Carrier v. State

• Citation: 60 A.3d 1241,2012 ME 142
• Decision Date: 28 December 2012
• Docket Number: Docket No. Som–12–111.
• Parties: Bryan CARRIER v. SECRETARY OF STATE.
• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)

60 A.3d 1241

2012 ME 142

Bryan CARRIER

v.SECRETARY OF STATE.

Docket No. Som–12–111.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: Nov. 8, 2012.

Decided: Dec. 28, 2012.

John Alsop, Esq. (orally), Alsop & Mohlar, Skowhegan, for appellant Bryan Carrier.

William J. Schneider, Attorney General, and Donald W. Macomber (orally), Asst. Atty. Gen., Augusta, for appellee State of Maine.

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, and GORMAN, JJ.

SILVER, J.

[¶ 1] Bryan Carrier appeals from a judgment entered in the Superior Court (Somerset County, Nivison, J.) denying Carrier's petition for judicial review, pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C, of the decision of a hearing officer of the Secretary of State's Bureau of Motor Vehicles denying Carrier's petition for reinstatement of his driver's license pursuant to 29–A M.R.S. § 2454(5) (2012). We affirm the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] In 1996, at age nineteen, Bryan Carrier drove while intoxicated and caused the deaths of three people when he collided with another car. In addition, one of Carrier's passengers sustained serious brain injury. Carrier and a passenger in the other vehicle were also injured. Carrierpled guilty to three counts of vehicular manslaughter, 17–A M.R.S.A § 203 (Supp.1996),¹ and three counts of aggravated operating under the influence, 29–A M.R.S.A § 2411(6) (1996).² On June 13, 1997, Carrier was sentenced on the manslaughter counts to the Department of Corrections for a term of ten years, all but two years suspended, with six years of probation and 2000 hours of community service. On the OUI counts, Carrier was sentenced to the Department of Corrections for a term of two years, concurrent with his sentence on the manslaughter counts, and ordered to pay $6000 in fines.

[¶ 3] The judgment and commitment also provided that “pursuant to applicable statutes,” Carrier's license “is suspended in accordance with [the] notice of suspension incorporated herein.” The incorporated notice of suspension notified Carrier that his license was suspended for life on the manslaughter counts. The trial court also noted the lifetime suspension in its written sentencing opinion. The abstract of the trial court record sent to the Secretary of State indicates that, as part of his sentence on the manslaughter counts, Carrier's “license is suspended for life.” The Secretary of State later notified Carrier that his license was “permanently revoked” by the Secretary of State “under Title 29–A Section 2452(2)” ³ based on his manslaughter convictions.

[¶ 4] In 2009, Carrier petitioned the Secretary of State for reinstatement of his license pursuant to section 2454(5). The hearing officer ⁴ denied Carrier's petition, but gave him the right to file a new petition in two years. On Carrier's petition for judicial review, pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C, the Superior Court (Somerset County, Nivison, J.) concluded that the relevant standard was whether Carrier presented a threat to public safety and remanded the matter to the hearing officer because it was unclear whether her decision was based on public safety or other grounds. On remand, the hearing officer issued amended findings and conclusions, again denying the petition. Carrier again filed a petition for judicial review, which the Superior Court denied, concluding that the hearing officer's findings reflected reasonable public safety concerns.

[¶ 5] In 2011, Carrier again petitioned for reinstatement of his license. At the outset of the hearing on the new petition, the hearing officer stated that notices had been sent to family members of the victims of the collision, that “[t]he statute does give the family victims the right to be heard in this matter,” and that “the family will be heard.” At several points throughout the hearing, Carrier objected to the testimony of the victims' family members, arguing that, as Justice Nivison had determined, the only issue relevant to his petition was public safety. At the close of the hearing, the hearing officer admitted in evidence Justice Nivison's orders. Carrier did not raise any constitutional issues at the hearing, or in his later written submission to the hearing officer.

[¶ 6] Carrier and several members of his family testified in support of his petition. In general, their testimony focused on Carrier's responsibility and attention to safety, particularly in his role as manager of his family's chipping plant. Several witnesses also characterized Carrier as a “nervous” or “defensive” passenger who points out potential hazards to the driver. Carrier and his family also testified to Carrier's successful completion of probation and community service, positive substance abuse evaluation, and participation in therapy, and that Carrier had given up alcohol entirely since the time of his first petition. Carrier submitted several exhibits, including a substance abuse evaluation, letters from his therapist and probation officer, and the 1997 sentencing opinion.

[¶ 7] Carrier's witnesses testified to his need for a license so that he would not have to rely on others to travel to Canada to visit his child from a previous relationship. Carrier's witnesses also explained that he and his wife hoped to move off of the property where the family chipping plant exists, which would require Carrier's wife to drive him to and from work if his license were not reinstated. Carrier also noted his inability to perform work-related tasks that require a vehicle.

[¶ 8] Family members of the victims testified in opposition to Carrier's petition, and letters opposing the petition from a victim's family member, a victim injured in the accident, and the District Attorney were admitted in evidence. The individuals testifying generally emphasized the impact of Carrier's conduct on their respective families, their wish to punish or take something away from Carrier, and their belief that the trial judge had said at sentencing that Carrier's license would be suspended for life. To the extent the family members referred to public safety, they did so based on the facts underlying Carrier's convictions rather than on current information. The letters admitted in evidence largely echoed the live testimony.

[¶ 9] The hearing officer issued a written decision denying Carrier's petition. The hearing officer found that there was “no evidence that ... Carrier would pose a risk to the public if his operating privileges were restored,” and that Carrier “[c]ertainly ... has a need for his driver's license.” Nevertheless, the hearing officer concluded:

I must find that the significance of the families' strong opposition to the Secretary of State issuing a driver's license to Bryan Carrier outweighs Mr. Carrier's need for a license. Therefore, despite the fact that the petitioner's driving may not pose a risk to public safety, his need to drive is less important than honoring the sentence communicated to the family by [the trial judge], respectful of the fact that Bryan Carrier's inability to operate a motor vehicle may bring these families some measure of comfort for their senseless and permanent loss of loved ones.

The hearing officer also concluded that, even if she were inclined to grant the petition, she had “no authority to overturn a decision taken by a Justice of the Superior Court,” and was “not allowed to ignore or modify a Superior Court's Criminal Sentence.”

[¶ 10] Carrier filed a petition for judicial review of the hearing officer's decision in the Superior Court pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C. The Superior Court denied the petition, concluding that, contrary to its decisions concerning Carrier's first reinstatement petition, license revocation pursuant to 29–A M.R.S. § 2454(2) (2012) is not exclusively remedial in nature. In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that section 2454(5) explicitly requires consideration of the testimony of the victims' families, and drew a distinction between suspension and revocation of a license. Carrier timely appealed.

II. DISCUSSION

[¶ 11] Carrier argues that the hearing officer, in denying his petition for reinstatement of his license based on the opposition of the victims' families, misinterpreted the statute and exceeded her statutory authority. Carrier argues that administrative license suspensions are remedial, rather than punitive in character, and that there is no substantive distinction between license suspensions and revocations. The Secretary of State argues that the plain language of the statute, by requiring the hearing officer to consider the testimony of the victims' families, mandates consideration of factors other than public safety. The Secretary of State further argues that because an individual has no constitutional or statutory right to a driver's license, the hearing officer's decision on a petition to reinstate a revoked license is discretionary, and the absence of public safety concerns does not require reinstatement.

A. Standard of Review

[¶ 12] “Because the Superior Court acted as an intermediate appellate court, we directly review the Secretary of State's decision.” McGee v. Sec'y of State, 2006 ME 50, ¶ 5, 896 A.2d 933. We review issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation de novo. Id. We first look to the plain meaning of the statute, interpreting its language “to avoid absurd, illogical or inconsistent results,” Estate of Joyce v. Commercial Welding Co., 2012 ME 62, ¶ 12, 55 A.3d 411 (quotation marks omitted), and attempting to give all of its words meaning, Cobb v. Bd. of Counseling Prof'ls Licensure, 2006 ME 48, ¶ 11, 896 A.2d 271. When a statute is unambiguous, we interpret the statute directly, without applying the rule of statutory construction that “prefers interpretations ... that do not raise constitutional problems,” McGee, 2006 ME 50, ¶ 18, 896 A.2d 933, and without examining legislative history, Ashe v. Enterprise Rent–A–Car, 2003 ME 147, ¶ 7, 838 A.2d 1157, or the agency's interpretation, Cobb, 2006 ME 48, ¶ 13, 896 A.2d 271....