Ex parte Henderson

• Citation: 6 Fla. 279
• Parties: EX PARTE HENRY HENDERSON
• Decision Date: 01 February 1855
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida

6 Fla. 279

EX PARTE HENRY HENDERSON

Supreme Court of Florida

February 1, 1855

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This is an application for a mandamus to the Judge of the Circuit Court of the Eastern Circuit, for Putnam county, to hear and adjudicate an appeal taken from a Justice's Court to the Circuit Court.

To the rule to show cause why a mandamus should not issue, Hon. W. A. Forward, Judge of the Eastern Circuit made the following answer:

Ex Parte Henry Henderson, on motion for Rule to show cause why Mandamus should not issue.

In obedience to rule issued in this cause, the Judge of the Circuit Court most respectfully shows cause as follows, to wit:

In the first act organizing the "Territory of Florida," Congress enacted, "That the Judicial Power shall be vested in two Superior Courts, and in such Inferior Courts and Justices of the Peace, as the Legislative Council of the Territory may from time to time establish."

The Legislative Council established County Courts and Courts of Justices of the Peace, with appeal from Justice's Courts to the County Courts.

It was not, however, until the third amendment was made by Congress, to wit: on the 26th March, 1824, that it was provided the Superior Courts "SHALL HAVE AND EXERCISE APPELLATE JURISDICTION OVER THE INFERIOR COURTS OF SAID TERRITORY."

This organic act of Congress is to be regarded as the CONSTITUTION of the Territory, containing grants of power. See Ponder Executor vs. Graham, 4 Florida R., 23.

After this power was conferred upon the Superior Courts the Territorial Legislature passed the act under which it is now claimed, appeals lie to the Circuit Courts of this State, and is the act in question, and which act was in force at the time the State Constitution went into effect in 1845.

When passed it was a constitutional and binding law, and proper for the action of the Territorial Legislature.

The question is whether on the organization under our State Constitution, it is in conflict with that Constitution.

Upon our passing from a Territory to a State, our State Constitution differed from the powers conferred by acts of Congress in this, that it was a "restriction of power primarily possessed." See Ponder vs. Graham.

We framed our Constitution immediately in succession of Arkansas, and from the Constitution of that State we seem to have drawn largely. Yet it will be seen that their Constitution expressly provides, that "the Circuit Courts shall exercise a superintending control over the County Courts and over Justices of the peace." See collection of American Constitutions. Upon examining the State Constitutions, it will be found that in every State where Circuit Courts have appellate jurisdiction it is expressly conferred.

By the Constitution of the State of Florida, the "judicial power" of this State is vested in a Supreme Court, Courts of Chancery, Circuit Courts and Justices of the Peace, and the General Assembly may vest criminal jurisdiction, (not capital,) in Corporation Courts.

The second section of the fifth article says: "The Supreme Court, except in cases otherwise directed in this Constitution, shall have appellate jurisdiction only, which shall be coextensive with the State, under such restrictions and regulations not repugnant to this Constitution, as may from time to time be prescribed by law, provided, that the said Court shall always have power to issue writs of injunction, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and such other remedial and original writs as may be necessary to give it a general superintendence and control of all other Courts.

The Supreme Court of Florida, in ex parte White, 4 vol., page 165, in giving construction to the above second section, held that the jurisdiction of that Court was two-fold; first, appellate jurisdiction; proper, and secondly, a general superintendence and control of all other courts; and this by means of all appropriate, original and remedial writs known to the common law.

Again, they say, the "exception" in the first clause of the section points to the power contained in the proviso, and this power the court would not have had from the mere grant of "appellate jurisdiction only."

And again they say: "It places this court, with regard to all other courts of this State in the same position, in this respect which the court of King's Bench in England occupies, in relation to the Inferior Courts of that kingdom.--It gives a superintending authority and control, the power to overlook and to govern, check and restrain all other courts."

It would seem then, that the Supreme Court have all the jurisdiction necessary.

Let us see what has been vested in this respect in the Circuit Courts.

The sixth section provides, that "the Circuit Courts shall have original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, within this State not otherwise excepted in this Constitution.

Here then is a "restriction of power primarily possessed," so far as appellate jurisdiction is concerned, and which was conferred on the Superior Court.

No appellate jurisdiction in the Circuit Courts can be found in the said sixth section of the Constitution. And of the original jurisdiction thereof, there does not seem a doubt but that remedial and original writs necessary for a general superintendence and control of all other courts, (excepting Courts of Ordinary in the ninth section,) are "excepted" in the second section and given to the Supreme Court.

And this appears to have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution, for they have not limited the Circuit Courts in original jurisdiction to any amount or proper subject.

Persons are not compelled to sue in Justice's Courts, but if from convenience or expedition in collection; they do resort to that tribunal, then appeal goes to the Supreme Court, as from the Circuit Court to the Supreme Court.

It is contended that there is no express prohibition against the vesting appellate jurisdiction in Circuit Courts. If this is a good argument, then it can be invested in Probate Courts or any courts created for that purpose. The answer to such a proposition presents itself, by enquiring from whence the Circuit Court derives its power? It does not derive it from the Legislature. It can only exercise such powers as the Constitution itself confers, or authorizes the Legislature to grant. It can derive no power elsewhere.

In the language of the Supreme Court of Ohio, in Kent, et al. vs. Mahaffy, et al., 2 Ohio R., 498, which is a case arising under an act of the Legislature of that State, attempting to confer original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court, by authorizing it to grant an injunction in a case pending in another court, and which by parity of reasoning, is like the case now under consideration, that court says: "It follows that to negative the existence of a power, it is not necessary to show that it is forbidden by the Constitution. It is sufficient that that instrument neither directly nor indirectly confers it. Now as before said, the only original jurisdiction granted to us by the Constitution, is that above mentioned, and the only jurisdiction that the Legislature is authorized to confer upon us as a court, is appellate jurisdiction. See Constitution of Ohio, adopted in 1851, and Kent, et al., vs. Mahaffy, et al., above cited.

The tenth clause of the fifth article of the Constitution is in these words:--

"A competent number of Justices of the Peace shall be from time to time, appointed or elected in and for each county, in such mode and for such term of office as the General Assembly may direct and shall possess such jurisdiction as shall be prescribed by law. And in cases tried before Justices of the Peace, the right of appeal shall be secured under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by law."

Now then it will be seen that no tribunal is specified to which this appeal is "secured." The natural inference to a legal mind is that it is to be to the court having appellate jurisdiction.

But it is contended that the tribunal is left open as one of the "regulations" to be prescribed by law.

It may be that fixing a tribunal which shall have the jurisdiction of such cases in the face of the provisions of the second section, which gives to the Supreme Court, "a general superintendence and control of all other courts," is one of the "regulations" spoken of, but we in our humble judgment cannot so view it.

That the right of appeal is "secured" by the Constitution there is no doubt, but we think it is to the Supreme Court, which has all the appellate jurisdiction, and not to the Circuit Court, which has only original jurisdiction.

If appellate jurisdiction can be conferred on the Circuit Court from one tribunal it can be from all, and there is no meaning in the Constitution where it authorizes the Supreme Court to issue such remedial and original writs as may be necessary to give it a general superintendence and control of all other Courts.

The framers of the constitution intended that appellate courts and courts of original jurisdiction should be separate and distinct, and for that purpose provided for the creating of a separate Supreme Court.

Under the Territorial system "which has been acted upon as we think illegally, since the State organization, a man with a $ 50 debt, may sue in the Justices Court, have a jury trial there, and if disatisfied appeal to the Circuit Court, have another jury trial, and then if disatisfied appeal to the Supreme Court, while an individual with a $ 5000 debt, cannot have but one jury trial.

If the constitution intended such a distinction, it is without a parallel in this republic

Then in our opinion, the Supreme Court...