Sunn v. Dean, Civ. A. No. C84-1090A.

• Decision Date: 27 September 1984
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. C84-1090A.
• Citation: 597 F. Supp. 79
• Parties: Joseph C. SUNN, Plaintiff, v. William T. DEAN, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

597 F. Supp. 79

Joseph C. SUNN, Plaintiff, v. William T. DEAN, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. C84-1090A.

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

September 27, 1984.

Joseph C. Sunn, pro se.

John Little, pro se.

Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Kathryn Allen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, Ga., James C. Morton, Bondurant, Miller, Hishon & Stephenson, Atlanta, Ga., Jeffrey M. Starnes, Conyers, Ga., for defendants.

ORDER

FORRESTER, District Judge.

This action is before the court on several pending motions: a motion to dismiss, a motion for attorney's fees, and a motion for a protective order filed by the juror defendants; plaintiff's motion for leave to amend the complaint and plaintiff's motion for leave to file a second amendment to the complaint; and defendant Dean's motion for a protective order.

I. FACTS.

Plaintiff in this case was a pro se plaintiff in an action tried before a jury in the Superior Court of Rockdale County. The jury in that case returned a verdict for the defendant and awarded attorney's fees against plaintiff. Plaintiff did not make any motion for a new trial or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or challenge the jury's award of attorney's fees. Plaintiff did not appeal the trial court's judgment to the Georgia appellate courts. Instead, plaintiff filed this action against the attorneys who represented defendant in the Rockdale County suit, the judge who presided at the trial, and the jury which rendered the verdict. Plaintiff alleges that all of the defendants conspired to deprive him of his civil rights and his right of access to the courts based upon his race, his interracial marriage, and the fact that he was not a resident of Rockdale County. Plaintiff claims that the jury was prejudiced against him from the start and disobeyed their oaths as jurors to decide the case fairly based upon the evidence. Plaintiff claims that the verdict entered by the jury was contrary to the evidence. Plaintiff further claims that Judge Dean made disparaging and prejudicial remarks during the trial and made various rulings against plaintiff which were contrary to law. As damages plaintiff seeks $10,000 from each defendant for the alleged deprivations of his civil rights.

II. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION.

This court has no subject matter jurisdiction to review a judgment by a state court. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 1311, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16, 44 S.Ct. 149, 150, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923); Reynolds v. Georgia, 640 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. Unit B), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 865, 102 S.Ct. 326, 70 L.Ed.2d 165 (1981); Warriner v. Fink, 307 F.2d 933 (5th Cir.1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943, 83 S.Ct. 937, 9 L.Ed.2d 969 (1963); Collins v. Collins, 597 F.Supp. 33 (N.D.Ga.1984); National Car Loading Corporation v. Shulman, 570 F.Supp. 3 (N.D.Ga.1983). This is true notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff's complaint might be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Reynolds v. Georgia, supra. This court further has no authority to decide constitutional issues which were raised, or reasonably could have been raised in the state court proceeding. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 103 S.Ct. at 1315 n. 16; Wood v. Orange County, 715 F.2d 1543, 1546-47 (11th Cir.1983). All of plaintiff's allegations concerning the prejudice of the jury, the correctness of their verdict, the disparaging remarks by the trial judge, and the correctness of his rulings, could have been raised, and should have been raised, on direct appeal to the Georgia appellate courts. This court, therefore, has no jurisdiction or authority to consider any issues concerning the correctness of the judgment against plaintiff. Insofar as plaintiff's claims would require this court to reverse, vacate, or otherwise modify the judgment of the state court this court is without jurisdiction to hear them. Collins v. Collins, supra. This court further lacks jurisdiction to review the proceedings in the state court for error, since such issues could have been raised on appeal.

Plaintiff, however, has not asked this court to interfere with the judgment of the state court. Instead, plaintiff simply seeks damages from the named defendants for conspiring to deprive plaintiff of his civil rights. While it may be impossible for plaintiff to prove his claims without forcing this court into an appellate-type review of the proceedings in the state court, an inquiry for which this court lacks jurisdiction, the court will assume for purposes of the present motions that plaintiff may be able to prove some set of facts in support of his claim without requiring the court to make such an inquiry. The court proceeds, therefore, to the pending motions.

III. THE JUROR DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS.

The juror defendants have moved to dismiss plaintiff's claim against them pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) on the grounds that plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff's complaint generally asserts that the jurors conspired to deprive him of his civil rights by rendering a verdict against him because of his race. This court's research has disclosed only two cases dealing with whether jurors are subject to liability for damages under the civil rights laws. In Roberts v. Barbosa, 227 F.Supp. 20 (S.D. Cal.1964) a state prisoner brought an action for damages under the Civil Rights Acts against 44 different defendants, including "the judge of the superior court who heard his case, all of the judges of the district court of appeals which affirmed his conviction, the attorney general of the State of California and certain of his deputies, the County Clerk of San Bernardino County, and several deputies, his own attorney, witnesses who testified at his trial, and ... all of the members of the Jury which convicted him of the crime" for which he was imprisoned. Id. at 21-22. In discussing the potential liability of the jurors, the court stated:

I have found no case which touches on the question of immunity of a jury. Perhaps this is the first case where anyone has had the gall to attempt to secure damages from a jury for convicting him, in alleging violation of his civil rights. If anyone should have immunity, it is the jurors. As Justice Frankfurter said in Tenney, et al. v. Brandhove (1951), 341 U.S. 367, at 377, 71 S.Ct. 783, at 788, 95 L.Ed. 1019: "The privilege of immunity would be of little value if they could be subjected to the costs and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of a pleader, or to the hazards of a judgment against them based upon a jury's speculation as to motives." There, the court was speaking of immunity of legislators. If ever immunity should be granted, it should be granted to jurors. To permit this case to proceed, and the jurors to be served with summons and complaint, and compel them to hire lawyers, would be the ultimate, not only in absurdity, but also in the subversion of justice. 227 F.Supp. at 26.

The ruling in Roberts v. Barbosa was later applied in a suit brought by plaintiff against jurors who had rendered a verdict against him in a civil case. In McIntosh v. Garofalo, 367 F.Supp. 501 (W.D.Pa.1973), the court, after discussing Roberts v. Barbosa and two other cases which had reached similar conclusions, White v. Hegerhorst, 418 F.2d 894 (9th Cir.1969) (affirming dismissal of a criminal defendant's civil rights action against a juror) and Martone v. McKeithen, 413 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir. 1969) (members of grand jury immune from liability for damages under the Civil Rights Act), the McIntosh court stated:

Research fails to disclose a case in which it has been held that jurors in a civil action are immune from suit under the Civil Rights Act. Perhaps this is because, as noted in the Roberts opinion, no one in the past has brought such an action. Be that as it may, the reasoning employed in Roberts, White, and Martone v. McKeithen, 413 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir.1969) compels the conclusion that one empaneled as a juror in a civil action is immune from a later suit for damages under section 1983.

In the first instance, it must be considered that this case could not be pursued further without the necessity arising for piercing the time-honored veil of secrecy which surrounds the jury's deliberations. The threat to the jury system, one of the keystones of the democratic process, is obvious. But more importantly, perhaps, the integrity of the judicial process demands that jurors, as well as judges (Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3d Cir.1966) and prosecutors (United States ex rel. Rauch v. Deutsch, 456 F.2d 1301 (3d Cir.1972)), be free to discharge their duties without fear of subsequent harassment. To hold that a juror in a civil case is not immune from liability under section 1983 would be to subject each citizen/juror, men and women who serve their community in a spirit of well-meaning, if sometimes grudging, civil altruism, to the possibility of lengthy, expensive and burdensome combat against the vendettas of dissatisfied litigants. Such a state of affairs cannot be fostered. A juror in a civil action is immune from subsequent suit for damages under 42 USC § 1983. McIntosh v. Garofalo, 367 F.Supp. at 504.

This court is completely in accord with the sentiments expressed by the courts in Roberts v. Barbosa and McIntosh v. Garofalo and completely agrees with their holding that jurors are entitled to absolute immunity from subsequent actions for damages under the Civil Rights Acts. Since the juror defendants enjoy absolute immunity to an action for damages, plaintiff's complaint against them fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The motion by the juror defendants to dismiss plaintiff's complaint against them is, therefore, GRANTED.

Although Judge Dean has not yet filed a motion to dismiss, this court sees no reason that he should be put to the additional expense...