Young v. Harris

Citation599 F.2d 870
Decision Date06 July 1979
Docket NumberNo. 78-1896,78-1896
PartiesRuby YOUNG, Monroe Young, Kim Greene, Joseph Weaver, Georgia Weaver, Ollie Green, Thomas Green, and Barbara Bradshaw, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Appellants, v. Patricia HARRIS, Sued in her Official Capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, Pantheon Corporation, a corporation, Pershing Redevelopment Corporation, a corporation, City of St. Louis, a Body Corporate, John Young, Thelma Young, Richard Shelton, Lipton Realty, Inc., a corporation, and the St. Louis Housing Authority, a Municipal Corporation, Appellees.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

Jim Eggleston, St. Louis, Mo., argued, Arlene Zarembka, Legal Service of Eastern Missouri, St. Louis, Mo. and Margaret Zonia Morrison, Legal Service of Eastern Missouri, St. Louis, Mo., on brief, for appellants.

Anne C. Travis, Asst. U. S. Atty., St. Louis, Mo., argued, Robert D. Kingsland, U. S. Atty., St. Louis, Mo., on brief, for appellee, HUD, Patricia Harris.

Charles A. Seigel, St. Louis, Mo., argued, Harvey A. Harris, Jeffrey H. Pass and Christopher M. Blanton, Stolar, Heitzmann & Eder, St. Louis, Mo., on brief, for appellees, Pantheon and Pershing.

Michael E. Hughes, Asst. City Counselor, St. Louis, Mo., argued, Jack L. Koehr, City Counselor, St. Louis, Mo., on brief, for appellee, City of St. Louis.

G. Carroll Stribling of Fordyce & Mayne, Clayton, Mo., for appellee, Richard Shelton.

Charles W. Kunderer of Klutho, Cody & Kilo, St. Louis, Mo., argued, Edward C. Cody and Victor J. Klutho, St. Louis, Mo., on brief, for appellee, St. Louis Housing.

Richard P. Sher of Peper, Martin, Jensen, Maichel & Hetlage, St. Louis, Mo., filed brief, for appellee, Lipton Realty, Inc.

Before GIBSON, Chief Judge, and ROSS and McMILLIAN, Circuit Judges.

GIBSON, Chief Judge.

This is an appeal from the District Court's 1 denial of appellants' motion for a preliminary injunction restraining appellees from continuing the redevelopment of the Pershing-Waterman area of St. Louis, Missouri. Jurisdiction in this court rests upon 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).

I

Appellants represent a class of persons who are present and former lower-income, predominantly black residents of the 106-acre redevelopment area in St. Louis, Missouri, known as the "Pershing-Waterman" area. Appellees represent various interests allegedly engaged in the project of redeveloping the Pershing-Waterman area. 2 Appellants filed their complaint on November 3, 1978, requesting declaratory, mandamus and injunctive relief because of alleged violations of three federal statutes, 3 the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Act of 1970 (URA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601 Et seq., the Housing and Community Development Act (HCDA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301 Et seq., and the National Environmental Policies Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 Et seq. The complaint also requested a temporary restraining order restraining any interference with the tenancy and quiet enjoyment of the appellants still residing in the Pershing-Waterman area, 4 and prohibiting further demolishing of any dwelling units located within the area. The District Court immediately granted a temporary restraining order and scheduled a hearing on appellants' motion for a preliminary injunction for November 9, 1978, on which date the court dissolved the temporary restraining order.

Appellants alleged that they would suffer irreparable injury in the form of deprivation of housing if appellees were not enjoined from evicting persons in the redevelopment area; from discontinuing utilities, services, and maintenance of appellants' apartments; from demolishing any more buildings in the redevelopment area; from disbursing and expending federal Community Development Block Grant funds in the area; and from taking any further redevelopment actions incompatible with accommodating the housing needs of the people who have been or will be displaced as a result of the project. The District Court denied the request for a preliminary injunction on December 7, 1978. It found that appellants failed to show that they were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims regarding statutory violations and also concluded that "the harm done those plaintiffs who may be forced to move while this case is proceeding is considerable, but later legal and equitable relief will be adequate to restore their rights if they are found to have been displaced wrongly, without benefits." 5 The District Court denied appellants' request to enter an injunction pending appeal on December 12, 1978, and this court did likewise on December 29, 1978. We now affirm the order of the District Court denying a preliminary injunction.

II

In April 1971 the City of St. Louis declared the Pershing-Waterman area to be blighted and designated it as a redevelopment area pursuant to the Missouri Urban Redevelopment Corporation Law, Mo.Rev.Stat. §§ 353.010, Et seq. (1969). Under the Urban Redevelopment Corporation Law, corporations organized according to the statute with a public purpose of redeveloping blighted areas 6 may be granted special privileges. These privileges include the power of eminent domain and property tax abatements on redeveloped property. Initially, two corporations, the Kingsbury Redevelopment Corporation and the Forest Village Redevelopment Corporation, were organized according to the Urban Redevelopment Corporation Law for the purpose of redeveloping the Pershing-Waterman area. The City of St. Louis approved the redevelopment plans submitted by them and granted both the power of eminent domain and property tax abatements. The redevelopment planned by these corporations, however, never materialized due to their inability to obtain financing.

Pantheon Corporation, a general business corporation, was incorporated on January 21, 1972, with Leon R. Stauss as the sole stockholder. In 1974, Pantheon formulated a coordinated redevelopment plan for the Pershing-Waterman area. Pursuant to this plan, it created the Pershing Redevelopment Corporation (developer) on May 30, 1975, a wholly-owned subsidiary incorporated as a Missouri Urban Redevelopment Corporation under Mo.Rev.Stat. Ch. 353, and acquired the stock of both the Kingsbury and Forest Village Corporations in May 1975 and February 1976, respectively. Pantheon also engaged in substantial efforts to obtain financing for its plan. As a part of this effort it arranged a multi-million dollar financing commitment from Mercantile Trust Company National Association in the form of a revolving credit agreement, subordinated debentures, and other loans. The redevelopment plan financing consists of wholly private capital, with the only aspect of federal assistance in the form of mortgage insurance by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).

On June 22, 1976, the Board of Alderman of the City of St. Louis approved Ordinance 57217, approving the redevelopment plan and setting forth an agreement between the developer and the city regarding the development. The agreement bestowed upon the developer all of the rights and benefits available under Mo.Rev.Stat. Ch. 353, and also provided for the city to undertake certain obligations with regard to the project. These obligations generally related to normal municipal services. 7

The City of St. Louis has applied for and received substantial amounts of federal Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds, available under the Housing Community Development Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301 Et seq. The city uses these funds, together with general revenues, to provide a variety of municipal services on a city-wide basis. In its annual applications for the CDBG funds, the city has indicated that portions of the funds would be used to provide services in the Pershing-Waterman area. 8 The city, however, contends that the approval of the applications does not commit it to apply the CDBG funds directly to its obligations with respect to the redevelopment project and that the funds are expended for services throughout the city. It is undisputed that the agreement between the developer and the city does not specify the source of funding for the municipal services to be provided.

Since the city's receipt of CDBG funds required it to comply with the requirements of NEPA regarding preparation of a statement assessing the environmental impact of their expenditure, 42 U.S.C. § 5304(h); 24 C.F.R. § 53.15, the city published a statement in August 1976 to the effect that an environmental impact statement was not required because the funded activities would not significantly affect the human environment. On January 11, 1977, following a fifteen-day time period for public comment and review, HUD approved the environmental certificate for release of funds. Although city funds have been used to provide usual and normal municipal services to the area, such as streets and sidewalks, all of the residential units and dwellings are privately owned; in addition, private funds are used exclusively in the rejuvenation program.

III

In Dakota Wholesale Liquor, Inc., v. Minnesota, 584 F.2d 847, 848-49 (8th Cir. 1978), this court reviewed the law regarding the proper standard to be applied by a district court in determining whether a preliminary injunction should be ordered:

The traditional tests have been that the party seeking the injunction must prove that "(1) there is a substantial probability that it will succeed at trial on the merits of its claims and (2) it will suffer irreparable injury if injunctive relief is not forthcoming." Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. Citizens for Community Action, 558 F.2d 861, 866 (8th Cir. 1977). However in Fennell v. Butler, 570 F.2d 263, 264 (8th Cir. 1978), this court directed the district court on remand to apply the preliminary injunction standards used in the...

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