Chandler v. McKinney

• Decision Date: 11 January 1859
• Citation: 6 Mich. 217
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: Samuel Chandler and others v. Vandalia P. M. McKinney

6 Mich. 217

Samuel Chandler and others v. Vandalia P. M. McKinney

Supreme Court of Michigan

January 11, 1859

Submitted November 26, 1858

Error to Hillsdale Circuit.

The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court.

Judgment affirmed.

G. A Knickerbocker and T. M. Cooley, for plaintiffs in error:

Jurisdiction of the person of the infant defendant was acquired, in the foreclosure suit, by service of process; and, however irregular may have been the subsequent proceedings, the decree is binding on the infant until reversed, and can not be attacked collaterally: Huson v. Wallace, 1 Rich Eq., 6; Barber v. Graves, 18 Vt. 292; Dewitt v Post, 11 Johns. 460. A failure to appoint a guardian ad litem does not affect the proceedings when attacked collaterally: Austin v. The Charlestown Female Seminary, 8 Metc. 202; Porter's Heirs v. Robinson, 3 A. K. Marsh., 253; Doe v. Bradley, 6 Sm. & Mar., 485; White v. Albertson, 3 Dev. Law, 241; Marshall v. Fisher, 1 Jones Law, 116. But when a guardian is once appointed, and has accepted the appointment, the court does not further look after the interest of the infant--her recourse being against the guardian for injuries occasioned by his neglect or mismanagement: Young v. Whittaker, 1 Marsh. 398, 400; Sheldon v. Newton, 3 O. S. R., 505, 507; Newport v. Mildmay, Cro. Char., 307; Note 2 to Hesketh v. Lee, 2 Atk. 96.

P. Morey and S. T. Douglass, for defendant in error:

1. The plaintiff being an infant feme covert, the mortgage was void: Rogers v. Cruger, 7 Johns. 557; Evelyn v. Evelyn, 2 P. Wms., 671; Sandford v. McLean, 3 Paige 117; Hearl v. Greenbank, 1 Ves. Sr., 298; Halsey v. Halsey, 9 Ves. 472; Johnson v. Bayfield, 1 Ves. 314; Capes v. Hutton, 2 Russ. 357; Stamper v. Barker, 5 Madd. 100.

2. The decree of foreclosure was void for the reason that the court did not obtain jurisdiction of the infant feme covert, and even if it did, no valid decree could be made against her: Harris v. Youman, 1 Hoff. Ch. R., 178; Thayer v. Lane, Walk. Ch., 202; Eyre v. Countess of Shaftsbury, 2 P. Wms., 102; Stephenson v. Stephenson, 6 Paige 353; Bulkley v. Van Wyck, 5 Paige 536; James v. James, 4 Paige 115; Booth v. Rich, 1 Vern. 275; Price v. Carver, 3 Myl. & Cr., 162.

OPINION

Campbell J.:

Vandalia McKinney, a married woman, brought ejectment in the court below, to recover possession of certain premises inherited by her.

The defendants set up title under a foreclosure in chancery of a mortgage made by her during her coverture, and while yet an infant. They showed proceedings in chancery, wherein she and her husband were defendants, from which it appears that a bill was filed by the mortgagees, setting up that this mortgage was made to secure a debt of the husband, and that the property belonged to the wife. A guardian ad litem was appointed for her, and his default, for want of answer, was taken, and the court refused, on a subsequent motion, to set it aside. A final decree was made June 29th, 1852, for a sale. Plaintiff came of age August 15th, 1852. The property was sold under the decree to some of the defendants in the chancery suit, and the present defendants (plaintiffs in error) claim through that purchase.

The court below held that the proceedings in chancery were entirely inoperative to divest the title of the plaintiff below, and this decision is alleged as error.

We regret that the cause was submitted chiefly on the briefs, without a full oral argument, as the questions presented are important, and in some respects novel. We have, therefore, been compelled to examine them for ourselves, without the aid of a criticism, by counsel, of the cases bearing upon the subject. The proceedings in the chancery suit are of an extraordinary character. The bill showing that the mortgage was made for the debt of another, the validity of such an act by an infant was so obvious that a guardian ad litem should have had no difficulty in suggesting the defect to the court But his failure to do so should not have prejudiced the infant; for the practice has always been perfectly well settled that a court of chancery can not grant a decree even upon his admissions. As against an infant, the case must always be made out by proof: Thayer v. Lane, Walk. Ch., 200. The whole proceeding is suggestive of the strongest suspicion of improper dealing; for we can not believe that the able judge who granted the decree could have had the actual state of the case presented to him. The decree can not be sustained upon any principle whatever. If appealed from, it must necessarily have been reversed. The question before us is, however, whether it can be attacked as invalid. And this is a question of the gravest consequence, involving, on the one side, the sanctity of the decrees of courts, and on the other, the question whether the invalid contracts of infants can, by proceedings during infancy, be placed beyond their power of disaffirmance.

The rule has always prevailed in England and in this country, of giving infants a day in court after their majority. But where a mortgage is in question, and the court, instead of a strict foreclosure, decrees a sale, it has been held in many cases that the infant is bound by such sale. The Court of Chancery of New York, in Mills v. Dennis, 3 Johns Ch., 367, held this doctrine. It was there decided in connection with the other doctrine referred to, that no decree could be made against an infant without full proof of the case, and that a sale was permitted because the court might deem a sale better for the infant than a strict foreclosure. By reference to the cases there cited, and others since decided, it will be found that the course was adopted of ordering sales, chiefly to prevent sacrifices of the infant's property where the land was worth more than the mortgage; and upon the principle that the court of chancery had power to convert the estate of infants from realty to personalty, under its general guardianship over them. This authority does not exist now in New York, and the court can not order a sale of infant's lands for any purpose not authorized by statute: Rogers v. Dill, 6 Hill 415. The statutes of New York and of Michigan now expressly authorize sales in mortgage cases; and it is to the statutes we must look for the authority, and for the effect of such sales. But under the English decisions no case can be found where an attempt was made to charge or affect an infant's estate by any mortgage or lien created by the infant; and the whole reasoning of the cases is opposed to the idea that such a thing would have been sanctioned for a moment. There is good sense in the rule as they apply it; for if the property is liable, a sale is the only method of realizing its full value, and a defeasible sale would be almost sure to entail a great sacrifice. ...