Nat'l Meat Ass'n v. Brown

• Decision Date: 31 March 2010
• Docket Number: No. 09-15486,No. 09-15483,09-15483,09-15486
• Parties: National Meat Association, Plaintiff-Appellee, and American Meat Institute, Plaintiff-intervenor, v. Edmund G. Brown, in his official capacity as Attorney General of California; Arnold Schwarzenegger, in his official capacity as Governor of California; State of California, Defendants, and The Humane Society of the United States; Farm Sanctuary, Inc.; Humane Farming Association; Animal Legal Defense Fund, Defendant-intervenors-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

599 F.3d 1093

National Meat Association, Plaintiff-Appellee, and American Meat Institute, Plaintiff-intervenor, v. Edmund G. Brown, in his official capacity as Attorney General of California; Arnold Schwarzenegger, in his official capacity as Governor of California; State of California, Defendants, and The Humane Society of the United States; Farm Sanctuary, Inc.; Humane Farming Association; Animal Legal Defense Fund, Defendant-intervenors-Appellants.

No. 09-15483

No. 09-15486

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted: Aug. 11, 2009.

Decided: March 31, 2010.

Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General of California, Douglas J. Woods, Acting Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Susan K. Leach, Deputy Attorney General Los Angeles, CA, for the defendants-appellants.

Sarah L. Conant and Peter A. Brandt The Humane Society of the United States Washington, D.C.; and Bruce A. Wagman Schiff Hardin LLP, San Francisco, CA, for the defendant-intervenor-appellants.

Steven J. Wells and Heather M. McCann, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Minneapolis, MN, for the plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, Lawrence J. O'Neill, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. l:08-cv-01963-LJODLB.

Before: ALEX KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, STEPHEN REINHARDT and BARRY G. SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.

KOZINSKI, Chief Judge:

This is an interlocutory appeal from a preliminary injunction prohibiting the enforcement of California Penal Code § 599f which bans the slaughter and inhumane handling of nonambulatory animals, against federally regulated swine slaughterhouses.

I

On January 30, 2008, The Humane Society released a video depicting images of nonambulatory cows—cows that are unable to stand or walk without assistance— being kicked, electrocuted, dragged with chains and rammed with forklifts at California's Westland/Hallmark slaughterhouse. Footage also showed some workers trying to get nonambulatory cows to stand by spraying pressurized water into their noses to simulate drowning. Public health professionals warned that meat from these "downer" cows was more likely to be diseased, partly because animals can become nonambulatory clue to disease and partly because downer animals grow sicker as they end up rolling around in other animals' refuse. The video triggered the largest beef recall in United States history.

California responded by amending California Penal Code § 599f to provide that:

(a) No slaughterhouse, stockyard, auction, market agency, or dealer shall buy, sell, or receive a nonambulatory animal.

(b) No slaughterhouse shall process, butcher, or sell meat or products of nonambulatory animals for human consumption.

(c) No slaughterhouse shall hold a nonambulatory animal without taking immediate action to humanely euthanize the animal.

(e) While in transit or on the premises of a stockyard, auction, market agency, dealer, or slaughterhouse, a nonambulatory animal may not be dragged at any time, or pushed with equipment at any time, but shall be moved with a sling or on a stoneboat or other sled-like or wheeled conveyance.

Cal. Pen. Code § 599f. Together these provisions: (1) ban the receipt and slaughter of downer animals, id. § 599f(a)-(c); and (2) require the humane handling of downer animals, id. § 599f(e).

Shortly before amended section 599f was to take effect, National Meat Association (NMA)—a trade association representing packers and processors of swine livestock and pork products—filed suit in federal district court against the State of California seeking declaratory and injunctive relief barring the application of section 599f to federally inspected swine slaughterhouses.¹ Some of its members claimed thatsection 599f would prevent the slaughter of approximately 2.5% of their pigs. NMA argued that section 599f is preempted by the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA), violates the dormant commerce clause and is unconstitutionally vague. The district court entered a preliminary injunction on preemption grounds;² the State of California and defendant-intervenors The Humane Society, et al., who supported the bill amending section 599f, bring this interlocutory appeal.

II

We review for abuse of discretion and will reverse if the district court's decision is based on an erroneous legal standard or clearly erroneous finding of fact. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109 1119 (9th Cir.2009). Preemption is a legal issue we review de novo. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. City of L.A., 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir.2009). Someone seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate "that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest." Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., — U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 365, 374, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008).³

Receipt and Slaughter Ban

Congress, as well as federal agencies, may expressly or impliedly preempt state law. Barrientos v. 18011825 Morton LLC, 583 F.3d 1197, 1208 (9th Cir.2009). There is express preemp tion where federal law explicitly preempts state law. Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, — U.S.—, 129 S.Ct. 538, 543, 172 L.Ed.2d 398 (2008). There is implied preemption where federal law was intended to occupy the legislative field or where state law conflicts with federal law, either because it's impossible to comply with both laws or because state law stands as an obstacle to accomplishing the purposes of federal law. See id.; English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S 72, 79, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990). In either case, there's a strong presumption against preemption, especially when the state law deals with matters like health and animal welfare, which have historically been regulated by states. See Wyeth v. Levine, —U.S.—, 129 S.Ct. 1187, 1194-95 n. 3, 173 L.Ed.2d 51 (2009).

1. Express Preemption. NMA argues, and the district court held, that the FMIA expressly preempts section 599fs ban on the receipt and slaughter of nonambulatory animals. Under the FMIA, all animals are sent to federal inspection before they enter a slaughterhouse where they are to be slaughtered for meat capable of human consumption that will be sold in commerce. 21 U.S.C. § 603(a). Regulations pursuant to the FMIA require nonambulatory animals to be classified as "U.S. Suspect" and held for further examination. 9 C.F.R. § 309.2(b). If the downer animal shows signs of certain diseases upon inspection, it must be classified as "U.S. Condemned" and disposed of according to specific procedures. See id. §§ 309.4-309.18. But if the animal passesinspection, it may be slaughtered and sold for human consumption. See generally id. § 309.2.⁴

The FMIA contains an express preemption provision:

Requirements within the scope of this chapter with respect to premises, facilities and operations of any establishment at which inspection is provided under subchapter I of this chapter, which are in addition to, or different than those made under this chapter may not be imposed by any State....

21 U.S.C. § 678 (emphasis added). Consistent with the presumption against preemption, we must give this provision a narrow interpretation. See Air Cond. & Refrig. Inst. v. Energy Res. Conserv. & Dev. Comm'n, 410 F.3d 492, 496(9th Cir. 2005). More so because section 678 explicitly preserves for the states broad authority to regulate slaughterhouses: "This chapter shall not preclude any State... from making requirement[s] or taking other action, consistent with this chapter, with respect to any other matters regulated under this chapter." 21 U.S.C. § 678.

Starting, as we should, with the language of the statute, we find no express preemption. Section 678 preempts state regulation of the "premises, facilities and operations" of slaughterhouses, and section 599f(a)-(c) deals with none of these. Rather, it regulates the kind of animal that may be slaughtered. Two circuits have held that the FMIA doesn't preempt state laws that do precisely that. Cavel Int'l, Inc. v. Madigan, 500 F.3d 551 (7th Cir.2007) (state ban on horse slaughter not preempted); Empacadora de Carries de Fresnillo v. Curry, 476 F.3d 326 (5th Cir.2007) (same). These cases explain that "[the FMIA] preemption clause expressly limits states in their ability to govern meat in spection and labeling requirements. It in no way limits states in their ability to regulate what types of meat may be sold for human consumption in the first place." Empacadora, 476 F.3d at 333. "Given that horse meat is produced for human consumption, its production must comply with the [FMIA]. But if it is not produced, there is nothing, so far as horse meat is concerned, for the Act to work upon." Cavel, 500 F.3d at 554. This makes horse sense: Federal law may establish fireworks safety standards, but that doesn't preclude states from banning fireworks. Similarly, the FMIA establishes inspection procedures to ensure animals that are slaughtered are safe for human consumption, but this doesn't preclude states from banning the slaughter of certain kinds of animals altogether.

The district court sought to distinguish Cavel and Empacadora: "A nonambulatory pig is not a 'type of meat.' A pig is a pig. A pig that is laying down is a pig. A pig with three legs is a pig. A fatigued or diseased pig is a pig. Calling it something else does not change the type of meat produced." In effect, the district court reasoned that states may ban the slaughter of certain species, but once a state allows a species to be slaughtered, it cannot impose further restrictions. Hogwash.

States aren't limited to excluding animals from slaughter on a species-wide basis. What if a state wanted to ban the slaughter of a specific breed of pig but not the entire species? Or to allow wild dogs and horses to be slaughtered, but not domesticated companions? And what if, in response to a population problem, a state only banned the slaughter of female...