Zimmerman v. Board of Educ. of Town of Branford

• Decision Date: 25 September 1984
• Docket Number: Civ. No. N83-262.
• Citation: 597 F. Supp. 72
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: Armand L. ZIMMERMAN v. The BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the TOWN OF BRANFORD, et al.

597 F. Supp. 72

Armand L. ZIMMERMAN v. The BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the TOWN OF BRANFORD, et al.

Civ. No. N83-262.

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

September 25, 1984.

Jeremy G. Zimmermann, Peter J. Lefeber, William H. Prout, Jr., Wiggin & Dana, New Haven, Conn., for plaintiff.

William C. Lynch, William C. Bruce, Lynch, Traub, Keefe & Snow, New Haven, Conn., for defendants.

RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

ELLEN B. BURNS, District Judge.

Procedural History

The plaintiff has asked for declaratory, monetary and injunctive relief for injury alleged to have arisen out of the defendants' denial of plaintiff's application to renew his teaching contract for the academic year 1983-84. The action was brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has alleged the court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3) and 1343(a)(4) and the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.

The plaintiff claims that he has been deprived of a constitutionally protected property right by the actions of the defendant Branford Board of Education in refusing to renew his teacher's contract without following the procedural requirements outlined in the collective bargaining agreement governing the employment of Branford teachers and in Conn.Gen.Stat. § 10-151. He has further alleged that Conn. Gen.Stat. § 10-183w of the Teacher Retirement Act violates the Federal and State Constitutions for failure to provide standards to limit the discretion of either the local board of education or the Teacher Retirement Board.

The defendants moved to dismiss under F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, maintaining that plaintiff has raised no viable federal constitutional claim and asserting, therefore, that pendent jurisdiction should be denied. Defendants have also moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(7), claiming that the plaintiff failed to join the Connecticut State Teachers' Retirement Board as an indispensable party defendant required by F.R.C.P. 19.

On June 27, 1983, oral argument was heard on defendants' Motion to Dismiss and an evidentiary hearing was held on plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction. On July 11, 1983, the plaintiff accepted a teaching position with The Country School in Madison, Connecticut, and withdrew his Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Thus, the only issue before the court at this time is the defendants' Motion to Dismiss. The motion is granted in part. The court abstains as to the remaining portions of plaintiff's complaint.

Statement of Facts

Plaintiff is a certified teacher who has been continuously employed by the Branford, Connecticut, school system (the "School Board") since 1958. He acquired tenure as a teacher pursuant to section 10-151(b) of the Connecticut General Statutes. For the purposes of this Motion to Dismiss it is admitted that the plaintiff is a qualified teacher who has competently performed his duties throughout his period of employment by the School Board.

On June 28, 1981, the plaintiff became 70 years old. Aware of the mandatory retirement age imposed on teachers under Connecticut law, Conn.Gen.Stat. § 10-183w,¹ the plaintiff wrote to the School Board in or about January, 1981, to request renewal of his teaching contract for the 1981-1982 school year. Pursuant to § 10-183w the School Board sought and received authorization from the State Teachers' Retirement Board (Retirement Board) to continue the plaintiff's employment. In or about January, 1982, plaintiff requested renewal of his contract for the 1982-1983 school year. Again, the school board sought and received the necessary authorization and renewed plaintiff's contract.

In or about December, 1982, plaintiff sought a third renewal of his contract beyond the mandatory retirement age. This time the School Board decided not to request authorization from the Retirement Board to renew plaintiff's contract. The School Board announced that decision at a public meeting on March 24, 1983, without giving any reason therefor. The plaintiff has repeatedly sought an explanation of the School Board's decision but no explanation, other than his age, has been forthcoming.

Plaintiff's employment with the School Board, both before June, 1981, and thereafter, has been covered by a collective bargaining agreement negotiated between the School Board and the Branford Education Association. That agreement provides for a grievance process and contains a clause prohibiting discrimination based upon age and a requirement that the procedures of the Teacher Tenure Statute, Conn.Gen.Stat. § 10-151, shall apply to all terminations of employment or non-renewals of contracts.

Discussion

I. Invalidity of Section 10-183w Under Fourteenth Amendment

Plaintiff claims that the mandatory retirement provision applicable to teachers is facially invalid because it does not afford a hearing prior to the termination of a teacher's employment, it does not provide guidelines to the Retirement Board for deciding whether to authorize the continued employment of a teacher over 70 years old, and treats older teachers differently from younger teachers in not providing a hearing, thus depriving older teachers of equal protection of the laws.

Plaintiff's claims that section 10-183w is unconstitutional because it does not provide a hearing and treats older teachers differently from younger teachers are without merit. In Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976), the Supreme Court clearly established that mandatory retirement laws that do not provide for a hearing do not violate an individual's rights to due process or equal protection. Although Murgia involved a mandatory retirement law for policemen, the Second Circuit has found that the rationale of Murgia extends to validate mandatory retirement laws for school teachers. Palmer v. Ticcione, 576 F.2d 459 (2d Cir.1978). The Palmer court noted that a mandatory retirement statute must be upheld if there is any rational basis to support the statute. Id., at 461. The court identified several possible rational bases to support a compulsory retirement statute: predictability in administering pension plans; opening opportunities for young teachers; bringing in young teachers with fresh ideas and techniques.² Furthermore, the court noted that it could see no purpose in requiring a hearing for an individual subject to a mandatory retirement statute. Id. at 464.

Plaintiff asserts that Palmer is not controlling because that case involved a mandatory retirement statute, whereas the Connecticut statute in question is discretionary in that it permits the Retirement Board to authorize the continued employment of a teacher beyond age 70. In Johnson v. Lefkowitz, 566 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1977), the court dealt with a retirement statute which permitted, but did not require, the state Civil Service Commission to extend an individual's employment if certain conditions were met. The plaintiff in Johnson claimed that he was entitled to a hearing and that his denial of a hearing violated his due process rights. Assuming arguendo that Johnson had a property or liberty interest warranting due process protection, the court found that the burden on the state of providing every retiree with a hearing outweighed any hardship to the individual. Id. at 869. Under Johnson, even a discretionary retirement statute does not necessarily give rise to a due process right to a hearing.

Plaintiff's claim that the granting of unbridled discretion to the Retirement Board deprived him of due process is also without merit. As was noted by the Supreme Court, Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972), "the requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property." Id. at 569. Such a property interest may arise "if there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support an individual's claim of entitlement to the benefit and that he may invoke a hearing." Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 601, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2699, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972).

Plaintiff appears to claim that such a property interest is created by section 10-183w by its holding out of the possibility of continued employment.³ He asserts that this possibility creates a sufficient property interest in continued employment to give rise to a due process right to a hearing and to a decision based upon clearly defined standards and guidelines. However, a closer examination of section 10-183w discloses that no such property interest is created. First, that section clearly states that a teacher "attaining the age of seventy shall be retired from service in the public schools...." (emphasis added). Plaintiff claims that the following clause, which permits a local board of education to seek authorization to continue a teacher's employment from the Retirement Board, creates the necessary interest. Rather than create an interest in a teacher, the clause in question gives an opportunity to the school board to continue a teacher's employment beyond age seventy. Nothing in section 10-183w implies that a teacher may apply to the Retirement Board, or suggests that a teacher might have any right to continued employment beyond age seventy.

There are a number of rationales that might have prompted the legislature to give a school board an opportunity to extend a teacher's employment. A general teacher shortage or a dearth of teachers qualified for a particular subject area may require an extension of a teacher's employment. A school board may also recognize that a particular teacher has such experience and training as to make him or her irreplaceable. But whatever reason a school board may have to request authorization to continue employment of a teacher, nothing in section 10-183w implies any limitation on a school board's exercise...