there is no dispute, Palmer alleges:
7. At no time during her period of ownership was Palmer aware of any issues regarding the location of the septic system or how the house was situated on the lot.
8. During her period of ownership, she was not aware of ever having a survey done of the property; having it appraised; having any work done that required a building permit; nor having repairs or improvements done to the septic system.
...
11. During her period of ownership, she was not familiar with the concept of the 440' elevation line.
12. During her period of ownership, Palmer was unaware of anyone else in the area having an issue regarding property boundaries and the septic system.
13. Palmer's husband had taken care of issues relating to the property.
Def.'s Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement [doc. # 25] at 2-3.
The Petrucellis contest these assertions. They acknowledge that Palmer "testified during her deposition on May 29, 2008, that she was not aware of any issues regarding the encroachments at the premises," but seek to discredit this testimony by pointing to other perceived inconsistencies between what Palmer has said and written with respect to her knowledge of the boundaries at the Premises. See Pls.' Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement [doc. # 31] ¶¶ 7-13, at 1-4.
This dispute may be genuine, but it is not material under the governing law. The result is the same, whether Palmer was telling the truth in her deposition or not.
III. DISCUSSION
On their cross-motions, both parties argue that discovery has not uncovered any genuine issues of material fact, and that the case is ripe for summary judgment.
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a moving party is entitled to summary judgment "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) (2008). Miner v. Clinton County, 541 F.3d 464, 471 (2d Cir.2008) (brackets in original) (quoting McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 202 (2d Cir.2007)). In this diversity action, the governing law is that of the state of Connecticut. "[U]nless the nonmoving party offers some hard evidence showing that its version of the events is not wholly fanciful, summary judgment is granted to the moving party." Id. (quoting McCarthy).
Both parties have identified areas of factual dispute....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Modise v. CareOne Health Servs.
...... pecuniary harm as a result.” Nazami v. Patrons Mut. Ins. Co. , 280 Conn. 619, 626 (2006); accord. Petrucelli v. Palmer , 596 F.Supp.2d 347, 371 (D. Conn. 2009). See also Kramer v. Petisi , 285 Conn. 674, 681. (2008) (quoting Restatement (Second) ......
-
Modise v. CareOne Health Servs.
...... pecuniary harm as a result.” Nazami v. Patrons Mut. Ins. Co. , 280 Conn. 619, 626 (2006); accord. Petrucelli v. Palmer , 596 F.Supp.2d 347, 371 (D. Conn. 2009). See also Kramer v. Petisi , 285 Conn. 674, 681. (2008) (quoting Restatement (Second) ......
-
Charmoy v. McNeilly (In re McNeilly), Case No.: 15-30064 (AMN)
...If the language of a contract is ambiguous, the court "must construe those ambiguities against the drafter." Petrucelli v. Palmer, 596 F. Supp. 2d 347, 359 (D.Conn. 2009)(quoting Ramirez v. Health Net of Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 13-14 (2008)); see also, David M. Somers and Associates, ......
-
Pyskaty v. Wide World of Cars, LLC, 15 Civ. 1600 (JCM)
...347 (1977). See also DiTolla v. Doral Dental IPA of New York, 469 F.3d 271, 276 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Hunt); Petrucelli v. Palmer, 596 F. Supp. 2d 347, 354 (D. Conn. 2009) (applying the Hunt rule in an action involving rescission). Here, the "object of the litigation" is the Vehicle, and t......