Henson v. Pulaski County Sheriff Dept.
| Decision Date | 30 September 1993 |
| Docket Number | 92-3970,Nos. 92-3442,s. 92-3442 |
| Citation | 6 F.3d 531 |
| Parties | , 126 Lab.Cas. P 33,030, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d 1057 Sam HENSON, Jr.; Stanley G. Batten; Kelvin W. Johnson; James Henson; Clarence R. Bond; Steven M. Mates; Yvonne Scott; Michael W. Martins; Thomas M. Bragg; Russell A. Honda; Hubert Lee Howell; Scott Turner; Lester St John Gauntt, Appellees, v. PULASKI COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT, Appellant. James Lee MORGAN; David L. Alvis; Eric A. Bailey; Melvin Barrow; Richard E. Davis, Appellees, v. PULASKI COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT, Appellant. Steve FELKNER; Clifton Hinnant, Jr.; Delvin R. Jackson; Theodore T. Lewis, III; Eugene C. Rouse, Jr.; Appellees, v. PULASKI COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT; Appellant. Alvin J. SINGLETON; Robert S. Smith; Wendell P. Smith; Len Wilson, Jr.; Anthony J. Cook; Appellees, v. PULASKI COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT; Appellant. Carolyn E. MORTON; Willie Joe Brown; Louis Crook, Jr.; Velma Lake; Emmett G. McCormack; Appellees, v. PULASKI COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT; Appellant. Arples MARTIN; Lee A. Berry, Jr.; Alza Froehlich; Tressie M. Gilbert; Farran Holdcraft; Appellees, v. PULASKI COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT; Appellant. Edgar HOUSEHOLDER; David Jackson; Joseph G. Motton, Jr.; Charlie Spease; James T. Pickens; Appellees, v. PULASKI COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT; Appellant. Henry S. WOOD; Shan Gachot; Mark A. Semelka; Robert D. Miller; Appellees, v. PULASKI COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT; Appellant. John R. HOUSER; Charlotte Y. Allmon; Michael C. Bliss; Joe Bradley; John D. Breckon; Phillip L. Canady; Phillip L. Clark; Angela Cook; Joel A. Cooper; Jerry Dawson; Harold Elliot; Oather Lee Fulmer; Jeff Glover; Robert G. Griffin; David Harrell; Scott G. Hasselbach; Daniel J. Horn; John L. Hudson; Kenneth L. Kincaide; Ralph McMoran; Thomas R. Manning; Larry J. Mickel; Darrell B. Pierce; Larry M. Rakoski; Roy T. Reynolds, Jr.; Laurie R. Robinson; Charles Dale Stroud; Phillip L. Tackett, Jr.; Eugene Tyree, Jr.; Mike J. Welsh; Clay Almond; Kim Almond; James Bonner; David Goldstein; Jack Romine; James C. Smith; Tina Blankenship Smi |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Larry Don Vaught, Little Rock, AR, argued for appellant in No. 92-3442. John R. Houser, argued for appellants in No. 92-3970.
Philip E. Kaplan, Little Rock, AR, argued for appellees in No. 92-3442. Timothy Davis Fox, North Little Rock, AR, argued for appellee in No. 92-3970.
Before WOLLMAN and LOKEN, Circuit Judges, and BOGUE, * Senior District Judge.
This consolidated appeal presents the issue of the standard that is to be applied in determining the compensability of meal periods under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA" or the "Act"), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 201 et seq. We must then apply that standard in reviewing the appropriateness of the grant of summary judgment in favor of the employees in No. 92-3442, Henson v. Pulaski County Sheriff Department, and the grant of summary judgment in favor of the city in No. 92-3970, Houser v. North Little Rock Police Department.
The FLSA, originally enacted in 1938, mandates that covered employees be paid at least a minimum wage and that they receive one and one-half times their regular pay for any overtime hours worked. The Act, however, does not define when an individual should be considered to be working for purposes of the Act. In a series of cases decided in the years following the enactment of the FLSA, the Supreme Court addressed the Act's definition of work. In Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad v. Muscoda Local No. 123, the Court defined work as "physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not) controlled or required by the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer and his business." 321 U.S. 590, 598, 64 S.Ct. 698, 703, 88 L.Ed. 949 (1944). In two companion cases involving private firefighters, the Supreme Court reiterated that lower courts should adopt a practical approach based on the realities of each case in determining whether employees were spending certain periods of time predominantly for the benefit of the employer or for their own benefit. Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 133, 65 S.Ct. 165, 168, 89 L.Ed. 118 (1944); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 136-37, 65 S.Ct. 161, 163, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944). In Armour and Skidmore, the Court concluded that time spent waiting for an event to occur, such as a fire, could constitute work if the employer had hired the employees for that function. Armour, 323 U.S. at 133-34, 65 S.Ct. at 168-69; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 136-37, 65 S.Ct. at 163.
Despite the Supreme Court's longstanding definition of work, the employees argue that this court should adopt a regulation issued in 1961 by the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor (the "Wage and Hour Division"). That regulation, now codified at 29 C.F.R. Sec. 785.19(a) () and 29 C.F.R. Sec. 553.223(b) (certain public employers), purports to apply specifically to meal periods. It states that bona fide meal periods are not worktime under the Act, but in order to qualify as a meal period an employee must be "completely relieved from duty for the purposes of eating regular meals." 29 C.F.R. Sec. 785.19(a); see also 29 C.F.R. Sec. 553.223(b) (). In essence, this standard means that employees who remain subject to call during their meal breaks must always be compensated for that time, because they continue to perform an "inactive" duty and are not completely relieved of duty. Indeed, that is how the magistrate judge applied the standard in granting summary judgment to the employees in the Henson case.
Moreover, the employees contend that we adopted the completely-relieved-of-duty standard in a 1975 case. Mumbower v. Callicott, 526 F.2d 1183, 1188 (8th Cir.1975). In Mumbower a switchboard operator sought to receive overtime and back pay for time spent performing various office tasks before and after her regularly scheduled switchboard hours and for her half-hour lunch periods, which she spent at the switchboard answering calls. We held that the duties performed before and after the scheduled hours and during the lunch period constituted work because the employer tacitly approved of Mumbower performing them and because they were for the employer's benefit. Id. In discussing the lunch periods, we made reference to the Wage and Hour Division's regulation. Id.
We conclude that the predominantly-for-the-benefit-of-the-employer standard provides the appropriate test for determining the compensability of meal periods under the FLSA. Established in the earliest Supreme Court cases interpreting the FLSA, this standard comports with the Supreme Court's admonition to use a practical, realistic approach under the unique circumstances of each case when deciding whether certain activities constitute compensable work. See, e.g.,Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140, 65 S.Ct. at 164 (); Armour, 323 U.S. at 133, 65 S.Ct. at 168 (). Because this standard is flexible, it allows courts to consider different factors depending on the nature of the business involved, whether the dispute involves factory workers or firefighters. Neither the FLSA nor the courts that apply it exist in a vacuum. We find it unrealistic to hold that an employer must compensate employees for all meal periods in which the employee is relieved of all duties except simply remaining on-call to respond to emergencies, which the completely-relieved-from-duty standard would seem to require. Finally, we have applied the predominantly-for-the-benefit-of-the-employer standard either expressly or implicitly in various situations to determine whether certain activities constitute work under the Act. See, e.g.,May v. Arkansas Forestry Comm'n, 993 F.2d 632, 639 (8th Cir.1993) (); Glenn L. Martin Neb. Co. v. Culkin, 197 F.2d 981, 985 (8th Cir.) (affirming district court's finding that meal periods of firemen and guards was compensable because they remained engaged in the "principal activity of their regular work"), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 866, 73 S.Ct. 108, 97 L.Ed. 671 (1952).
The predominantly-for-the-benefit-of-the-employer standard has also been adopted by a majority of the courts of appeals that have addressed the scope of "work" under the FLSA, whether in the context of meal periods or after hours on-call time. See, e.g.,Lamon v. City of Shawnee, Kan., 972 F.2d 1145, 1155 (10th Cir.1992) (), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1414, 122 L.Ed.2d 785 (1993); Birdwell v. City of Gadsden, Ala., 970 F.2d 802, 808 (11th Cir.1992); Bright v. Houston N.W. Med. Ctr. Survivor, Inc., 934 F.2d 671, 677 (5th Cir.1991) (), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 882, 116 L.Ed.2d 786 (1992); Hill v. United States, 751 F.2d 810, 814 (6th Cir.1984) (...
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...in Hartsell v. Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. of Tex. , 207 F.3d 269, 274 (5th Cir. 2000). Accord, Henson v. Pulaski County Sheriff Dep’t , 6 F.3d 531 (8th Cir. 1993) (adopting a “primarily for the benefit of the employer and his business” test). The DOL regulations define the phrase “bona fide me......
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Wages, Hours, and Overtime
...in Hartsell v. Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. of Tex. , 207 F.3d 269, 274 (5th Cir. 2000). Accord, Henson v. Pulaski County Sheriff Dep’t , 6 F.3d 531 (8th Cir. 1993) (adopting a “primarily for the benefit of the employer and his business” test). The DOL regulations define the phrase “bona fide me......
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Wages, hours, and overtime
...in Hartsell v. Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. of Tex. , 207 F.3d 269, 274 (5th Cir. 2000). Accord, Henson v. Pulaski County Sheriff Dep’t , 6 F.3d 531 (8th Cir. 1993) (adopting a “primarily for the benefit of the employer and his business” test). The DOL regulations define the phrase “bona fide me......
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Wages, Hours, and Overtime
...followed in Hartsell v. Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. of Tex., 207 F.3d 269, 274 (5th Cir. 2000). Accord, Henson v. Pulaski County Sheriff Dep’t, 6 F.3d 531 (8th Cir. (adopting a “primarily for the benefit of the employer and his business” test). The DOL regulations define the phrase “bona fide m......