Sun Valley Foods Co. v. Ward

• Decision Date: 29 June 1999
• Docket Number: Docket No. 108676, Calendar No. 5.
• Citation: 460 Mich. 230,596 N.W.2d 119
• Parties: SUN VALLEY FOODS COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. George E. WARD, George E. Ward, P.C., Kaufman, Roche & Ward, P.C., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

596 N.W.2d 119

460 Mich. 230

SUN VALLEY FOODS COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. George E. WARD, George E. Ward, P.C., Kaufman, Roche & Ward, P.C., Defendants-Appellants.

Docket No. 108676, Calendar No. 5.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued January 21, 1999.

Decided June 29, 1999.

Sommers, Schwartz, Silver & Schwartz, P.C. (by Donald J. Gasiorek and Patrick Burkett), Southfield, for the plaintiff-appellee.

Kerr, Russell & Weber, P.L.C. (by Robert J. Pineau ), Detroit, for the defendants-appellants.

Opinion

CORRIGAN, J.

In this legal malpractice action involving an underlying landlord-tenant dispute, we granted leave to determine whether the tolling provisions in M.C.L. § 600.5744(5); MSA 27A.5744(5) require the filing of an appeal bond within ten days after entry of the judgment awarding possession to the landlord. Because the statute does not require the filing of an appeal bond within ten days, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Facts and Procedural History

This case has an extraordinarily tortured procedural history. Defendant George Ward represented Sun Valley Foods in a landlord-tenant dispute with Detroit Marine Terminal. On July 1, 1982, the trial court granted summary disposition to Detroit Marine Terminal, resulting in a judgment for possession. On July 9, 1982, Ward filed a claim of appeal, an application for bond approval, a motion for stay, and a brief in support of the motion. Ward sought an emergency, same-day hearing to set the amount of the appeal bond. The trial court, however, set July 13, 1982, as the hearing date.¹

On July 13, the trial judge issued a writ of restitution, set the bond amount, and tolled the redemption period for forty-eight hours until the bond could be filed. The bond was filed within the required forty-eight hour period.² By order dated October 7, 1982, the trial court allowed Sun Valley ten days following the final order on appeal to redeem the property.

In August 1983, the Court of Appeals affirmed the order granting summary disposition to Detroit Marine Terminal and affirmed the stay of the writ of restitution. After one of the parties moved for clarification, the Court of Appeals set aside the stay on November 1, 1983. This Court denied leave to appeal at that time. Ultimately, Sun Valley settled its claims with Detroit Marine Terminal and vacated the warehouse.

Sun Valley thereafter filed a legal malpractice claim against defendant Ward in November 1986, alleging several grounds. Only one of those claims is at issue here.³ Plaintiff alleged that Ward negligently failed to preserve Sun Valley's statutory redemption rights by failing to file the appeal bond within the time set forth in M.C.L. § 600.5744(5); MSA 27A.5744(5). Sun Valley alleged that the statute requires both the filing of an appeal and an appeal bond within ten days after entry of the judgment for possession. Defendant Ward countered that the statute requires only the filing of an appeal within ten days after entry of the judgment for possession.

The trial court granted Ward's motion for summary disposition regarding the legal malpractice claim. The trial court adopted Ward's interpretation of the statute, ruling that it was "clearly reasonable." The trial court further ruled that an attorney's reasonable interpretation of an unsettled point of law does not constitute malpractice.⁴

The Court of Appeals reversed the order granting summary disposition, holding that "[w]hether Ward's interpretation of the statute was reasonable is a question of fact," precluding summary disposition. Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued February 10, 1992 (Docket No. 123995). This Court denied leave to appeal. 442 Mich. 866, 500 N.W.2d 469 (1993).

After the case was remanded to the trial court, Ward filed a motion asking the court to interpret the statutory provision. The trial court denied the motion, ordering that "the jury shall determine the requirements of MCLA 600.5744(5) [MSA 27A.5744(5) ]" and the reasonableness of defendant's conduct. Defendant appealed the order denying the motion. The Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal, but correctly observed that the judiciary possesses the exclusive power to determine the law. This Court again denied leave to appeal. 449 Mich. 870, 535 N.W.2d 801 (1995).

By order dated July 28, 1995, the trial court interpreted the statutory provision. It held that the statutory provision plainly did not require the filing of the appeal bond within ten days after entry of judgment for possession.

After remand, the Court of Appeals reversed in a published opinion. 221 Mich. App. 335, 561 N.W.2d 484 (1997). The Court of Appeals held that the trial court's interpretation was "reasonable." Nonetheless, it did not "accurately reflect the intent of the Legislature," because the landlord "would have no protection during the period between when the ten days had elapsed and whenever the bond was eventually filed...." Id., 337-338, 561 N.W.2d 484. This Court again denied leave to appeal. 456 Mich. 920, 589 N.W.2d 288 (1998).

Defendant moved for reconsideration. We granted defendant's motion for reconsideration and granted leave to appeal. 457 Mich. 884, 586 N.W.2d 231 (1998). While the motion for reconsideration was pending before this Court, a jury trial was held on the legal malpractice claims. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Sun Valley.⁵

II. Statutory Analysis

When a judgment for possession is entered in a landlord's favor, M.C.L. § 600.5744; MSA 27A.5744 permits the issuance of a writ of restitution. The writ permits the property owner "to be restored and put in full possession of the premises." MCL 600.5744(1); MSA 27A.5744(1). In all but a few circumstances, the writ of restitution "shall not be issued" until ten days after the judgment for possession is entered. MCL 600.5744(4); MSA 27A.5744(4). Subsection five of the statutory provision provides:

If an appeal is taken or a motion for new trial is filed before the expiration of the period during which the writ of restitution shall not be issued and if a bond to stay proceedings is filed, the period during which the writ shall not be issued shall be tolled until the disposition of the appeal or motion for new trial is final.

The redemption tolling provision of the statute is intended to give "the tenant and vendee a last chance to avoid forfeiture." Birznieks v. Cooper, 405 Mich. 319, 330, 275 N.W.2d 221 (1979).

The rules of statutory construction are well established. The foremost rule, and our primary task in construing a statute, is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Murphy v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 447 Mich. 93, 98, 523 N.W.2d 310 (1994). See also Nation v. W. D. E. Electric Co., 454 Mich. 489, 494, 563 N.W.2d 233 (1997). This task begins by examining the language of the statute itself. The words of a statute provide "the most reliable evidence of its intent...." United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 593, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981). If the language of the statute is unambiguous, the Legislature must have intended the meaning clearly expressed, and the statute must be enforced as written. No further judicial construction is required or permitted. Tryc v. Michigan Veterans' Facility, 451 Mich. 129, 135, 545 N.W.2d 642 (1996). Only where the statutory language is ambiguous may a court properly go beyond the words of the statute to ascertain legislative intent. Luttrell v. Dep't of Corrections, 421 Mich. 93, 365 N.W.2d 74 (1984).

In interpreting the statute at issue, we consider both the plain meaning of the critical word or phrase as well as "its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme." Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995). See also Holloway v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 966, 143 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999). As far as possible, effect should be given to every phrase, clause, and word in the statute. Gebhardt v. O'Rourke, 444 Mich. 535, 542, 510 N.W.2d 900 (1994). The statutory language must be read and understood in its grammatical context, unless it is clear that something different was intended. Aetna Finance Co. v. Gutierrez, 96 N.M. 538, 632 P.2d 1176 (1981).

It is a general rule of grammar and of statutory construction that a modifying word or clause is confined solely to the last antecedent, unless a contrary intention appears. Dale v. Beta-C, Inc., 227 Mich.App. 57, 68, 574 N.W.2d 697 (1997); Weems v. Chrysler Corp., 448 Mich. 679, 699, 533 N.W.2d 287 (1995). See also 2A Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction (5th ed.), § 47.33, p. 270.

Following these principles, we conclude that the plain language of the statute does not require that the bond to stay proceedings be filed within ten days after the judgment for possession is entered.⁶

If the statute is read in its grammatical context, there is no ambiguity. The ten-day limitation clause is clearly linked to the first condition preceding the placement of the conjunction—"[i]f an appeal is taken or a motion for new trial is filed." The second clause, following the conjunction, requires a stay bond to toll the issuance of the writ—"if a bond to stay proceedings is filed." That clause contains no time limit on the filing of the stay bond. We hold that the stay bond need not be filed within ten days after the judgment for possession is entered.

Thus, a tenant tolls the redemption period by filing a claim of appeal or motion for a new trial within ten days after the entry of judgment. The writ of restitution is then stayed until the appeal or the motion is decided, provided the bond is filed as directed by the trial court.⁷ If the party fails to file the bond as directed, the trial court must issue the writ of restitution. The bond itself, however, is not required to be filed within the ten-day period.

We refuse to discover a bright-line, ten-day time limit within which...