Patton v. La Bree

Citation35 Cal.Rptr. 622,387 P.2d 398,60 Cal.2d 606
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (California)
Decision Date13 December 1963
Parties, 387 P.2d 398 Bernice PATTON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Clinton LA BREE et al., Defendants and Respondents. L. A. 27433.

Coleman & Silverstein, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and appellant.

Smith & Wilson, Andrew V. Smith and A. Charles Wilson, Beverly Hills, for defendants and respondents.

GIBSON, Chief Justice.

The complaint in this action alleges that plaintiff took her automobile to defendant Friendly Rambler, Inc., to have it serviced and that she rode in it as a 'passenger' while it was being serviced and was being driven by defendant La Bree, an employee of Friendly Rambler, Inc. 1 It is further alleged that as a proximate result of defendants' negligence in operating the automobile it collided with another car and plaintiff was injured. The action was dismissed following the sustaining of a general demurrer to the complaint, and plaintiff has appealed.

Section 17158 of the Vehicle Code provides: 'No person riding in or occupying a vehicle owned by him and driven by another person with his permission and no person who as a guest accepts a ride in any vehicle upon a highway without giving compensation for such ride, nor any other person, has any right of action for civil damages against the driver of the vehicle or against any other person legally liable for the conduct of the driver on account of personal injury to or the death of the owner or guest during the ride, unless the plaintiff in any such action establishes that the injury or death proximately resulted from the intoxication or willful misconduct of the driver.'

The words of the section that we have italicized were added by amendment in 1961. Prior to the amendment it had been held that under ordinary circumstances an owner riding in his own car, while it was being driven by another, was not a 'guest' and did not come within the limitations on recovery prescribed by the section. (Ahlgren v. Ahlgren (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 216, 217, 8 Cal.Rptr. 218 et seq.; Ahlgren v. Ahlgren (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 723, 725, 313 P.2d 88.) As amended, the section includes within its scope an owneroccupant of a vehicle driven by another with his permission. Plaintiff contends that the word 'owner' should be construed so as to include only an owner who has not given compensation for the ride and that she gave compensation for the trip since it was primarily for a business purpose from which defendants were to derive a substantial economic benefit. We do not agree with plaintiff's construction of the amendment. The language does not show an intention to except an owner who gave compensation for the ride. As pointed out in the Legislative Counsel's Digest of the measure, Assembly Bill No. 2704, 1961 Regular Session, the amendment 'Includes within that group of persons who must establish intoxication or willful misconduct of the driver any person riding in or occupying a vehicle owned by him and driven by another person with his permission.' It follows that the section is applicable here.

Plaintiff contends that the section as so construed is unconstitutional in that it makes an arbitrary distinction between owners giving compensation for a ride and other persons, not owners, who give such compensation. There is, of course, a presumption in favor of constitutionality, and the invalidity of a legislative act must be clear before it can be declared unconstitutional. (Los Angeles Met. Transit Authority v. Public Util. Com., 59 A.C. 891, 895, 31 Cal.Rptr. 463, 382 P.2d 583; Lundberg v. County of Alameda, 46 Cal.2d 644, 652, 298 P.2d 1.) Wide discretion is vested in the Legislature in making a classification, and its decision as to what is a sufficient distinction to warrant the classification will be upheld by the courts unless it is 'palpably arbitrary and beyond rational doubt erroneous' and no set of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it. (Bilyeu v. State Employees' Retirement System, 58 Cal.2d 618, 623, 25 Cal.Rptr. 562, 375 P.2d 442; Johnson v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.2d 693, 699, 329 P.2d 5.)

It cannot be said that the classification made by the Legislature in the 1961 amendment to section 17158 is arbitrary or that no set of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it. The relationship between a driver and the owner of the car who is a passenger is obviously different from that existing between a driver and a passenger who is not an owner. In making the distinction between owner-passengers and nonowner-passengers, the Legislature may have taken into consideration the fact that an owner generally has the right to direct and control the driver, but a nonowner ordinarily does not have that right.

The judgment is affirmed.

TRAYNOR, SCHAUER, McCOMB, TOBRINER and PEEK, JJ., concur.

PETERS, Justice.

I dissent.

The majority opinion correctly summarizes the allegations of the complaint. It there appears that plaintiff was not only the owner of the car, but was engaged in a business enterprise with the driver. The majority opinion holds that the classification contained in the 1961 amendment to section 17158 of the Vehicle Code between nonowner business occupants or passengers and owner business occupants or passengers has a reasonable basis and, therefore, is constitutional. With that conclusion I disagree. As will be shown, the classification contained in that amendment, as applied to plaintiff, is arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious, and is, therefore, unconstitutional.

As the majority opinion admits, prior to the 1961 amendment to the section, the complaint clearly would have stated a cause of action. Under the section as it read prior to the amendment, it had been held that an owner riding in his car as an occupant, except under unusual circumstances not here present, was not a guest in his car, but was a passenger, and therefore could recover for injuries resulting from the ordinary negligence of the driver. (Ray v. Hanisch, 147 Cal.App.2d 742, 306 P.2d 30; Ahlgren v. Ahlgren, 152 Cal.App.2d 723, 313 P.2d 88, and the same case on another appeal, 185 Cal.App.2d 216, 8 Cal.Rtpr. 218. These cases were in accord with the weight of authority elsewhere. Gage v. Chapin Motors, 115 Conn. 546, 162 A. 17; Thomas v. hughes, 177 Kan. 347, 279 P.2d 286; Gledhill v. Connecticut Co., 121 Conn. 102, 183 A. 379; Naphtali v. Lafazan, 7 Misc.2d 1057, 165 N.Y.S.2d 395; Lorch v. Eglin, 369 Pa. 314, 85 A.2d 841; see Note 65 A.L.R.2d 312.) In this case the plaintiff was not only an owner, but was engaged in a common business enterprise with the garage mechanic, and was therefore a business guest or passenger. Independent of the owner relationship, that is, had the plaintiff been a nonowner, as such she could recover for injuries resulting from the oridnary negligence of the driver, because plaintiff would then have been an ordinary business passenger engaged in a common business purpose with the driver. (McCann v. Hoffman, 9 Cal.2d 279, 70 P.2d 909; Walker v. Adamson, 9 Cal.2d 287, 70 P.2d 914; Whitechat v. Guyette, 19 Cal.2d 428, 122 P.2d 47.)

The 1961 amendment added that all owners, regardless of whether or not they give compensation for the ride and regardless of whether or not they are engaged in a common business enterprise with the driver, are prohibited from recovering for injuries resulting from the ordinary negligence of the driver. Nonowners giving compensation for their ride may still recover for ordinary negligence of the driver. The section now precludes from recovery for such negligence not only riders who furnish no compensation, but as stated in the 1961 amendment, any 'person riding in or occupying a vehicle owned by him and driven by another person with his permission,' whether he gives compensation or not. Thus, under the statute, as amended, two classes of persons are prohibited from recovering for ordinary negligence of the driver guests, who accept a ride without the giving of compensation, and all owners riding in a car owned by them, and being driven by someone with their permission, whether giving compensation or not. The statute simply says that an owner occupant whatever his status that of guest or passenger, whether he gives compensation for the ride or not cannot recover for the ordinary negligence of the driver. Obviously, the 1961 amendment was aimed at every owner occupant who is a passenger in his own car, whether he gives compensation or not. This the majority opinion concedes. Plaintiff is an owner who gave compensation for her ride.

Prior to the passage of the guest law any rider, guest or passenger, under the common law, could recover for injuries caused by the ordinary negligence of the driver. (Callet v. Alioto, 210 Cal. 65, 290 P. 438.) Then the guest law classified between guests and passengers. This classification was upheld because there is a reasonable distinction between the two classes, that is, one class gives compensation for the ride, the other does not. (Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 50 S.Ct. 57, 74 L.Ed. 221; see Note 111 A.L.R. 1011.) The Legislature obviously felt that a gratuitous guest, who has accepted the driver's hospitality, should not recover for the ordinary negligence of his host. The Legislature evidently believed that there was a real danger of guests making fraudulent claims against their hosts, perhaps with the connivance of the host, so as to mulct the driver's insurance company. (Weber v. Pinyan, 9 Cal.2d 226, 70 P.2d 183, 112 A.L.R. 407; Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal.2d 421, 289 P.2d 218.) But it was not felt that such a danger existed as to those who were passengers those who in one form or another gave compensation for the ride. They were permitted to recover for ordinary negligence.

The 1961 statute purports to distinguish between those passengers who are owner riders, whether they give compensation or not, and those who are nonowners. No possible legal reason exists for such a...

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