People v. Myers, Cr. 15948

Decision Date21 March 1972
Docket NumberCr. 15948
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
Parties, 494 P.2d 684 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. William Glenn MYERS, Defendant and Appellant. In Bank

Robert L. Fletcher, Jr., Los Alamitos, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for defendant and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Robert R. Granucci and Charles R. B. Kirk, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

WRIGHT, Chief Justice.

William Glenn Myers appeals from a judgment upon jury convictions of illegal possession of marijuana (Health & Saf.Code, § 11530), illegal possession of amphetamines (Health & Saf.Code, § 11910), and illegal possession of a hypodermic needle and a hypodermic syringe (Bus. & Prof.Code, § 4143). Searches without a warrant of defendant's cabin and automobile produced evidence which led to the convictions. The searches were concededly unconstitutional if defendant was, at the time, entitled to Fourth Amendment protection. 1 The question is whether defendant's status as an outpatient following his commitment as a narcotic addict to the California Rehabilitation Center made the searches without a warrant valid. We conclude that it did not.

The facts of the case are essentially undisputed. Defendant was committed on April 18, 1966, to the California Rehabilitation Center at Corona as a narcotic addict following a narcotics conviction but before he was arraigned for judgment. (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 3051.) He was released on August 28, 1967, as an outpatient pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 3151. 2 On July 17, 1969, defendant rented a cabin from Bernice Smith and moved in the next day. From that time until July 28, Mrs. Smith observed defendant and at least 35 or 40 persons going to and from defendant's cabin in a 'continuously (sic) stream.' Sometimes defendant would leave several of his visitors in the cabin while he went out. Mrs. Smith also observed people leaving the cabin carrying objects. She relayed her observations to the Humboldt County Sheriff.

On July 28, 1969, sheriff's deputies communicated with Elmer Cox, the parole officer assigned to supervise defendant as an outpatient (see Welf. & Inst.Code, § 3151), and advised him that defendant was suspected of dealing in narcotics. 3 Cox, together with sheriff's deputies, went to defendant's cabin to talk to him and to search his cabin in order to determine whether he was involved in narcotics activity. Defendant was not home. At Cox' request Mrs. Smith unlocked the door; the officers entered and proceeded to make a thorough search of the cabin. In the bedroom a deputy sheriff found marijuana, marijuana seeds, amphetamines, a homemade hypodermic syringe and needle, and Dexamyl tablets (containing both amphetamines and barbiturates).

While the search was in progress defendant drove up in an automobile with two other persons. Cox went outside and took defendant into custody. Thereafter defendant was removed to the interior of the cabin where he was placed under arrest for the aforementioned violations. A search of the automobile disclosed a marijuana cigarette in a tobacco pouch on the visor.

A motion to vacate and set aside the information on the ground that the evidence was illegally seized (Pen.Code, § 995) was denied.

The question of whether a person who has the status of an outpatient under the rehabilitation program is entitled to Fourth Amendment protections was considered in People v. Jasso (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 955, 82 Cal.Rptr. 229. Jasso was an outpatient who had failed to report for narcotics testing and who had changed his residence without securing prior approval. A supervising agent received a call from a person who told him where Jasso lived. The agent, together with police officers, went to that location and took Jasso into custody outside his house. A search without a warrant of the interior of the house produced evidence which led to Jasso's conviction.

The court held that Jasso's status as an outpatient did not justify the search. It said: 'The parole agent . . . acted upon the theory that an outpatient's status was completely identical to that of a parolee. This is not true. While there are criminal aspects to narcotics addiction proceedings (People v. Moore (1968) 69 Cal.2d 674, 681--682, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800, 446 P.2d 800), a commitment under sections 3050 et seq. of the Welfare and Institutions Code is deemed nonpenal and civil in character. (In re De La O (1963) supra, 59 Cal.2d 128, 156, 28 Cal.Rptr. 489, 378 P.2d 793; In re Trummer (1964) 60 Cal.2d 658, 36 Cal.Rptr. 281, 388 P.2d 177.) A parolee is a sentenced felon and in law is deemed 'civilly dead' for certain purposes under section 2600 of the Penal Code. (Citation.) The outpatient's civil rights have not been lost, except as curtailed by the conditions deemed necessary to supervise his cure. (In re Trummer (1964) supra, 60 Cal.2d 658, 661--662, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 281, 388 P.2d 177; People v. Moore (1968) supra, 69 Cal.2d 674, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800, 446 P.2d 800; Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 3151, 3152.) His status is more analogous to that of a defendant who has been placed on probation without imposition of a felony sentence. 'The probationer (whose guilt has been established by plea, finding, or verdict, but who has not been sentenced to prison) still retains his ordinary civil rights, unless the court has restricted them' (People v. Banks (1959) 53 Cal.2d 370, 386--387, 1 Cal.Rptr. 669, 680, 348 P.2d 102, 113) as a condition of probation. (See People v. Hernandez (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 143, 150, 40 Cal.Rptr. 100, cert. denied, 381 U.S. 953, 85 S.Ct. 1810, 14 L.Ed.2d 725 . . . ) A probationer enjoys the protection of the constitutional guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures of his home (Martin v. United States (4th Cir. 1950) 183 F.2d 436, 439), absent some other legal basis for the search.' (People v. Jasso, supra, 2 Cal.App.3d 955, 963--964, 82 Cal.Rptr. 229, fn. omitted.) The Jasso court concluded that there was no other legal basis for the search as defendant had not waived his Fourth Amendment rights as a condition of release to outpatient status.

Jasso, then, analogizes outpatients to probationers who have not had sentence imposed nor waived their Fourth Amendment rights as a condition of probation (People v. Mason (1971) 5 Cal.3d 759, 97 Cal.Rptr. 302, 488 P.2d 630). Other courts have analogized outpatients to parolees (cf. Hacker v. Superior Court (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 387, 390, 73 Cal.Rptr. 907) who can be subjected to a search without a warrant by parole officers (In re Martinez (1970) 1 Cal.3d 641, 647, 83 Cal.Rptr. 382, 463 P.2d 734, fn. 6). However, as an outpatient is neither a parolee nor a probationer, analogies with the status of such persons is an unsatisfactory approach in determining whether outpatients can be subjected to searches by reason of their status alone. Rather, we must look to the particular policy which the commitment program serves. In a similar situation we have said: 'As a further ground of distinction, petitioner stresses that conviction is 'criminal' and parole is a matter of 'grace,' while commitment is 'civil' and outpatient release is a matter of 'discretion.' Little is gained by the use of such labels. Whether any particular rule of criminal practice should be applied in a narcotics addict commitment proceeding depends, rather, 'upon consideration of the relationship of the policy underlying the rule to the proceeding.' (People v. Moore (1968) 69 Cal.2d 674, 681, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800, 805, 446 P.2d 800, 805.)' (In re Marks (1969) 71 Cal.2d 31, 47--48, 77 Cal.Rptr. 1, 12, 453 P.2d 441, 452.)

The policy which underlies the whole of the commitment program is set forth in Welfare and Institutions Code section 3000: 'It is the intent of the Legislature that persons addicted to narcotics, or who by reason of repeated use of narcotics are in imminent danger of becoming addicted, shall be Treated for such condition and its underlying causes, and that such treatment shall be carried out For nonpunitive purposes not only for the protection of the addict, or person in imminent danger of addiction, against himself, but also for the prevention of contamination of others and the protection of the public. . . . It is the further intent of the Legislature that persons committed to this program who show signs of progress after an initial or subsequent periods of treatment and observation be given reasonable opportunities to demonstrate ability to abstain from the use of narcotics under close supervision in outpatient status. . . .' (Italics added.)

It is readily apparent that the Legislature intended to treat an outpatient as someone who is recovering from an illness. The purpose of the narcotic addict commitment program is not only to effect a temporary 'cure' of the patient's addiction, but to rehabilitate him. (In re Trummer (1964) 60 Cal.2d 658, 36 Cal.Rptr. 281, 388 P.2d 177; People v. Moore (1968) 69 Cal.2d 674, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800, 446 P.2d 800; People v. Jasso, supra, 2 Cal.App.3d 955, 82 Cal.Rptr. 229.) 'Experience with past programs of this nature has shown that a lack of followup supervision results in a high rate of relapse. (Citations.) The present 'parole' (outpatient) system is designed to overcome this defect by providing the necessary followup through counseling, testing for narcotic use, and immediate return for further treatment if a relapse should occur. As pointed out in In re De La O (1963) supra, 59 Cal.2d 128, 145, 28 Cal.Rptr. 489, 500, 378 P.2d 793, 804, 'These rules appear to be designed to meet the particular needs of an addict in the later stages of the process of rehabilitation. " (In re Trummer, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 661, 36 Cal.Rptr. 281, 283, 388 P.2d 177, 179.)

The rehabilitation, as appears from the legislative declaration of policy, is to be carried out for nonpunitive purposes. It could not be otherwise since 'punishment of a...

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